Throughout the long history of China, the Song Dynasty was known for its cultural prosperity and economic development. However, this seemingly powerful dynasty has an unknown weakness. As we look back at the rise and fall of the Song Dynasty, a perplexing question arises: Why was the Song Dynasty's army so weak? Why did the army of the Central Plains, which was once mighty, retreat in the face of the Jin people and the Mongol iron cavalry? The root of all this can be traced back to a decision of Zhao Kuangyin, the founding emperor of the Song Dynasty. This decision was originally well-intentioned, but it caused a catastrophe in the future, which eventually led to the disgrace of Jingkang and the tragedy of the Mongol destruction of the Song Dynasty. So, what did Zhao Kuangyin do? Why did his decision have such a profound impact on the military strength of the Song dynasty? What is the complex relationship between the military and commerce?
In 960 AD, after the Chenqiao Mutiny, Zhao Kuangyin took over the authority of the Later Zhou Dynasty and established the Song Dynasty. As an emperor by military background, Zhao Kuangyin understood the importance of the military to a burgeoning dynasty. However, he was also well aware that the historical lessons of warlords and self-respect of feudal towns during the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period could not be ignored.
During the period of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms, it has become a common phenomenon for the military to do business. At that time, in order to maintain the strength of the army, the envoys of Jiedu would often send their cronies and subordinates to sell goods to various places to replenish the army. Although this approach solved the problem of military spending in the short term, it also laid a hidden danger for the warlords to divide their territories.
Zhao Kuangyin is well aware of the pros and cons. On the one hand, he hoped to ease the pressure on the country's finances by allowing the military to do business, but on the other hand, he feared that an excessively strong army would threaten the central power. Driven by this ambivalence, Zhao Kuangyin made a seemingly contradictory decision: to allow the army to do business, but at the same time to take measures such as "releasing military power with a glass of wine" to weaken the army's strength.
The decision was made with good intentions. Zhao Kuangyin believes that by allowing the military to do business, the army can be self-sufficient and reduce the financial burden on the state. He even ordered that "their trade be exempted from taxes" in order to increase the profits of the army's repatriation. In Zhao Kuangyin's view, this can not only solve the problem of military spending, but also allow the soldiers to defend the border with peace of mind, and will not have dissent because of difficulties in life.
However, Zhao Kuangyin may not have expected that this decision would have such far-reaching consequences in the future. Initially, the scale and form of military business were relatively limited. Most of the troops were engaged in small-scale trade activities near their stations, such as selling cloth, grain, and other daily necessities. These activities did alleviate the economic pressure on the military to a certain extent, and did not have much impact on the local economy.
However, over time, the scope and scale of the army's business gradually expanded. Some generals began to take advantage of the military's special status and tax-free privileges to dabble in more areas of commercial activity. In addition to selling ordinary goods, they also began to get involved in forbidden goods such as tea and salt.
For example, Zhang Yongde, the general who guarded Taiyuan in the early Song Dynasty, was impeached for selling salt without authorization. This phenomenon is not only in the border areas, but even the military in the vicinity of Gyeonggi has begun to do business on a large scale. According to historical records, Xia Yuanji, the deputy governor of Qin Fenglu during the Song Dynasty, was removed from his post for using his military status to sell forbidden goods.
What is even more worrying is that some militaries have begun to use their military superiority to buy and sell forcibly and disrupt local order. In the third year of Jiayou (1058), the famous Qing official Bao Zheng once played to the imperial court, pointing out the bad behavior of the army to forcibly purchase civilian materials.
With the expansion of the military's business activities, some negative effects began to appear. First of all, a lot of time and energy was spent on commercial activities, which led to the serious neglect of military training. Second, the profits from business are often enriched by the generals, and ordinary soldiers do not get much benefit. This not only affected the combat effectiveness of the army, but also seriously damaged the morale of the army.
More seriously, the military's business activities began to have an impact on the local economy. Due to the privileges and coercive power of tax exemption, the commercial activities of the army soon overwhelmed many civilian merchants. This not only disrupted the normal economic order, but also aggravated the contradictions between the military and the people.
Zhao Kuangyin originally hoped to solve the military spending problem and stabilize the frontier by allowing the army to do business. However, he probably did not expect that this decision would later evolve into an uncontrollable monster that would eventually become one of the important factors in weakening the military power of the Song dynasty.
Over time, the business activities of the Song Dynasty army gradually evolved and expanded. From Taizu Zhao Kuangyin to Huizong Zhao Ji, the attitudes and policies of successive emperors towards the army's business were constantly changing, which directly affected the scale and form of the army's business.
During the Taizu period, the army's business was still in its infancy, mainly in some small-scale trade activities. But by the time of Taizong Zhao Guangyi, the situation began to change. Taizong was aware of the drawbacks that the army might bring about in business, and once issued an edict strictly prohibiting "internal and external generals, creating a return to ease, and collecting sergeants". However, this ban has not been strictly enforced.
During the period of Zhenzong Zhao Heng, due to the huge military expenditure due to the continuous war, the imperial court had to acquiesce and even encourage the army to do business. According to the record of "Song Hui Yao", Zhenzong once ordered "all the armies in the winter moon and agricultural gaps, and Xu ordered to return to Yi". This policy undoubtedly provides a legal basis for the military to do business.
During the reign of Emperor Injong Zhao Zhen, the army's business activities were further expanded. In order to alleviate the financial pressure, the imperial court even took the initiative to provide the army with repatriation capital. For example, in the second year of Jiayou (1057), the imperial court allocated a large amount of money and goods to the armies in Hebei, Hedong and other places as the principal of the exchange.
During the reign of Emperor Zhao, due to the implementation of the new law, the pressure on the country's finances was even greater, and the army's business activities reached a new peak. At that time, not only did the border guards engage in business, but even the forbidden army began to get involved in commercial activities. According to historical records, the imperial army during the Shenzong period set up shops near the capital to sell various goods.
By the time of Emperor Huizong and Zhao Ji, it had become a common phenomenon for the military to do business. Huizong also tried to ban the military from doing business, but with little success. On the contrary, due to the emptiness of the treasury, the imperial court had to lift the ban on Huiyi several times, and even allocated the Huiyi to the army with the Dusandish (i.e., a document issued by the government to recognize the identity of monks and nuns) as the principal of Huiyi.
With the expansion of the military's business activities, the types of goods involved in it are also increasing. In the beginning, the army mainly sold some daily necessities, such as cloth and grain. But as time went on, they began to venture into more areas, including some forbidden goods.
Among them, the most striking is the army's trafficking of tea and salt. Tea and salt, as important monopoly commodities in the Song Dynasty, should be monopolized by the government. However, due to the privileges enjoyed by the army, they began to participate heavily in the trade of these forbidden goods. For example, in the last years of the Northern Song Dynasty, the army in Sichuan attracted the attention of the imperial court for selling large quantities of tea.
In addition to tea and salt, the army was also involved in the trade of high-profit goods such as silk and spices. According to the "History of the Song Dynasty", during the period of Huizong of the Song Dynasty, there were army generals and even organized soldiers to produce and sell exquisite silk products. This not only seriously affected the development of civilian handicrafts, but also led to the abandonment of military training by a large number of soldiers.
The impact of the military's business on the local economy is far-reaching. First, because of the privileges of tax exemption, the goods of the military tend to be more competitive than those of civilian traders. As a result, many private traders were squeezed out of the market, and the local economic structure was seriously distorted.
Second, the military's coercive procurement behavior has seriously harmed the interests of the peasants. It has been recorded that in some areas, the army would forcibly buy the farmers' produce at a low price and then sell it at a high price for a huge profit. This kind of behavior not only exacerbates the contradictions between the military and the people, but also seriously affects agricultural production.
More seriously, the military's business activities began to affect the normal functioning of local governments. In order to curry favor with the military, some local officials often turn a blind eye to their business activities, or even secretly provide convenience. This phenomenon of collusion between officials and businessmen has seriously undermined the effectiveness of local governance.
For example, in the last years of the Northern Song Dynasty, there was an incident in Hebei where the army wantonly looted people's wealth in the name of doing business. The local officials did not dare to offend the army, so they could only write to the imperial court to ask for treatment. This was not an isolated phenomenon at the time, but a common phenomenon.
As the Song Dynasty's military continued to expand its business activities, so did its erosion of military strength. This erosion is mainly manifested in three aspects: the reduction of training time and the degradation of combat skills, the laxity of military discipline and the discouragement of the army, the corruption of generals, and the shortage of military supplies.
First of all, the military's business activities have seriously crowded out the time that should be devoted to military training. In the middle of the Northern Song Dynasty, some troops even spent most of their time doing business rather than military training. According to the "History of the Song Dynasty", during the reign of Emperor Shenzong of the Song Dynasty, there was a unit stationed in Shaanxi, and it did not conduct any form of military exercises for a whole year. The generals of this unit claimed that they did not have time to train their soldiers because of the need to do business to maintain the army's expenses.
This circumstance led to a serious deterioration of the combat skills of the soldiers. A typical example is that during the reign of Emperor Zongzheng of the Song Dynasty, when a rebellion broke out in Hebei, the local garrison could not effectively quell it. Later investigations found that most of the soldiers in this unit had forgotten basic combat skills, and some could not even use bows and arrows properly.
Secondly, the long-term business activities have seriously affected the discipline of the army. In the process of doing business, the soldiers gradually developed the habit of seeking profits, and the army's sense of hierarchy and obedience gradually faded. According to historical records, during the reign of Emperor Zhezong of the Song Dynasty, an army in Sichuan had internal strife due to the uneven distribution of business interests, which eventually turned into a large-scale military conflict, which directly led to the emptiness of local defense.
What is even more serious is that business activities have led to the discouragement of the military. Many soldiers focus on how to make money rather than on how to improve their combat effectiveness. According to the record of the "Manuscript of the Song Society", during the Daguan period of Emperor Huizong of the Song Dynasty, a frontier general admitted frankly when reporting to the imperial court that his subordinates were "all businessmen nine times out of ten" and had no intention of practicing at all.
In addition, the military's business has led to a growing problem of corruption among generals. Some high-ranking military officers took advantage of their power to monopolize the most profitable commercial projects, and even colluded with local forces to enrich their own pockets. For example, during the reign of Emperor Huizong of the Song Dynasty, a governor of the Northwest Frontier was impeached for using the military to sell forbidden tea. According to the impeacher, the governor can make hundreds of thousands of yuan a year by selling tea alone.
The corruption of the generals directly led to the shortage of military supplies. Many generals embezzled military funds to engage in commercial activities for personal gain, resulting in the soldiers' basic livelihood being unable to be satisfied. During the reign of Emperor Zongzheng of the Song Dynasty, there was a serious incident in the northwest frontier: due to a serious shortage of military supplies, a unit stationed at the border gate mutinied en masse, almost resulting in the loss of border defense.
The shortage of military supplies not only affects the lives of soldiers, but also directly affects the combat effectiveness of the army. In the Jingkang Disaster at the end of the Northern Song Dynasty, there are records showing that when the Jin soldiers attacked Kaifeng, the defenders in the city were seriously underarmed, and some soldiers did not even have decent weapons. This state of affairs is directly related to the fact that the military has been doing business and military spending has been misappropriated for a long time.
What is even more ironic is that some armies even sell weapons and equipment as commodities in order to make money. According to the "Records of the Year since the Establishment of Yan", in the early years of the Southern Song Dynasty, a unit stationed in the south of the Yangtze River actually sold the new bows and arrows just issued by the imperial court to merchants in order to obtain more profits, but in a subsequent battle, due to the lack of effective weapons, suffered a heavy defeat.
The erosion of military strength by military business is all-encompassing, affecting not only the grassroots soldiers, but also the senior generals. In the course of long-term business activities, many generals gradually lost their military qualities and became businessmen who could only do business. This directly led to the Song army's successive defeats in the face of the Jin soldiers and the Mongol iron cavalry.
For example, in the famous Battle of Yuncheng, although the commander of the Song army, Wu Jue, repelled the attack of the Jin soldiers with fewer victories, he mainly talked about how to trade with the spoils of war in his post-war report, rather than summing up tactical experience. This fully shows that even in the most critical moments of war, the minds of some generals are still full of commercial interests.
The attitudes and policies of the emperors of the Song Dynasty towards the military and business went through a complex process of change, from the initial strict prohibition to the later acquiescence and even encouragement, and finally to the helplessness. This process reflected the Song rulers' difficult balance between military needs and financial pressures.
At the beginning of the establishment of the Song Dynasty, Taizu Zhao Kuangyin adopted a strict prohibition attitude towards the military doing business. He was well aware of the dangers that the military could bring about when doing business, so he ordered that the military should not be allowed to participate in any form of commercial activities. According to the "History of the Song Dynasty", Taizu once said: "How can a sergeant be allowed to do business if he takes combat as his job?" However, this draconian ban did not last long.
During the reign of Taizong Zhao Guangyi, due to the huge military expenditures due to the successive wars, the imperial court began to acquiesce in some small-scale military business activities. Although Taizong still ostensibly opposed the military doing business, he had actually begun to deregulate it. For example, in the third year of the Taiping Rejuvenation (978), Taizong ordered that the border guards should be allowed to carry out some small-scale trading activities during the agricultural slack period to supplement military supplies.
During the period of Zhenzong Zhao Heng, the army's business activities were further expanded. In order to alleviate the financial pressure, Zhenzong even took the initiative to provide business funds for the army. According to the record of "Song Hui Yao", Zhenzong once ordered: "All the armies are in the winter moon and the agricultural gap, and the order is allowed to return to Yi." "This policy undoubtedly provides a legal basis for the military to do business.
During the reign of Emperor Renzong Zhao Zhen, the imperial court became more open to the military in business. In order to solve the problem of military spending, Injong repeatedly ordered that the army be allowed to conduct large-scale commercial activities. For example, in the fourth year of Gyeongli (1044), Renzong ordered that the Northwest Frontier Army be allowed to conduct large-scale trade with merchants from the Western Regions to supplement military spending.
However, as the military's business activities continue to expand, so do its negative effects. By the time of Emperor Yingzong and Zhao Shu, the imperial court began to realize the seriousness of the problem and tried to impose some restrictions on the army's business. Emperor Yingzong had ordered that the army should not be allowed to participate in the tea and salt trade, but this ban had little effect.
The period of Emperor Shenzong was one of the most rampant periods in which the army did business. Due to the implementation of the new law, the pressure on the country's finances was enormous, and Shenzong had to further relax the restrictions on the military's business. During the reign of Yuanfeng (1078-1085), Emperor Shenzong even ordered that the forbidden army be allowed to engage in commercial activities, which had previously been absolutely forbidden.
In the early days of Zhezong Zhao Xu's accession to the throne, due to his young age, the government was controlled by the Empress Dowager Gao. In order to encircle the army, Empress Dowager Gao further relaxed the restrictions on the army's business. According to the History of the Song Dynasty, during the reign of Yuan You (1086-1093), some armies even openly set up shops in the market to compete with the people for profit.
During the reign of Emperor Huizong and Zhao Ji, the army's business operation had become a stubborn disease that was difficult to eradicate. Huizong also tried to ban the military from doing business, but with little success. For example, during the reign of Zhenghe (1111-1118), Emperor Huizong repeatedly issued orders prohibiting the military from participating in the tea and salt trade, but these prohibitions were often ineffective. On the contrary, due to the emptiness of the treasury, the imperial court had to lift the ban on Hui Yi many times, and even allocated the monk dish as the principal of Hui Yi to the army.
By the time of Zhao Huan of Qinzong and Zhao Gou of Gaozong, in the face of the invasion of Jin soldiers, the imperial court had no time to take care of the army's business problems. During this period, the army's business activities were further expanded due to the needs of the war. For example, during the Jingkang Disaster, the Song army even began to sell military supplies on a large scale in order to raise military spending.
After the establishment of the Southern Song Dynasty, due to the drastic shrinkage of the country, the fiscal revenue fell sharply, and the imperial court became more open to the military in business. In order to maintain the huge military expenditure, Gaozong Zhao had to further relax the restrictions on the army's business. During the Shaoxing period (1131-1162), the imperial court even ordered the army to be encouraged to raise its own military expenses.
However, the disadvantages of doing business in the military are also becoming more and more obvious. By the time of Emperor Xiaozong, the imperial court began to realize the seriousness of the problem and tried to impose some restrictions on the army's business. Hyojong repeatedly ordered prohibitions for the military to engage in certain high-profit commercial activities, but these prohibitions were often difficult to enforce thoroughly.
In general, the attitude and policy of the Song court towards the military business went through a process from strict prohibition to acquiescence to encouragement, and finally to helplessness. This process reflected the Song rulers' difficult choice between maintaining military strength and easing financial pressures.
As a phenomenon unique to the Song Dynasty, military business had a profound impact on the fall of the Song Dynasty. This effect is mainly reflected in the decline of military strength, the intensification of social contradictions, and the deepening of political corruption.
First of all, the army's business directly led to a sharp decline in the military strength of the Song Dynasty. In the Jingkang Disaster, the Jin soldiers easily broke through Bianjing and captured the Hui and Qin Emperors, and this painful defeat was directly related to the decline in the combat effectiveness of the army caused by business for a long time. According to the "Chronicles of the Year since the Establishment of Yan", most of the forbidden troops guarding Bianjing at that time had indulged in commercial activities and abandoned military training. When the Jin soldiers approached the city, these forbidden troops had lost even basic combat skills, and some of them could not even use their weapons correctly.
What is even more ironic is that after the fall of Bianjing, instead of resisting, some armies took advantage of the chaos to loot and sell the looted goods as commodities. For example, according to historical records, there was a forbidden army that was supposed to guard the palace, but after the Jin soldiers broke through Bianjing, they actually transported the treasures in the palace to Jiangnan to sell, completely forgetting their military identity.
Second, the military's business exacerbated social contradictions and weakened the ruling foundation of the Song dynasty. Because of the privileges enjoyed by the military, its business activities often cause serious damage to ordinary businessmen and ordinary people. According to the Manuscript of the Song Society, during the Southern Song Dynasty, the army in Zhejiang often forcibly occupied the best positions in the market, and even used force to drive away ordinary merchants. This behavior has sparked strong discontent among the population, which has led to many violent clashes.
Soon after Yue Fei was killed, a large-scale civil uprising occurred in Hangzhou. The reason for this was that the local garrison forcibly seized the most prosperous markets and charged high protection fees to the merchants. Angry merchants and civilians banded together to storm the barracks, which eventually turned into a mass riot. Although the rebellion was eventually suppressed, it reflected the fact that the army's business had severely damaged the foundation of Song rule.
In addition, the military's business deepened political corruption and shook the foundations of the Song dynasty's rule. Because the armed forces are at their disposal, their business activities are often coercive in nature and can easily turn into blatant extortion. According to the History of the Song Dynasty, in the last years of the Southern Song Dynasty, some armies even openly blackmailed local officials and demanded a share of tax revenues. For example, during the reign of Emperor Lizong of the Song Dynasty, a naval division along the coast of Fujian extorted huge protection fees from local officials in the name of protecting maritime trade.
This behavior not only undermined the prestige of the imperial court, but also seriously weakened the financial strength of local governments. What is even more serious is that some high-ranking generals took advantage of the opportunity of the military to do business and colluded with local tyrants to form a force that was not controlled by the imperial court. During the reign of Song Duzong, there was a case that shocked the government and the opposition: an army commander in eastern Zhejiang used the deterrent power of the army to monopolize the salt and iron trade in the entire region in partnership with the local tyrants.
The army's business also directly influenced the foreign policy of the Song dynasty. Because the army relied on business for profit, some generals were often reluctant to fight, preferring instead to make peace with the enemy. During the reign of Emperor Gaozong of the Song Dynasty, when the Jin soldiers went south, some border generals took the initiative to surrender to the Jin soldiers in order to protect their commercial interests. For example, in the seventh year of Xuanhe (1125), an army commander in Hebei voluntarily surrendered to the Jin soldiers because he was worried that the war would affect his tea business.
By the late Southern Song Dynasty, the army's business had become a stubborn disease that was difficult to eradicate. Many generals have completely lost their true qualities as soldiers and have become businessmen who only know how to pursue profits. In the process of resisting the Mongol invasion, this malaise was exposed. According to the History of the Song Dynasty, in several important battles with the Mongol army, the Song army performed extremely badly. Some units on the battlefield show not heroism but mercenary. For example, in the Battle of Yashan, the forbidden army, which was supposed to protect the emperor, snatched property at a critical moment, which eventually led to the complete destruction of the Southern Song Dynasty.
In general, the special phenomenon of the army doing business weakened the national strength of the Song Dynasty in many ways and accelerated the process of the demise of the Song Dynasty. It not only directly led to the decline of military strength, but also exacerbated social contradictions, deepened political corruption, and finally became the last straw that crushed the Song Dynasty.