During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, Shandong practiced the unified leadership of military and government, and went through a difficult process.
First of all, the Party Central Committee made Chen Guang the acting commander of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, but Chen Guang did not succeed in achieving the unified leadership of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army and the Shandong Column. Subsequently, it was decided to set up a Shandong sub-bureau and send Zhu Rui and Xu Xiangqian to Shandong to take charge of unifying the party, government, and army in Shandong.
However, the effect is not obvious, the purpose is not achieved, and there are almost strategic mistakes.
Among them, the Shandong sub-bureau ordered the 115th Division to go north in 1940, which is an example.
From the spring of 1940, japan stepped up its efforts to induce Chiang Kai-shek to surrender and stir up conflict between the Kuomintang and the Communists, so Chiang Kai-shek instigated a second anti-communist upsurge, and on October 19, he ordered the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, which had persisted in the War of Resistance in the north and south of the Yangtze River, to march north of the Yellow River within a month.
The situation of unity in the war of resistance has become grim.
Under such circumstances, it is even more urgent to unify Shandong's military and political leadership. In order to implement the unified military command of Shandong, the Shandong sub-bureau ordered Luo Ronghuan to lead the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army and the main force to the north, move to the Yimeng District, and meet the Shandong sub-bureau.
As a result, Luo Ronghuan and Chen Guang led the main force to move to the Qingtuo Temple, where the Shandong branch was stationed. However, Luo Ronghuan left the 2nd Brigade behind and placed it in Lunan, so that they could continue to persist in the struggle against the enemy.
Luo Ronghuan did this, although he only left a brigade, but it was a very clever strategic approach.
Why?
Because the main force of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army moved north with the division headquarters, the 2nd Brigade was in Lunan, although it was weakened compared to the main force of the division in Lunan, but it continued to control Lunan.
Why control Lunan?
In this regard, Luo Ronghuan recalled this incident in the 60s:
"(In 1940) after we entered the Tan (Cheng) Ma (Tou) area, we asked the Shandong branch to go south. The sub-bureau was delayed, fearing losses, and demanded that the 115th Division move north and move closer to the sub-bureau and the Shandong sub-bureau column. The 115th Division left its troops to persist in the Lunan Struggle, and the division headquarters moved north to the vicinity of Qingtuo Temple, north of Linyi. However, because the mountainous area was too difficult, and later even the problem of eating could not be solved, so the division headquarters went south to the coastal area to find a place to eat. Strictly speaking, going north is contraction and retreat. If we all went north, the Northeast Army would completely occupy the Lunan Mountains, and we would be compressed into the Yimeng Mountains, which was actually to make way for the Northeast Army. If Lunan is lost, there will be no exit to the south in the future, and it will not be conducive to the connection between the south of Longhai Road and the Huxi region. We insist on Lunan, open up coastal areas, and open up the Jiazi Mountain, all in order to cooperate with the persistence and development of the Yimeng Mountains. ”
The meaning of this passage is that if the 115th Division goes north, the Northeast Army will control Lunan, and the consequences are:
The 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army lost Lunan and had no exit to the south.
Second, the 115th Division went north to Mount Yimeng, unable to solve the problem of feeding, and it was difficult to eat.
The 3rd and 115th Division's move north was not conducive to the shandong Eighth Route Army's contact with the southern and Huxi regions of Longhai Road, that is, the contact with the New Fourth Army in northern Jiangsu would be cut off.
It was precisely because Luo Ronghuan left a 2nd Brigade when he went north and took control of Lunan. Subsequently, the main force was "swept up" by the Japanese army at Yimeng Mountain, and it was almost impossible to survive, and "the mountain column command organs were attacked together, and most of the personnel were scattered." Luo Ronghuan and Chen Guang then decided to lead their troops to move to the coastal area east of Lunan, and after the Battle of Jiazishan, the 115th Division opened up a new situation in the Shandong War of Resistance.
Facts have proved that Luo Ronghuan is a mature, steady, accurate party, military, and government leader who sees problems accurately, has a proper method, and has a strategic vision, and has the ability to lead the overall situation in Shandong. Therefore, the Party Central Committee decided to unify the leadership of the party, government and army in Shandong, headed by Luo Ronghuan. Sure enough, as soon as Luo Ronghuan was used, the entire Shandong chess game was all alive. Under the leadership of Luo Ronghuan, Shandong's work flourished day by day, becoming one of the most powerful enemy rear base areas of the Chinese Communists in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression.