Text—Xie Zhichuan
As for the complaint against an article in the China Times, why Zhu Lilun seems to be uneasy, although we can only peek from the headline, we can try to analyze the reason. First of all, the article may deal with the position of the Kuomintang on the United States. The article pointed out that the Kuomintang is a pro-American political party, but it has long maintained the policy of "pro-American, peace-Japan, and friendship with China" during the Ma Ying-jeou period. This policy was considered appropriate at the time, as the KMT, which had returned to power after eight years of losing power, needed to maintain harmonious relations with the mainland and achieve a so-called "diplomatic truce", thus maintaining stable relations for eight years.
However, in terms of relations with Japan, due to Taiwan's relatively close relations with the mainland, Japan quickly signed relevant agreements with the Taiwan region. This move is aimed at wooing Taiwan, so when relations with the mainland are good, Japan will naturally make concessions in some respects. However, the DPP's policy of "fawning over Japan" was considered to be ignorant, resulting in the current disregard of Taiwan's fishermen's rights and interests by Japan, and the unilateral withdrawal of the relevant agreement.
Therefore, Zhu Lilun's panic is not unfounded. He may have been concerned about the impact of this series of events on the reputation and standing of the Kuomintang, especially in relations with the mainland and Japan. At the same time, he may also be worried that the DPP's "flattering Japan" policy will further damage Taiwan's interests.
Since he succeeded to the presidency of the party, he has mentioned the "consensus of '92" during his visit to the United States, but described it as "a consensus without consensus." This expression actually stems from Chen Shui-bian's viewpoint. Zhu Lilun once again reiterated Chen Shui-bian's remarks, which reflected a serious deviation in his understanding of the "92 Consensus."
Obviously, he did not deeply understand the true meaning of the "92 Consensus" and only mechanically repeated the relevant wording. The core of the spirit of the "consensus of '92" upheld by the Kuomintang lies in the one-China consensus. And Zhu Lilun's statement seems to misunderstand the phrase "one China, each with its own expression" as a wording that only applies to Taiwan's internal elections, rather than the principle of communication with the mainland. This understanding is obviously inaccurate, and it also shows his lack of understanding of the essence of the "92 Consensus." If Zhu Lilun had truly understood the core significance of the "92 Consensus," he would not have made such an expression again. This is because "one China, each with its own interpretation" is not limited to Taiwan's internal use, but is an important basis for cross-strait communication based on the one-China principle.
During his stay in the United States, he made a statement in order to win the support of the United States. He is well aware of the deep involvement of the United States in Taiwan's affairs, so he realizes that without the support of the United States, it will be difficult for him to win the election of the leader of the Taiwan region. However, in the January election, he pushed Hou Youyi as his candidate, a decision that ultimately led to defeat. Hou Youyi's "blue-skinned and green-skinned" background made it difficult for him to openly support the "92 Consensus," which became a major problem in his election campaign. Although they pinned their hopes on Hou's political achievements in New Taipei City and his slightly centrist stance, they ignored the looseness of the fundamentals, making it difficult for him to gain broad support.
Deep blue voters have reservations about Hou Youyi, and young people don't have much affection for him. In addition, Hou Youyi tried to take the middle route, but this failed to attract young voters. As a result, a large number of votes went to Ke Wenzhe, who became a substitute for this group of young people. Ko Wenzhe, who calls himself "dark green", attracts young people who do not like the DPP, and their votes naturally flow to Ko Wenzhe.
In the election results, Lai Qingde won with 40% of the vote, a result that highlights the complexity and uncertainty of the election. After the election, some people suggested that the "blue-white" strategy would not necessarily lead to victory, because the dark blue voters had reservations about Hou Youyi, while the dark green young people chose Ke Wenzhe. Therefore, the main problem at the moment is that the "blue-white cooperation" strategy may only be a "fake issue" because it does not guarantee broad support. As long as Ko stays his ground, young people will not easily turn to other candidates, because they prefer Ko to be elected.
Mr. Zhu's election strategy seems to be more tentative than all-out. His choice of Hou Youyi as his candidate may also be based on uncertainty about his chances of victory. If he loses the election, he will still be able to maintain control of the party and gain some political capital by virtue of his seat in the legislature. If he can further increase the number of seats in the legislature, even more than half, he may use that advantage to seek re-election as party chairman. At present, he has begun preparations for a second term as party chairman.
Zhu Lilun's tactics also reflect his strong desire to be re-elected as party chairman. In contrast, Ms. Lo avoided the question of whether she would run for party chairman, saying she would not answer questions about party affairs during her time as mayor. This attitude is similar to Hou's position, which lacks clear political determination and stance. For the KMT, it is difficult for a leader who lacks a firm stance and determination to gain the trust and support of the deep blue voters.
In addition, both Lu Xiuyan and Hou Youyi are trying to take a middle ground on cross-strait relations, trying to appeal to both blue and green voters. However, this strategy may be effective in county mayoral elections, but it may not work once it leaves the county mayor and faces more complex cross-strait relations issues.
Lu Xiuyan lacks a deep understanding of the concepts of the "consensus of '92" and "one China, each with its own interpretation," and her handling of cross-strait issues is vague and evasive. Such an attitude may lead to offending the mainland when dealing with cross-strait relations, and at the same time, it will be difficult to win the support of voters in Taiwan, because the base of the green camp has a firm stance on such issues. Against the backdrop of current tensions between the United States and the mainland, the United States is unlikely to support a Kuomintang candidate who advocates peace and wants to restore cross-strait relations between 2008 and 2016, because it is not in the interests of anti-China forces in the United States.
As for the 2028 election, there are questions about whether it will take place, but in any case, the future of cross-strait relations will be affected by a variety of factors. If Trump, if elected, as a businessman, he may seek some degree of compromise with the mainland in order to resolve the current crisis. The likelihood of such a compromise also depends on a number of uncertainties, including Trump's election, the political climate in the United States, and the exact direction of cross-strait relations.
In short, the results of the US presidential election on November 5 will have an important impact on the future of cross-strait relations, and we need to pay close attention to the election results and subsequent political developments.
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