The arrogance of the United States and the stubbornness of the Taliban led to the outbreak of the 9/11 terrorist attacks

【Explanation of the Situation King】

The Taliban established the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan" in 1996, stepped down in power for five years due to the war on terror launched by the United States after 9/11, and returned to Power in Afghanistan again in 2021, 20 years later.

When he first came to power in 1996, one of the founders of the Taliban was abdel Salam Zaif, one of the most core cronies of the original Taliban leader Omar, who had served as the Taliban's ambassador to Pakistan for a long time, served as a liaison between Afghanistan and the outside world, dealt with diplomats from all over the world, and participated in the negotiations between the United States and Afghanistan on the transfer of bin Laden.

After the outbreak of the War on Terror in Afghanistan, the Taliban fell, zaif was arrested and imprisoned in Guantanamo Prison, released four years later and protected by the Afghan government, thus completely losing the trust of the Taliban, and now he is in exile abroad as a religious scholar.

This article is quoted from Zaif's "Self-Description of Senior Taliban Leaders", from which we can see that due to the arrogance of the Americans and the stubbornness of the Taliban, both sides missed the opportunity to arrest and try bin Laden, thus failing to prevent the outbreak of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

In the past, when describing this period of history, everyone said that "the Taliban refused to hand over bin Laden, so the US military attacked Afghanistan and overthrew the Taliban", so what is the specific story behind the refusal to hand over bin Laden? This article provides a flesh-and-blood description.

This article is an excerpt from Zaif's memoir, "Self-Descriptions of Senior Taliban Leaders," pp. 159-256.

As events unfolded and Afghanistan continued to isolate, fewer diplomats came to Kandahar and Kabul for separate talks, and ambassadors worked more and more like diplomats, until the two bodies, the Embassy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were barely indistinguishable. Although most countries do not recognize the Islamic Emirate as a legitimate government, many foreign diplomats come to us regularly for talks or when they are concerned about Afghanistan, and I have learned a lot from regular meetings with them.

In addition to the Russian ambassador, I have had personal meetings with ambassadors from all countries and I have good relations with them. Many people are polite and knowledgeable. I don't have a good impression of the Ambassadors of Germany, Belgium, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, who are very kind and wise.

Contrary to our ongoing efforts, the diplomatic situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating day by day, with increasing sanctions and other coercive acts by other countries, and diplomatic relations continue to deteriorate, one after another, each of which has made our previous efforts in vain. This is a continuous downward ramp to 9/11, after which the world was in chaos.

One of the most troublesome of these was the relationship with the United States, where we often had meetings with the United States, and we had very difficult negotiations about bin Laden, and their demands caused a lot of questions, and we met again and again in the United States or at our own embassies to discuss them. When I first appeared as ambassador to Afghanistan, the U.S. ambassador was William Milam, accompanied by his colleague Paul Teddy, the embassy official in charge of political affairs.

In 2001, George W. After the election of President W. Bush, a new ambassador and a high-level embassy staff were appointed to Take office in Islamabad. Kabir Muhabat, an Afghan-American like Khaliza, came to Islamabad as ambassador. Muhabat facilitated dialogue and acted as a mediator, and was once appointed as a temporary envoy. The United States insisted that Afghanistan hand over os-im bin Laden to the United States or send him to a U.S.-designated country.

But the Taliban have offered to preserve bin Laden's dignity and want a trial. This issue has created a deep rift in the relationship between the two countries. One night, I went to the U.S. ambassador's office to talk to him about it, and it had been a long time since I had left work. The Afghan side proposes three solutions that would satisfy both sides. That night, I explained the three options in detail to the Ambassador of the United States.

First, if the United States condemns bin Laden as responsible for the bombings in Nairobi and Tanzania, it should present relevant evidence against him, and the United States should submit all the evidence to the Supreme Court of Afghanistan; Afghanistan will summon bin Laden according to law. If he is proven guilty, he is convicted and punished under the decree.

Secondly, if the United States cannot accept the first proposal and does not recognize the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, or because it does not believe in the independence, impartiality and impartiality of the Afghan Supreme Court, we propose to create a new court, headed by three Ministers of Justice of Islamic countries, in the fourth Islamic country. The United States could bring evidence of bin Laden's guilt to this court. Afghanistan also participated in the trial to ensure that bin Laden appeared, answered all questions and defended himself. If he is unable to defend himself and is found guilty, he will be punished for his crime.

Third, if the United States cannot trust the tribunals established by the three Islamic states and does not recognize the Afghan Supreme Court, we can restrict all of bin Laden's movements and allow him to communicate with the outside world in all correspondence, limiting him to his current exile. We guarantee that he will not use his territory to do anything that threatens other countries.

The United States rejected the three proposals, insisting that Afghanistan should unconditionally hand over osten bin Laden to the United States. The United States claims that he should be tried in a fair and impartial United States court and will be punished if found guilty; but the Afghan side cannot accept the United States' request. We explain why it cannot be agreed that Afghanistan and the United States are not obliged to hand over criminals to each other, that the two countries have not signed such an agreement; The reputations of both sides and their respective sovereignty should be respected.

The United States insisted on trying os-women in its own country, and no country had ever made such a request. They do not even consider a trial at the International Tribunal in The Hague, which at least has a degree of independence and fairness, and the choice of a United Nations tribunal would allow both sides to retain face.

There are two main reasons why the Islamic Emirate opposes the transfer of bin Laden to the United States: first, if every country hands over the suspects that the United States wants to the United States, then the United States will in fact control the entire world, and the independence and sovereignty of all countries will be threatened; second, the demands of the United States and the rejection of all the proposals made by the United States to Afghanistan mean that there is no justice in the Islamic world, and there is no just and legitimate authority in the Islamic world to enforce legal norms. This is a direct repudiation of Islam itself and its system of upholding civil rights and punishing crimes. This problem has not been solved.

There are other solutions, but neither Afghanistan nor the United States has officially adopted any of them. One proposal was to establish a joint tribunal to reconcile between the United States and Afghanistan. There is also a recommendation to conduct a trial at the International Tribunal at The Hague. None of the proposals were seriously discussed by both sides, as the United States was reluctant to change their demands and insisted that os-jain bin Laden be tried under their judicial system. The attitude of the United States is clear, and if Afghanistan does not meet their demands, it wants to use force to solve it.

Christina Rocca, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, passed through Islamabad and asked to meet with us. I met her at the United States Embassy in Islamabad on August 2, 2001. She focused only on bin Laden, and throughout the conversation she flouted every diplomatic norm, every word she said was a threat, and our meeting was more like a battle of words.

In response to os-laden's question, I have held a total of four negotiations with the United States, each of which has been fruitless. Although we both want to advance diplomatic relations between the two sides and have good personal relations, none of us have the power to make decisions. Everything we discuss at the meeting is decided by others, and the outcome of the meeting is negative.

One morning, the U.S. ambassador suddenly wanted to see me (americans occasionally fussed about small things), and I was tired and on my way home, ready to go back to rest, but they insisted on meeting as soon as possible. After an afternoon prayer, the Ambassador came to my house, accompanied by Paul Teddy. He looked anxious, and as soon as he entered the door, he said: "Our intelligence shows that bin Laden is preparing to launch a large-scale attack on the United States, which is why we came so late at once, you must immediately tell the Afghan officials to stop this attack!" ”

I reported directly to the Islamic Emirate of what the U.S. ambassador had reported, although I should have communicated with the central leadership first through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Because the U.S. ambassadors arrived in an emergency and learned the lessons of the last Chahill Shah-era border commander incident, the best thing to do this time was to break the rules and report directly. 23 hours later, I received a response from Kandahar: "Afghanistan does not intend to harm U.S. interests, and it will not do so now and will not." We will not forgive anyone for launching an attack on the United States, and we will deter anyone in Afghanistan who is planning to carry out the attack. ”

The letter clearly expresses the position of the Islamic State of West Chang. I myself translated the letter, attaching the original Pashto language, and showed it to the American ambassador, but the letter did not reassure the Americans.

The last time I saw the U.S. ambassador was when he came to say goodbye to me. He told me that he cherished the good diplomatic relations we had fostered, and that he expressed concern about the future and what was about to happen that would lead to disaster. The U.S. ambassador believes that bin Laden is still a threat, that he will continue to attack the United States, that the United States can no longer tolerate his threats and attacks, and that we must find a solution or the problem will spiral out of control.

Although the United States is still imposing coercive sanctions on Afghanistan through the United Nations and has taken a series of diplomatic moves to further isolate Afghanistan, there are still concerns about bin Laden. We have discussed this topic countless times, privately or publicly. If bin Laden is handed over to the United States, the United States should abandon any other demands and formally recognize the legitimate status of the Islamic Emirate.

After the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, everything came to a standstill and the world spun around. 9/11 put an end to our negotiating process, and everyone knows what happened next.