Editor's note
China Review News, Hong Kong, July 20 (CNS) -- Liu Zongyi, director of the Center for South Asian Studies at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, published an article in the June issue of China Review, a monthly magazine sponsored by the China Review Think Tank Foundation. 》。 In this article, the author argues that in 2023, India will become a United States "non-treaty alliance partner", and the relationship between the United States and India has undergone a qualitative change, and the two countries have officially formed an alliance against China. Although the United States and India have agreed to contain and suppress China, containing China is not the ultimate goal of both countries. There are considerable differences between the two countries in terms of what they want to achieve by containing China and the means and ways in which they can achieve those goals by containing China. India's foreign policy has a very strong opportunistic color, and the quality of Sino-Indian relations depends to a large extent on Sino-US relations. China's policy toward India should have reasonable expectations, and attempts to hold India at bay will be ineffective, but China should be confident while remaining vigilant about U.S.-India relations. At present, whether it is between China and the United States, or between China and India, the main competition is still in the economic field. The South Asian Studies Bulletin reprints this article for readers' reference.
Source: China Review News Agency
India's general elections are just around the corner. For international observers and observers in India, most believe that there is not much suspense in this election, Modi is likely to be re-elected, and the domestic and foreign policies of the India government will maintain continuity. Even if Modi and the India Bharatiya Janata Party lose the general election, the next government's domestic policy will change greatly, but the foreign policy will still maintain strong continuity, because for the BJP and the Congress party, as well as the entire India strategic community, they have basically formed a consensus on foreign policy. By observing India's foreign policy in 2023, we can basically judge the direction of India's foreign policy in the next few years, especially its policies towards the United States and China. 2023 is a year of home diplomacy and great power diplomacy for India. India hosted two Global South virtual summits, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization virtual summit and the G20 summit; India Prime Minister Narendra Modi participated in the G7 summit in Japan, the QUAD summit of the US-Japan-India-Australia Security Dialogue (QUAD), and the BRICS summit hosted by South Africa. Modi paid an official visit to United States in June and visited France as the Guest of Honour on France's National Day in July. Among them, the two most important were Modi's visit to the United States and the G20 summit, which attracted the attention of the world. For a time, India and its Prime Minister Modi were particularly popular in the Western world, and India's pro-American Western stance was also evident in these home diplomacy and major power diplomacy activities. But at the same time, the contradictions between India and the United States and the West are gradually revealed. Just during the G20 summit, clashes between India and Canada over the assassination of Canada's Sikh leader Nijjar erupted, sparking a diplomatic dispute between India and Canada. Canada has not received the solidarity of the Government of United States that it expects on this issue. But by November, the United States Department of Justice had publicly accused India officials of being involved in planning an "assassination plot" against Sikh separatist leader Pannon on United States soil, and that the case was linked to the assassination of Sikh leader Nijjar in Canada. Although high-level officials on both sides of the United States and India have come forward to claim that this incident will not shake the close relations between the United States and India, many observers of international issues believe that this incident is only the tip of the iceberg of the contradictions between the United States and India, and that the development of US-India relations will never be smooth sailing.
1. The United States and India have formed an alliance against China
On June 21-24, 2023, India Prime Minister Narendra Modi paid his sixth and first state visit to the United States since taking office in 2014 and was received by the United States. The two countries have reached a series of cooperation documents in the fields of economy, science and technology, national defense and people-to-people relations, covering various fields such as semiconductors, critical minerals, advanced technology, space cooperation, and defense manufacturing and sales. United States President Joe Biden and India Prime Minister Narendra Modi jointly declared "a new era in U.S.-India relations" and India become United States's "non treaty alliance partner." 【①Harsh Pant, "India and US - A Partnership Crafted by Modi and China," Jun 27, 2023, https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-and-us-a-partnership-crafted-by-modi-and-china】 The visit marked a qualitative change in U.S.-India relations, and the two countries have formally formed an alliance against China. On September 8, 2023, United States President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Modi reissued the U.S.-India Joint Statement during his visit to India to attend the G20 Summit, further strengthening, refining and concretizing the cooperation between the United States and India against China. While the U.S. and India are deliberately emphasizing the comprehensiveness and comprehensiveness of their bilateral relationship, it is clear that the current focus of cooperation between the two countries is on two areas: first, in the field of defense, United States giving India some advanced military technology that some formal allies do not receive, approving the joint production of F414 engines by General Electric and India and the sale of 31 MQ-9B drones to India. Second, in the high-tech fields such as semiconductors, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence, which are United States to be heavily restricted to China, the United States and India will focus on promoting the Critical and Emerging Technology Initiative (iCET), which will strengthen cooperation in the joint development and production of key and emerging technologies, identify semiconductors, biotechnology, advanced materials, and rare earth processing technologies as key areas for future cooperation, deepen connectivity between the two innovation ecosystems, and establish semiconductor supply chains and innovation partnerships. To meet India's ambition to become an innovation and emerging technology powerhouse, replacing China in the global industrial supply chain. 【②The White House, Joint Statement from the United States and India, June 22, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/06/22/joint-statement-from-the-united-states-and-india/】
The main goal of the U.S. and India approach is to contain China. For United States, United States has established China as its biggest strategic competitor, hoping to contain China through the "Indo-Pacific" strategy and using alliances and partnerships, and India is regarded by the United States as a key pillar of its "Indo-Pacific" strategy. After the reactivation of the Quadrilateral Mechanism (QUAD) in 2017, the United States has always hoped to develop it into a military alliance, but on the one hand, India is actively promoting the United States, Japan, Australia and other countries to form an alliance to contain China, on the other hand, it has shirked the establishment of a military alliance on the grounds of "strategic autonomy", and has constantly put forward conditions in economic, trade, science and technology. At present, the United States hopes to tie India to its chariot of containing China by providing India with new and advanced weapons and equipment, and by strengthening strategic coordination and cooperation with India, and even to charge into battle for it and act as a vanguard. Even if it does not encourage India to engage in direct conflict with China, it can boost India's great-power ambitions and morale to compete with China, increasing strategic pressure on China along the Sino-Indian border and in the India Ocean region, as well as in global industrial supply chains. In addition, cooperation in military technology and weapons production between the United States and India will further squeeze the market share of Russian weapons and equipment in India and drive a wedge between Russia and India. As far as the Indian side is concerned, Indian policymakers and their strategic circles have reached a consensus that they hope to establish an international order of "multipolar Asia and a multipolar world", in which "multipolar Asia" is the premise of a "multipolar world". The Indian side believes that China is the biggest variable in the changes in the world pattern today, and that China may become the dominant power in Asia, so it believes that China is the biggest threat to India's rise as a great power, so India must carry out so-called "strategic management" of China to contain China's development. While using the U.S. "Indo-Pacific" strategy to contain China's development, India will obtain funds and advanced technology from the United States, Japan and Europe to promote the transfer of global industrial and supply chains to India, so as to achieve India's economic take-off and the rise of a great power. India has used China as a stepping stone to economic take-off and the rise of a great power.
Regarding Modi's visit to the United States, some India strategic elites believe that this key "geopolitical moment" can be regarded as Modi's "Deng Xiaoping moment", claiming that India's current geopolitical status is similar to China's position in the US-Soviet confrontation in the 70s of the 20th century. The analogy of India's strategic elite also shows that the United States and India have formed a de facto alliance against China. They believe that India is the only country that can catch up with China in terms of demographic, military and technological prowess. Now the United States is seeking cooperation with India to reorganize the global economic order and reduce the world's dependence on the Chinese economy. Therefore, India should seize the opportunity provided by the Biden administration to strengthen geo-economic cooperation, establish and consolidate its status as a "key country in containing China" in the eyes of the United States and the West and a substitute for China's status in the global production and supply chain, and become a global rule-maker and reshaping the global economic order. Domestically, the Modi government hopes to use the US-India relationship to enhance India's status as a great power and its domestic approval rating in order to win the 2024 election. Judging from President Biden's personal participation in the G20 summit in September and the fact that he did not clamor about the Russia-Ukraine conflict at the G20 summit as in the past, the United States is indeed very concerned about India's concern about its status as a great power.
2. Problems in the US-India alliance with China
In order to contain China and achieve their respective strategic goals, the United States and India have put forward their own "Indo-Pacific Strategies" (India called "Indo-Pacific Vision"), and under the repeated requests and active promotion of India, they have United States improved their "Indo-Pacific Strategies" and met some of the India's requirements in terms of geographical scope, economy and trade. However, the United States and India have only agreed to contain and suppress China, but containing China is not the ultimate goal of both countries. There are considerable differences between the two countries in terms of what they want to achieve by containing China and the means and ways in which they can achieve those goals by containing China. The difference in these goals makes the process of containing China full of mutual use, mutual calculation, and mutual vigilance.
(a)
The "Indo-Pacific strategies" of the United States and India are not fully compatible
First of all, the strategic goals are different. The goal of United States's "Indo-Pacific Strategy" is to maintain its hegemonic system of "one superpower", while the ultimate goal of India's "Indo-Pacific" strategy is to achieve India's rise as a great power and a "multipolar Asia and a multipolar world". Second, the strategic focus areas are different. The focus of United States' "Indo-Pacific" strategy is in the Asia-Pacific region, so United States most wants to see India militarily involved in Asia-Pacific affairs, but the focus of India's "Indo-Pacific" strategy is the India Ocean region. Third, there are differences in the perception of the main forces and means of containing China. The United States and India are indeed in agreement to contain and suppress China, but neither wants to come into direct conflict with China. United States hopes that India will be at the forefront of containing China, and encourage India to confront China on the border issue, or even enter into a direct conflict with China; India hopes to hold back United States and let United States take action to contain China himself, and hopes to promote the transfer of global industrial supply chains in the process. United States hopes more to use military means and military alliances, while India does not want to passively get involved in military conflicts with China, so India does not want to develop the QUAD into a military alliance, does not want to join "NATO +", and does not want to sign a bilateral treaty with United States and lose its so-called "strategic autonomy". India is unwilling to shoulder the responsibilities and obligations of a treaty ally, but will enjoy the benefits enjoyed by all United States treaty allies.
(b)
The history of U.S.-India relations and India's national psychology dictate that the process of cooperation will not be smooth sailing
Although many India strategic figures have repeatedly claimed in recent years that the history of mutual distrust between the United States and India has come to an end, both the historical mustard and the contradictions in reality remain the same. United States does not want to see India take advantage of Sino-US strategic competition to rise, still less does it want India to become a second China, so although United States seems to be generous in selling advanced weapons and equipment and its production technology to India and investing in the development of advanced manufacturing industry in India, this is a gradual process, and the United States depends on the extent to which India cooperates with its strategy of containing China. India people believe that United States need to invest real money to contain China with the help of India, and India people believe that United States owe too much to India in history and should be compensated in exchange for the trust of India. India's national character has always been calculating, and its ambitions and appetites are so great that it will constantly make demands on the United States that it cannot accept. India's economic nationalist sentiment is very strong, its national monopoly bourgeoisie regards the India market as a forbidden place, and if the United States and Western multinational companies get involved too deeply in the India market, they will inevitably encounter the fate of China's "millet".
(c)
The contradiction between India's foreign strategic focus and United States' strategic objectives
Since 2017, India has actively formed an anti-China alliance with Western countries. In the wake of the institutionalization of the US-Japan-India-Australia Security Dialogue and the establishment of AUKUS, India's strategic elite argued that the window of opportunity for China's rise was closing, or had closed, because China's crowded geography limited its operations on land and at sea, as well as because of resistance from Western countries and other countries. While China's power and influence will continue to expand, especially around India, the prospects for Chinese hegemony in Asia are slim. 【③Shivshankar Menon, Yamini Aiyar, Sunil Khilnani, etc. "A strategy for India in a world that is adrift," October 07, 2021, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/a- strategy-for-india-in-a-world-that-is-adrift/article36867249.ece】 After United States clearly established China as its biggest strategic competitor, India strategists believe that now is a favorable time for a strategic counterattack against China, so India's foreign strategic focus has shifted from leading the United States, Japan, Australia and other countries to form an anti-China alliance to squeeze and eliminate China's influence in the India Ocean region, and establish India's leadership position in the so-called "Global South", so as to establish a "one-pole" identity and compete with United States. However, India found it difficult to compete with China in the "Global South" on its own, and ·Happymon Jacob and others used the pretext of competing with China to beg the United States and the West to help India establish a leader in the "Global South". 【④Happymon Jacob, "How to Thwart China's Bid to Lead the Global South," Foreign Affairs, December 25, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/how-thwart-chinas-bid-leadglobal-south】 Although the United States and the West hope to use India to divide developing countries and squeeze out China's influence in developing countries, they do not want to provide too much material to help India become a true leader of the "Global South". In early April 2024, I went to New Delhi to conduct research and found that India's strategic community no longer emphasized being a "global South leader" and instead endorsed the "Voice of Global South".
(iv)
The struggle for control and counter-control between United States and India and the revolt of India nationalists
The United States has always exercised control over its allies in order to tie them firmly to the United States chariot. An important reason for the great progress made in US-India relations in 2003 was due to United States' suppression and intimidation of the Modi government: first, the United States released a human rights report listing India's "major human rights problems" and abuses; The BBC in United Kingdom produced a documentary called India: The Modi Problem. Second, at the instigation of the United States, the Sikhs in the United States, Canada, Australia, Britain and other countries launched the "Khalistan Movement." Third, the United States short-seller Hindenburg Research launched a precision strike against India's chaebol Adani. Adani is Modi's closest ally, and United States shorting Adani is also a warning to Modi that United States has the power to influence the economic and political stability of India. Fourth, support Rahul · Gandhi. United States' control of India provoked Indian resistance. India's diplomatic dispute with the West over the assassination of an independent Sikh leader abroad actually reflects the struggle between control and counter-control between the United States and India. India has taken advantage of United States' strategic dependence on China to test United States' bottom line, launching assassinations of Sikh independence leaders in Canada and United States, and only temporarily halting after the United States government has explicitly warned India. At the same time, there is compromise and cooperation in India's control over United States. In March 2023, GQG Partners Inc., an United States investment firm, invested in the Adani Group; 【⑤Scott Murdoch, Nandan Mandayam and Yousef Saba, "Adani shares surge after $1.87 billion GQG investment; more road shows lined up," March 3, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/markets/shares-adani-backer-gqg-partners-fall-australian-trade-2023-03-03/] November, United States' Development Finance Corporation (DFC) has provided $553 million in financing for a port terminal developed by the Adani Group in Colombo, Sri Lanka, to curb China's influence in South Asia and the India Ocean. 【⑥"U.S. Development Finance Institution DFC To Fund CWIT, Adani's JV In Sri Lanka For USD 553 Million," 8 November2023https://www.adani. com/newsroom/mediarelease/usdevelopment-finance-institution-dfc-to-fund-cwit-adanis-jv-in-sri-lanka] But the fundamental differences in values between the United States and India and the conflict of interests between the United States and India monopolies cannot be eliminated. The "fascist" overtones of India nationalism will intensify. United States wants to tie India to the chariot of containing China while also controlling India's development, so it will continue to manipulate the Modi government through sensitive issues such as human rights, khalistan, market openness, and opposition such as the Congress party, which will inevitably provoke resistance from India nationalists.
In addition, there are also deep contradictions between the United States and India on bilateral and regional issues such as India-Russia relations, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and India-Iran relations.
3. How should China view the future direction of China-India relations?
First, China should recognize the objectives of India's China strategy. India's diplomacy has a distinct speculative color, and India's strategic circles believe that the current Sino-US strategic competition is an unprecedented strategic opportunity for India. In this context, India's grand strategy is to use the US "Indo-Pacific" strategy to exchange its own economic take-off and the rise of great powers at the expense of China. The Indian side judges that United States will still have an advantage in the next 10 years, so India will continue to pursue a pro-US policy and adopt a confrontation-oriented policy toward China for at least 10 years. India will not easily act as a pioneer in containing China, but its ambition to contain China and isolate and replace China in the global industrial supply chain will not change. After the establishment of the "non-treaty alliance partner" between the United States and India, in order to induce United States to increase capital investment and technology transfer to India, it is more likely that the Indian side will continue to maintain tension in Sino-Indian relations. Therefore, China's policy toward India should have reasonable expectations, and the effectiveness of efforts to try to hold India in place remains to be seen. Second, the quality of Sino-Indian relations depends to a large extent on Sino-US relations. One of the so-called "global leading forces" that India wants to play is to lead the United States and the West to jointly contain China, thus creating a situation in which "sandpipers compete with each other and fishermen benefit". India has played an active leading role in the formation of the United States' "Indo-Pacific" strategy and the formation of the QUAD. India is most worried about the stability and relaxation of Sino-US relations, especially the so-called "G2" or Sino-US co-governance. After the successful meeting between President Xi Jinping and President Biden in San Francisco and the stable trend of Sino-US relations, especially when India saw that Australia and Japan in the "Quadrilateral Security Mechanism" were also restarting high-level political dialogue with China, there was a certain "sense of anxiety" in diplomacy, and there were also disputes and differences on China policy in India. Although United States assured India of the continuity of its "race to win" policy toward China through the fifth round of the "2+2" dialogue between the US and Indian foreign and defense ministers, some people in Indian strategic circles still have misgivings about the United States and are also worried about whether the United States will have sufficient capabilities to deal with China while facing two regional conflicts: Russia, Ukraine, and Israel and Palestine. Therefore, China should treat India's repeated claims that China should not view China-India relations from the perspective of third-party factors. Finally, China should be confident while remaining vigilant about the U.S.-India relationship. The current gap between China and India, both militarily and economically, is very small, and it is unlikely that this gap will narrow in the next decade, and it is even likely to continue to widen. Although the United States and the West hope that India can become a substitute for China in the global industrial chain and supply chain, and constantly touted India's bright prospects in economic development, India's development achievements over the years have shown that it is difficult to reach the speed and level of China's infrastructure construction and manufacturing development. India has always wanted to surpass China through aid and technology transfer from the United States and the West, which is simply impossible. The United States and the West only want to use India and sow discord between China and India, but they do not want India to really rise. The civilizational differences and strategic contradictions between the United States and the West and India are difficult to eliminate. Although U.S.-Indian military cooperation will cause some disruption to China on China's western border and in the India Ocean, China's military superiority is enough to deter India from acting rashly. China will not take the initiative to provoke trouble, but it will resolutely fight back against provocations. At present, whether it is between China and the United States, or between China and India, the main competition is still in the economic field. China is opening up to the outside world at a higher level, its economy is transforming, it is leaping to a higher end of the international supply chain, and it has recognized India's ambitions. For India, which is relatively backward in the stage of industrial development, it is the most convenient way to join the Asian production and supply chain system centered on China and maintain friendly relations with China, so as to realize the industrial transfer from China. Now that India has basically blocked its own road to industrial upgrading, China is comfortable with how to handle Sino-Indian relations while maintaining appropriate strategic vigilance against India.
About author:Liu Zongyi is a researcher and director of the Center for South Asian Studies at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies
(Interviewee Liu Zongyi is the director and researcher of the Center for South Asian Studies at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, and a visiting researcher at the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of Chinese, this article is transferred from the Observer Network Wind News Community on July 23, welcome to follow the Chongyang Sina Weibo: @人大重阳, WeChat public account: rdcy2013)