The battle in the Yellow Sea was tragic and tragic, and the officers and men of the Beiyang Navy paid a huge price in their lives. In the front mast tower of Zhenyuan, there are two original small cannons, equipped with a ranging non-commissioned officer, five gunners, at this time Khotan is silent, and the mast is checked, then the enemy in the mast is shot, and all six people have been killed, and the reason for the silence of the former is suddenly apparent. ”
However, this is a lost naval battle after all, and reflection and inquiry are more meaningful than sadness and sighing. Analyzing the reasons for the failure of this naval battle, there are probably the following points:
First, there was a lack of deployment and preparation before the war.
Pre-war preparation is the key to the success or failure of a war. When the military strategist Mao Zedong said that we should not fight a war for which we are unprepared and do not fight a war for which we are uncertain, we were referring to the importance of pre-war preparations for winning a war. From June 1894, there were already signs of war between China and Japan, and in July, war was imminent, and Ding Ruchang knew about it. However, Li Hongzhang's futile diplomatic mediation and strategy of "protecting ships and containing the enemy" seriously misled Ding Ruchang, and in addition to the outdated weapons and equipment and the insufficient number of ships, Ding Ruchang could not make up his mind to fight a decisive battle with the Japan fleet. This can be seen from a series of negative performances of Ding Ruchang before the Battle of the Yellow Sea.
Some scholars believe that both the lack of preparation for war and the weak sense of tactics are caused by the incompetence of Ding Ruchang, a land general. This view is too one-sided. There is no doubt that Ding Ruchang and even most of the pipe bands have not gone through the practice of naval warfare, which is an important reason for the mistakes in the preparation for war, but Ding Ruchang is also a person who has come from the war, and he will not fail to understand the simple truth that combat needs to be prepared, and the lack of some key preparations, such as not arranging for a replacement of the commander, not assessing the amount of ammunition, not formulating a tactical plan, and so on, cannot be explained by the word "incompetence" alone.
Moreover, even if Ding Ruchang was "incompetent" to such an extent, he still had a group of ship pipes and belts that had been trained for a long time, and their opinions and suggestions would not make the pre-war preparations so bad. From this point of view, the main reason for the lack of pre-war deployment and preparation of the Beiyang Navy was not Ding Ruchang's "incompetence", but Ding Ruchang's negative reaction in the face of the contradictory war guidance of Emperor Guangxu and Li Hongzhang.
Judging from the actual situation of naval warfare, the lack of operational deployment and preparation of the Beiyang Navy is mainly manifested in four aspects:
First, there was no predetermined tactical plan for naval warfare. Although tactics were indispensable in Ding Ruchang's thinking, and before the war, he was also trying to embody his own tactical ideas and put forward the "three-point principle," the "three-point principle" could not replace a complete tactical plan, it was only a tactical regulation at the beginning of a naval battle, and could not run through the entire process of naval warfare. So far, there is no historical record that Ding Ruchang drew up a naval battle tactical plan before the Battle of the Yellow Sea.
Therefore, in the naval battle, the Beiyang Fleet's tactics were monotonous, the formation was rigid and lacked change, the tactical cooperation between the sister ships was not brought into play, and the various ships were helpless in the enemy's constantly changing formation. The loss of unified command of the fleet is not a reason for the ships to give up tactical coordination, although the flagship "Dingyuan" cannot give orders, but the communication between the ships has not been destroyed, if there is a tactical predetermined plan before the war, the ships can completely form temporary formations, especially between sister ships, the more the fleet loses unified command, the more the synergy between the two ships is brought into play, but unfortunately, from the beginning to the end, no warship management has sent a signal of unified action to the sister ships, In addition to the weak tactical awareness of each ship's pipe belt, the lack of tactical arrangements is the main reason. Another serious consequence of the lack of tactical arrangements is that "the brave are too brave, and they do not wait for orders and compete for the first; The cowardly are too cowardly, and they do not obey the order and retreat, the reason why this formation is uneven, and the reason why the team is not sluggish."
In contrast, the Japan Navy's tactical use was flexible and appropriate, and the first guerrilla unit and its own team always maintained tactical coordination, which was difficult to achieve without the strict requirements before the war.
First Guerrilla: Matsushima. Naniwa. Akitsuzu
Second, the combat formation drill was not precise. Although the Beiyang Navy had already selected a battle formation and conducted targeted drills, Li Hongzhang once praised this formation as "still neat and flexible." However, since Ding Ruchang usually led a small number of warships to sail when he was carrying out his mission, there were very few opportunities for the whole fleet to conduct formation drills, and only large-scale exercises and undergoing proofreading were valuable opportunities for the whole fleet to conduct drills, and the drills at this time were drills without a tactical background, and each ship could calmly sail to their respective positions, so that the formation was neat and beautiful. As a result, it will be difficult to refine and complicate the practice of battle formations, and it will be difficult to form a plan for changing the formation based on assumptions.
Yu Siyi once commented: The formation of the Beiyang Navy "has all kinds of wonderful changes, so it must be strategic and well-read, confident in its calculations, and competent in its work." It is especially advisable for the ships to give up the front, rear, left and right artillery routes, and if they do not exercise skillfully, how can they win?" Due to the lack of precision in the exercise, the change of the formation of each pipe belt in a naval battle was very unfamiliar, and when the formation changed from a crack to a seam and a wild goose formation, the warships on both wings could not move in place because of the different speeds of each ship, and this should have been expected and avoided in advance, but this situation still occurred at the critical moment of engagement.
In particular, when the enemy's ship movement interfered, the combat formation was not adjusted and changed accordingly, and only a simple "bow against the enemy" was used to deal with it, so that the formation suddenly evolved into a shackle that bound the hands and feet of each ship. Just as Shen Shoukun, the first mate of the guns and artillery of the "Dingyuan" ship, reviewed after the war: "When the ship formation is drilled on weekdays, the formation must always be temporarily adapted, and it cannot be booked in advance. If you are predetermined, you only need to memorize the number of things that should be operated, and the rest can be disposed of.
Temporarily hang flags at will and show each formation, and each driver has to be fully considered. There is no trouble in making mistakes, and it can also be surprisingly successful. However, in the naval battle of the Yellow Sea, "the enemy was outflanked left and right, and I did not try to open a team to divide the attack, so I was trapped by it. Gao Chengxi, the second officer of the guns and guns of the "Dingyuan" ship, also said: "The naval division meets the enemy's formation, and when it agrees on the battle and changes the formation in peacetime, it often exercises. Or two groups of ships, one as the enemy ship and the other as our ship, in the ocean to make a confrontation, the drill is very familiar. When the enemy is not approached, there is a danger of defeat due to chaos. ”
Third, there is no plan for dealing with emergencies. War is brutal and often accompanied by a large number of casualties, and this is especially true of naval battles. The position of the commander has always been the primary target of the enemy's attack, and the sacrifice of the commander and the loss of the command function of the ship should be expected, and appropriate arrangements must be made in advance, which is a matter of common sense in war. When Zheng He went to the West in the Ming Dynasty, the emperor specially set up two eunuchs for Zheng He's fleet to command the fleet, Zheng He and Wang Jinghong, one of the purposes of which was to prepare for the fleet to complete the task of going to the West by Wang Jinghong to replace Zheng He when the fleet had an accident and Zheng He lost his command ability. If a fleet whose mission is peace, what reason should a fleet facing brutal naval battles not do so? But the Beiyang Navy did not do this.
The author believes that this is not that Ding Ruchang did not think of it, but that he did not make up his mind to fight a decisive battle with the Japan fleet, and even more underestimated the cruelty and intensity of the naval battle, resulting in the fleet losing its unified command soon after the start of the war, and always in a chaotic state of fighting its own battles, with no cooperation or support between the ships, and being led by the nose by the Japan fleet. The planning and orderliness of the Japanese fleet shocked Western spectators, who commented: "The situation of the Chinese is getting worse and worse, and the movements of Japan's warships are coordinated and consistent."
Fourth, the ammunition carried is insufficient and there are problems with its quality. Guns and ammunition are indispensable weapons to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy in naval warfare, and they have a great stake. However, the number of shells of the Beiyang Fleet in the Battle of the Yellow Sea was obviously insufficient, and this was disclosed by Majifen on the "Zhenyuan" and Dale on the "Dingyuan" after the battle, and Hannagan also reported after returning to the brigade: "Our ships and guns were wounded, and the munitions were also used up, and they sailed back to Lushun at night." In a letter, the General Department of Customs and Excise Hurd revealed the reason for the lack of shells in the Beiyang Navy. He said: "The Krupp cannon has ammunition but no ammunition, and the Armstrong cannon has ammunition but no ammunition!" Hannagan has been instructed to handle the Beiyang Defense Urging Ammunition, and the Tianjin Arsenal has received his order to rush to make ammunition ten days ago, but so far there has been no action! He wanted to gather enough shells for several hours to prepare for a naval battle, and he could not get hold of it so far.
Worst of all, I'm afraid he will never have any hope of getting it! In this way, the Tianjin Machinery Bureau, which is responsible for the production of artillery shells, and the Tianjin Ordnance Bureau, which is responsible for the allocation of artillery shells, have become the main culprits in the shortage of artillery shells.
As a result, for a long time, people pointed the spearhead at Zhang Shiheng, the general office of the Tianjin Ordnance Bureau, believing that he took advantage of his relationship with Li Hongzhang's uncle and nephew to engage in malpractice in the supply of ammunition for personal gain, thus affecting the operations of the Beiyang Navy, and should bear full responsibility. In fact, this is just a misunderstanding of people's anger, Zhang Shiheng is indeed Li Hongzhang's nephew, and there is indeed fraud in the production and supply of arms, but the amount of ammunition provided to the Beiyang Navy before the Battle of the Yellow Sea is not as lacking as people think. On December 9, 1894, Xu Jianyin, the alternate of Zhili, was ordered by the emperor to go to Weihai to inspect the ammunition situation of the Beiyang Navy, and obtained the following results:
The various shells stored on the seven warships, including "Dingyuan", "Zhenyuan", "Jingyuan", "Laiyuan", "Jiyuan", "Pingyuan" and "Guangbing", are: 293 305-mm artillery shells and 244 steel bullets; 35 260-mm artillery shells; 210 mm artillery shells 271 shells, steel bullets 163; 852 150-mm artillery shells, 202 steel bullets, and 109 sub-munitions; 137 6-inch artillery shells and 23 steel bullets; 205 120-mm artillery shells and 38 steel bullets. A total of 2,572 pieces.
The spare shells of the above-mentioned ships stored in the ammunition depot of Liugong Island are: 110 305-mm artillery shells;
681 shells from 210-mm guns; 385 shells from 150-mm guns and 340 shells from 6-inch guns;
157 120-mm artillery shells. A total of 1,673 pieces.
A total of 4,245 shells were found in the above two parts,[2] excluding 160 305-mm artillery shells, 100 210-mm artillery shells, and 100 150-mm artillery shells that were transported to Weihai during the period from the Battle of the Yellow Sea to before Xu Jianyin inspected the ammunition of the Beiyang Navy,[2] and the remaining 3,885 shells were all leftover shells from the Battle of the Yellow Sea. This means that most of the shells were stored in the ammunition depot and were not carried onto the ship, which once again shows that Ding Ruchang was not prepared for a decisive battle with the enemy before the war.
Of course, the lack of shells does not mean that the quality of the shells is excellent, although Zhang Shiheng is not the main culprit of the lack of ammunition in the Beiyang Navy as people think, but it is a fact that there are quality problems in the shells produced by the Tianjin Machinery Bureau. Because this incident had a great deal to do with the naval battle, the officers and men of the Beiyang Navy were deeply impressed by the firing obstacles caused by the quality of the shells, and they unanimously expressed their condemnation. Zhang Zheqing, the first mate of the "Laiyuan" ship, said: "As for the medicine received, it is not suitable and not prepared. In the battle of Donggou, there were those who delayed the application because the bullets were running out, and there were those who temporarily reduced the medicine because the factors did not fit the chest. Shen Shoukun, the chief officer of the guns of the "Dingyuan" ship, also said: "Some of the bullets made by China do not fit the breech; There are those who have poor iron quality and are all holes in the bullet surface, and it is difficult to ensure that they are not exported and not blown up first. Even if the fuse pulls the fire, there are many who fail to trigger.
When you are in battle, when you encounter such arms, it is really not a shallow harm, so you should not be careless in ordinary times. Gao Chengxi, the second mate of the guns and guns of the "Dingyuan" ship, pointed out: "Guns and guns are extremely important parts of military affairs, and when they are manufactured, they must be more disciplined, seek their strength, carefully try them properly, and then use them, so as not to prevent harm." If the previous example is still followed, regardless of whether the chamber is closed or not, the size of the explosive force, and whether it can be far, the plug will be obliged to work.
Not only is it harmful to use it in wartime, but it is also harmful to use it in peacetime. These are all heartfelt feelings after experiencing the brutal ordeal of the battlefield. The serious consequences caused by the quality of the ammunition are self-evident, ranging from delaying the firing of naval guns and causing insufficient firepower, to causing accidental injuries and unnecessary sacrifices, and no matter what the consequences, it is a great weakening of combat effectiveness.
Second, there is a gap between weaponry and the enemy.
There are many indicators to measure the combat effectiveness of a fleet, including the number of ships, the tonnage of warships, the quality, the speed, the number and performance of naval guns, and so on. A comparison of the above indicators of the Chinese and Japanese navies before the Sino-Japanese War shows that the overall strength of the Beiyang Navy is seriously weaker than that of the Japan Navy, and Li Hongzhang, Ding Ruchang and others have realized this before the war, so they vigorously urged the Qing government to purchase ships in an attempt to make up for the gap in strength between the Chinese and Japanese navies. However, due to the aforementioned reasons, their efforts were unsuccessful, forcing Li Hongzhang and Ding Ruchang to turn to individual improvements, such as replacing naval guns and increasing the rate of fire and accuracy. At the end of March 1894, Ding Ruchang wrote to Li Hongzhang:
The "Zhenyuan" and "Dingyuan" two iron ships were originally set up with large and small gun positions of the old type, the "Jiyuan" steel express ship was only equipped with three cannons, and the gun power was thin, and the "Jingyuan" and "Laiyuan" steel fast ships still lacked stern gun positions, and the two ships of Zhenyuan and Dingyuan should each have six new 12-life express guns, and the three ships of "Jiyuan", "Jingyuan" and "Laiyuan" should each have two new 12-life express guns, a total of 18 guns, and sub-medicinal equipment. In addition, the "Weiyuan" training ship was originally equipped with the old Amos breech gun behind the foremast, which was not very smart, and it was planned to replace it with three new breech guns with a special semi-grinding disc seat of Kelubu, and other parts. All of them are indispensable for coastal defense, please check and handle them at your discretion.
Li Hongzhang reported Ding Ruchang's request to the Prime Minister's Naval Affairs Yamen, and received the reply that this gun position was related to the warship's sharp weapons, and the general needed to handle it with a silver number. Li Hongzhang immediately ordered the Tianjin Ordnance Bureau and the Branch Bureau to calculate the required funds. The Ordnance Bureau and the Branch Bureau reported:
In the preceding item, a total of 21 new gun emplacements were purchased, all of which were connected with the medicine equipment, and according to the confirmed estimate of the price of the Kelubu Factory, the total cost of transportation feet and insurance was about 613,040 taels of silver. The Navy charter has been checked and finalized, and any purchase of a large quantity of arms should be approved by the Navy Yamen and allocated separately, and it should not be included in the perennial funds.
In view of this, Li Hongzhang felt:
At present, the Navy Yamen and the Household Department are the same as the same department, if this purchase of guns is a huge amount of money, I am afraid that it will be difficult to raise funds, and then four plans, check the annual silver rated by the Navy Yamen, 200,000 taels of silver, and transfer the "Zhenyuan" and other eight ships to repair coal all the year round and add various things at any time. A total of more than 354,000 taels of silver are estimated to be needed, which will be temporarily allocated in annual installments from the reserve funds, and will still be reported in the reimbursement case of the eight ships. Its "Jiyuan", "Jingyuan", "Laiyuan", "Weiyuan" and other four ships should purchase each gun, after the "fixed" and "town" two ships of the gun price is paid off, if the spare item can still be moved, and then continue to purchase and so on, please come to the bill.
In particular, he noted:
The new quick-firing cannon of the Chenchard factory can be fired up to 60 out every six minutes, and its power can penetrate several inches of iron, which is really a victory weapon made at sea. The Beiyang Navy's ironclad, fast, and training ships were originally set up with gun positions, although they were called new at that time, but they were dwarfed by the current fast guns, and the navy took the "fixed", "town", "classic", and "come" iron fast ships as giants, and the ships were especially strong and sharp, and if the gun positions were not many, they were too thin, and in case of urgency, they were not enough to be trusted, and they could not be strengthened. It is urgent to gradually add to the purchase to defend the war. However, due to the shortage of salaries and the difficulty of raising huge sums of money, it is hereby planned to make every effort to evenly balance the funds of the eight ships, and first purchase 12 fast guns of the two ships of "Ding" and "Town", and purchase them one after another as soon as there is a surplus. It seems that this is handled in years, which is not only beneficial to the military, but also does not need to raise additional funds, which is very appropriate.
It can be seen from this that in order to update the naval guns, Li Hongzhang can be said to have racked his brains, but at this time, there were only more than three months before the outbreak of the Battle of Toshima, and in this short period of time, it was not easy to overcome many obstacles and install these 120 mm Krupp guns on the "Dingyuan" and "Zhenyuan." In the end, the last chance to bridge the power gap between the Chinese and Japanese navies was lost. On 12 September, five days before the outbreak of the Battle of the Yellow Sea, Ding Ruchang also expected to lead his brigade to Lushun the next night to discuss with Gong Zhaoxi the deployment of rear artillery for "Jingyuan" and "Laiyuan."
Judging from the number of ships participating in the battle, the Beiyang Fleet has 14 ships and the Japan Fleet has 12 ships, and on the surface it seems that the Beiyang Fleet has more than the Japan Fleet, but in fact the Beiyang Fleet has 4 ships that not only participated in the war late, but also did not play a big role, and can only be regarded as the number of ships on both sides is equal. However, in terms of tonnage, even if 14 ships are counted, the total tonnage of the Beiyang Fleet is only about 32,600 tons, while the total tonnage of the 12 warships of the Japan Fleet is about 39,600 tons, which is 7,000 tons more than the Beiyang Fleet.
Looking at the quality of warships, most of the ships of the Beiyang Navy were commissioned in the 80s of the 19th century, while most of the ships of the Japan Navy were commissioned in the 90s of the 19th century.
Except for weak ships such as the "Akagi" and "Saikyo Maru," which were relatively slow, most of the Japan fleet's warships sailed at a speed of more than 15 knots, and the average speed of the four warships of the First Guerrilla Force reached 19.4 knots, and the speed of the "Yoshino" was as high as 23 knots, which was the fundamental reason why the Japan fleet was able to maintain a complete battle formation and carry out high-speed maneuvers during naval battles. On the other hand, the Beiyang Fleet, with the exception of the "Zhiyuan" and "Jingyuan" with a theoretical speed of 18 knots, the rest of the ships have a speed of between 14 and 15 knots, and because they are all old ships, the actual speed can no longer reach such a level, and this is one of the reasons why the Beiyang Fleet has not completed the transformation of the battle formation from the very beginning.
Cruiser Yoshino
The speed of warships is the most important guarantee for the realization of tactical intentions, and the huge difference in speed has brought about a series of serious consequences, as evidenced by the review of the officers participating in the Beiyang Navy:
In the battle of Dadonggou, the enemy changed to Ling, and in an instant, our army's change of formation was not completed, and it was already surrounded. Although there is a heavenly ingenuity, it is difficult to fly with wings.
Warships are expensive and fast, and if they are fast, it is easy to change formations and win. Such as the battle of Dadonggou...... Our ship was slow and difficult to change, so it was defeated by the enemy.
The enemy was wounded and retreated, and our ship could not chase it. It was the two armies that faced each other, and Peter advanced and retreated freely.
The performance of naval guns is a key factor related to the victory or defeat of the sea, especially the firing speed, which has far exceeded the caliber and firing range. The 12 warships of the Beiyang Fleet had a total of 58 guns of more than 100 mm caliber, while the Japan fleet had 104 guns, 1.8 times that of the Beiyang Fleet, and most of them were rapid-fire guns, of which "Matsushima", "Itsukushima" and "Hashidate" were each equipped with 11 to 12 rapid-fire guns of 120 mm caliber; "Yoshino", "Akitsuzu", "Chiyoda" and other ships also have 8 to 12 rapid-fire guns of 120 mm and 150 mm calibers each. In addition, the Beiyang Fleet with guns below 100 mm was equipped with 163 guns, and the Japan fleet was equipped with 171 guns, and the Japanese side also had an advantage. Although the 320-mm guns of the "Matsushima", "Itsukushima", and "Hashidate" ships were fired only 13 times in the naval battle, and their power was not fully utilized, the power of the rapid-fire guns was brought into full play, thus making up for the shortcomings of the giant guns.
Rapid-fire gun drawings from the original drawings of the ship "Yoshino".
In contrast, the Beiyang Fleet ships have very few rapid-fire guns, although the "Dingyuan" and "Zhenyuan" give full play to the role of 305 mm caliber cannons, but this is also the inevitable manifestation of the lack of rapid-fire guns, no matter how powerful they are, it is difficult to resist the power of many rapid-fire guns. According to calculations at the time, a 120-mm rapid-fire gun could fire 8 to 10 shells per minute, a 150-mm rapid-fire gun could fire 5 to 6 shells per minute, and the same caliber of the old naval gun could fire only 50 rounds per second. There is no doubt that the firepower of the old naval guns will be suppressed by the rapid-fire guns, which has caused Zhang Zheqin to say, "If I fire one huge cannon, the enemy can use five rapid guns, and if it is not hit, the enemy will already suffer a lot." I don't have a quick cannon to counter it".
Third, the sense of discipline is too weak.
Although the "Beiyang Navy Regulations" do not clearly stipulate battlefield discipline, the sense of discipline is that of soldiers
One of the most basic qualities, which is determined by the nature of war. Whether it is Ding Ruchang, who came from the army, or the pipe belts of various ships that have undergone special training in the navy, they should understand this simple truth. However, the formation of the concept of discipline is closely related to the cultural state of a country and the era in which the country lives. In the late Qing Dynasty, the decline of social culture and the disorder of social management will inevitably be reflected in the construction of the army. The abolition of discipline and the corruption of military style were the inevitable characteristics of the army of the late Qing Dynasty. As a modern navy under the feudal system, the management mode of the Western army can make it glow with vitality for a while, but it cannot fundamentally change its genes.
The efforts of foreigner Lang Weili once gave the Beiyang Navy the mental state of the modern navy in the rising period, but in the end it failed to eliminate its slackness and casualness. Zhang Zheqing, the first mate of the "Laiyuan" ship, summed up the problems existing in the Beiyang Navy as follows:
The order is not strict. Usually flags and lights, there are many slow promises. Once the order is issued, it is also urged again and again before it can be ordered. It has been used consistently, and in the autumn of something, it is inevitable that there will be no disease that will slow down the opportune time.
Assist the lack of talent. Since the rise of the army, there has been no one who has a plan to win. When the admiral and the generals drew up their plans, there were those who were duitous and disagreeable, and there were those who retreated. The staff has a word, but they dare not go up because they avoid suspicion. When it comes to the enemy, each of them takes advantage of their own tricks, regardless of the overall situation.
Lack of discipline. There is no distinction between merit and inferiority among naval officers and men. Those who do not do so will not be punished. Therefore, many follow-ups. If there is something good at the top, there will be something at the bottom. Accustomed to each other, it is regarded as the old state. Subordinates dare not report the fault of their superiors, and their superiors can also hide the mistakes of their subordinates. and even flinched from the battle, fearing not to move forward, and not to investigate. And merit and guilt are reversed, and things are boiling.
will be inaugurated envoy. There are those who are invincible in talent, those who are not knowledgeable, and those who have no knowledge of their duties. Or hindered by affection, or good at greeting, or loyal to the cost-saving, good at a slight art, Xun enough to live a life. When the enemy is near, it will be used, regardless of the delay of the whole ship.
The morale of the army is not solid. The soldiers' rebellion depends on the ability of the generals. The generals of our army, there are those who have a good grasp of the situation, and the soldiers think they are reliable, and there are many solids. He has tight military affairs, and when he encounters trouble, and his god is discolored, the soldiers will inevitably be terrified when they see it. If a ship is so, tell him that so is a ship.
Soldiers are safe. When Qianlang Weili was in the army, he practiced day and night, and it was very difficult for the soldiers to leave the ship. It is within the reach of the spirit of Lang, and no one dares to make mistakes. Since Lang went, gradually loosened, soldiers have moved, and those who live on the shore at night have half a boat. Although the operation is carried out according to the rules during the day, it may not be serious, and when there is something to do, it is hard work.
The affection is too heavy. Students' courage is the foundation of the navy, and the strength and weakness of the old and the young are uneven, and it is inevitable that there will be no disadvantages of being merciless. Those who have deeper qualifications and better ability in the army will not be promoted for a long time. And those who serve will join the army.
Improper awards. After the navy has gone through battle, no matter whether it is victorious or defeated, there are those who are brave in each of its ships, and there are those who retreat, so that they can be rewarded and punished separately, which is enough to encourage people's hearts. After the battle, our army never inspected, and its fearful evasion, fortunately did not taste the risk. Those who charge to fight fires and bravely fire cannons still regret not learning their abilities.
These malpractices are difficult for outsiders to perceive when no one investigates them in peacetime, and they are extremely harmful in wartime. At the beginning of the naval battle in the Yellow Sea, there was "the brave who are too brave, and they do not wait for orders and compete for the first; The cowardly is too cowardly, and does not obey the order and retreats." When the fleet loses its unified command, the ships also lose discipline and restraint. In particular, after the sinking of the "Zhiyuan" at 3:30 p.m., the chaotic situation of the Beiyang Fleet suddenly intensified, with the "Jiyuan" and "Guangjia" escaping one after another, and the "Jingyuan," "Laiyuan," "Jingyuan," "Pingyuan," and "Guangbing" leaving the battlefield one after another without giving any signal, leaving only the "Dingyuan" and "Zhenyuan" struggling to support themselves on the battlefield.
The act of fleeing on the battlefield is not only a serious weakening of combat effectiveness, but also a heavy blow to the morale of officers and men, and the impact of Fang Boqian, Wu Jingrong, and others' acts of abandoning their military responsibilities and losing their will to fight on naval warfare is incalculable. According to the statistics of the Japanese side, when the ships of the Beiyang Fleet withdrew from the battle, 225 rounds were fired in the "Laiyuan," 110 rounds in the "Jingyuan," 24 rounds in the "Pingyuan," and 15 rounds in the "Jiyuan." This shows that the withdrawal of most of the warships of the Beiyang Fleet from the battle was not unbearable, but had something to do with the vacillation of the military's morale, and the impact of this situation on the subsequent war is incalculable.
On the other hand, the Japan fleet, when the weak ships withdrew from the battlefield after suffering heavy losses, all sent signals to inform the flagship. At 2:15 p.m., "Hiei" withdrew from the battlefield and issued a signal that "the ship is on fire and withdraws from the battle." Soon after, "Saikyo Maru" also discovered that "Hiei" and "Akagi" were in danger, and quickly sent a signal to notify the team and the first guerrilla group to rescue. When the "Saikyo Maru" was attacked by four Chinese warships, it gave the signal "there is an obstacle to our rudder" in time, and then hurriedly fled the battlefield. Except for the "Saikyo Maru," which could not bear to be left in battle, the other two ships managed to return to their temporary anchorage after fighting fires and repairing leaks. With a displacement of just over 600 tons, the "Akagi," which narrowly escaped pursuit, was "returned to its own unit after three or four hours" after a military inventory and replenishment of troops. The old ship "Hiei", which had been in service for 16 years, "finally could not move with the team due to the fire, so it returned to the temporary anchorage for the time being, entrusted the wounded to the transport ship, and then returned to the battlefield with Haimen." ”
In addition, the 1st Guerrilla Force always obeyed the orders of its own unit, and no matter how much he exercised his subjective initiative, Kozo Tsuboi did not ignore the orders of his own unit and acted in his own way, as did the ships. It can be seen from these circumstances that there is a marked difference in the sense of discipline among the Chinese and Japanese naval officers, and the weak sense of discipline among the officers of the Beiyang Navy is an important factor in accelerating the defeat of the naval war.
Fourth, the technical level of officers and soldiers is not high.
The tactical and technical level of officers and men is another prerequisite for winning a war. In terms of tactics, there was a large gap between the generals of the Beiyang Navy and their opponents. During the naval battle, the Japan fleet, from the commander to the ship management belt, always paid attention to reflecting the tactical intentions formed before the war, and the two tactical groups of the fleet maintained close cooperation from beginning to end, and even if there was a deviation in coordination, they would make up for it in the course of maneuvering. Since the Beiyang Fleet launched the "Gap Goose Formation", there is no tactic to speak of. It is true that this is mainly caused by Ding Ruchang's lack of tactical arrangements, but the weakness of the tactical awareness of each ship's pipe belt is also one of the important factors.
In terms of technology, according to Japanese statistics, the Japan fleet fired a total of 20,921 rounds of large and small caliber shells in naval battles, and only the six ships "Dingyuan," "Zhenyuan," "Laiyuan," "Jingyuan," "Pingyuan," and "Jiyuan" were hit 753 rounds. Although we cannot find any record of the number of shells fired by the Beiyang Navy and the number of enemy ships hit in Chinese historical materials, judging from the fact that not a single warship of the Japan fleet was sunk and repaired quickly, the hit rate should not be very high. In addition to the equipment, the low level of military technology of the officers and men is also an important reason. Philmant once said: "If all the generals of the Chinese ships are trained in the study of naval warfare, the Japanese ships can become animal powder." There is some truth to this.
All in all, there are many reasons for the defeat of the Beiyang Navy in the Battle of the Yellow Sea, and the author will sort out here in order to better sum up the lessons of the defeat and provide a useful reference for today's naval construction, and there is absolutely no denial of the sacrifice made by the officers and men of the Beiyang Navy for the nation.
On the contrary, the author believes that the patriotic and sacrificial spirit displayed by the overwhelming majority of officers and men in naval battles is an important part of the spiritual treasure house of the Chinese nation and deserves to be inherited and carried forward today.
However, in recent years, in order to give prominence to the fighting spirit and military qualities of the officers and men of the Beiyang Navy, some scholars have ignored the facts, exaggerated the leading role of the equipment and technology gap between China and Japan in naval warfare, cut off the ties between the decadent feudal system and the Beiyang Navy, and blindly elevated the technical quality and moral quality of the officers and men of the Beiyang Navy.