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In July 1923, the Soviet delegation informed the Chinese Foreign Ministry that Yue Fei had been transferred back to China, and that the Soviet government had sent Garahan, who had been acting foreign minister, as its plenipotentiary to China.
Garahan met with Zhang Zuolin several times while passing through the northeast, and then arrived in Beijing on September 2.
On September 4, Garrahan circulated a written statement to representatives of the Chinese press, in which he said:
The principles of the two declarations on China in 1919 and 1920 were still the guiding principles for the Soviet Union in handling relations with China, and the Soviet Union's policy toward China was fundamentally different from that of Tsarist Russia. The European and American powers hoped that China would become the "sick man of East Asia", but the Soviet Union hoped that China would be unified and strong; The Soviet Union's friendship with China was not only due to its principles, but also to the consideration of Soviet political interests. The statement accused the Beijing government of taking unfriendly actions against Russia in recent years, saying that this does not represent public opinion.
The statement asserted that the Soviet Union would never give up its interests in China, and that the actual interests of the Soviet Union in China must be recognized.
When Garrahan came to China, the Soviet Union was more stable at home, and there was a trend of recognizing the Soviet Union in the world, but China was still in a situation of confrontation between the governments of the north and the south and Zhang Zuolin seizing the northeast. The situation was favorable to the Soviet side. Garrahan took advantage of the situation and took a tough stance in the negotiations.
From September 3 to November 30, 1923, Wang Zhengting held eight talks with Garahan.
1. Sino-Soviet negotiations that have repeatedly reached an impasse
At first, Garrahan insisted that the Chinese side first unconditionally recognize the Soviet government and restore diplomatic relations between the two countries, and then negotiate various issues between China and the Soviet Union.
The Beijing government insisted on recognizing the question of the Soviet government in parallel with other issues between China and the Soviet Union. When negotiating with the Viet Fay mission, the Chinese side demanded that the issue of the withdrawal of Soviet troops in Outer Mongolia be resolved first, and Viet Fei opposed raising individual issues in advance before the start of the Sino-Russian conference, and advocated that all issues should be resolved together at the Sino-Russian conference, and the Chinese side was forced to agree.
At this time, Wang Zhengting used the existing consensus between Yue Fei and the Chinese side as an argument, but Garrahan could not answer, but said that the pending cases of first resumption of diplomatic relations and then negotiations were mentioned in Moscow's instructions.
In order to break the deadlock and move forward with the negotiations, Wang Zhengting proposed:
The two sides first signed an agreement, which set out the basic principles (i.e., outlines) for the settlement of the outstanding major issues between China and the Soviet Union, and the specific negotiations for the settlement of the issues were completed within six months after the signing of the agreement; The resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries is included in the agreement, and on the day of its signing, diplomatic relations between the two countries will be restored naturally, and concrete negotiations on the settlement of various issues will begin in earnest.
Garrahan asked the Chinese side to explain its views on the basic principles for resolving the outstanding cases.
The two sides then exchanged views on the matter. After several consultations, a consensus was reached on the abolition of Russia's leased land and consular jurisdiction in China and the conclusion of a separate treaty of commerce on an equal footing.
But there are significant differences between the two sides on several key issues:
Wang Zhengting advocated the abolition of all treaties and agreements signed between the tsarist government and China, and the two sides should sign treaties and agreements on an equal footing, and Garrahan believed that the treaty on the Sino-Russian border should still be valid; Wang Zhengting proposed that the Soviet troops stationed in Outer Mongolia be withdrawn within six months, but Garrahan was unwilling to agree; Wang Zhengting believed that the Soviet Union should return the China Eastern Railway to China in accordance with the commitments made in the two declarations on China, but Garrahan did not agree.
Negotiations are again at an impasse.
On November 21, 1923, Wang Zhengting sent a letter to Garahan, saying that he would go on a two-week business trip to Japan and that "the outstanding Sino-Russian cases have yet to be resolved, and I sincerely hope that the date of the formal meeting will be decided, and consultations with your representatives will begin when the contemptible people return."
In a reply dated November 23, Garrahan expressed dissatisfaction with the Chinese government's reluctance to immediately and unconditionally restore diplomatic relations between China and the Soviet Union.
Wang Zhengting replied on November 28, pointing out that the positions of the two sides in the Sino-Soviet negotiations were already close, and now the Soviet side suddenly reprimanded them in writing on the issue of resuming diplomatic relations, which is not beneficial to both China and the Soviet Union. China and the Soviet Union have their own problems that need to be resolved during negotiations on the establishment of diplomatic relations, and it is hoped that Garrahan will discuss everything after his return from Japan in accordance with the consensus reached by the two sides.
On 30 November, Garrahan replied to Wang Zhengting in a long letter, once again accusing the Beijing government of having participated in the armed intervention of Soviet Russia, saying that the first resumption of diplomatic relations was the best guarantee for a successful outcome of the meeting to negotiate various outstanding cases.
He also said that the differences between the two sides were caused by misunderstanding, and he never said that all rights to the China Eastern Railway belonged to China. Garrahan accused that Wang Zhengting wanted to settle all problems thoroughly in advance when determining the basic principles for settling the outstanding cases and when resuming Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations, and wanted the Soviet Government to pay a special remuneration for obtaining China's recognition and "repay China's recognition of the Soviet Union by agreement."
Garrahan said that he could not agree to Wang Zhengting's proposal, let alone convey it to the Soviet government.
Garrahan said that there was only one obstacle to Sino-Soviet talks, that is, the unwillingness of the Beijing Government to restore normal relations with the Soviet Union. Garrahand's letter was followed by the texts of the two declarations on China in 1919 and 1920, which were "officially corrected."
2. Garahan's tough attitude
In early December, the Office for the Supervision of Sino-Russian Representations sent a letter to the Soviet delegation informing the Chinese Foreign Ministry of its views on the issue of the presentation of certificates by the Soviet representatives, but the Soviet delegation refused to accept the letter, saying that the Office for the Supervision of Sino-Russian Representations could not replace the Chinese Foreign Ministry.
After returning from his trip to Japan, Wang Zhengting sent a letter to Garrahan on January 9, 1924, replying to his letter of November 30 of the previous year. Wang Zhengting pointed out that the text of the first declaration of Soviet Russia on China, copied by Garahan, is somewhat different from the text of the declaration received by the Chinese government from Irkutsk in March 1920.
The text received by the Chinese Government from Irkutsk was transmitted through official channels between China and Russia, and this text should prevail.
The Chinese Government's proposal to discuss all issues between China and the Soviet Union at the same time was based on the proposal of Yue Fei, the former representative of Soviet Russia. Wang Zhengting also pointed out that Garrahan said that the Soviet Union had shown its sincerity to China through its two declarations on China, but the Chinese people believed that the Soviet Union's sincerity was not enough, "because your country's troops are still stationed in China's territory, Outer Mongolia, and Inner Mongolia."
If we only restore diplomatic relations and postpone the unsolved Sino-Soviet cases that need to be resolved urgently, how can the Chinese people be satisfied?
If the Sino-Soviet meeting can be started at an early date, Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations will naturally be restored at an early date. It is hoped that the Soviet side will give further consideration, promptly inform the date of the meeting, and resolve all issues.
On January 17, Garrahan sent a long letter to Wang Zhengting, in which he made a comprehensive refutation of Wang's views. Garrahan said that the text that had been omitted from the gratuitous return of the China Eastern Railway was the accurate text of the 1919 Declaration on China; The Chinese Government has not declared its acceptance of the 1919 Declaration, and its participation in the armed intervention in Russia is a concrete rejection of the Soviet Russian Declaration, and it is unreasonable to use this Declaration as the basis for certain demands five years later.
Garrahan once again stated the Soviet Union's point of view on the crux of the negotiations, the question of Outer Mongolia.
Garrahan said that before sending the Russian Red Army to Outer Mongolia to eliminate the Enggen bandits, Soviet Russia had asked the Chinese government to stop the Russian white bandits from attacking Soviet Russian territory, but the Chinese government had not taken any measures to eliminate these troops.
Under these circumstances, Soviet Russia had no choice but to defend its independence and freedom with its own army.
Galahan said menacingly:
"Now I can declare very clearly to your Governor that if there are any more white bandits anywhere in China, and the Chinese Government still gives asylum, or does not want or is unable to eliminate the white bandits despite the request of the mainland, the Soviet Government will have to take the necessary measures to defend itself with the help of the Red Army, as it did in Outer Mongolia in 1921."
On the issue of the withdrawal of troops from Outer Mongolia, Garrahan said:
"We consider Mongolia to be part of China, and as soon as the Chinese government makes the necessary guarantees for the security of the mainland border, we are ready to withdraw the Red Army units stationed in Kulen." Even if, according to the most favorable explanation for China, the Chinese did not encourage the White Party in 1921 and did not take measures to expel them from Mongolia because of insufficient troops, at the present time, when the situation in northern China is more favorable than in 1921, we should pay more attention to knowing what guarantees the Beijing government intends to give us at the conference. ”
In order to induce the immediate and unconditional recognition of the Soviet government by the Beijing government, Garrahan said:
"All questions can be resolved at the meeting after the restoration of normal Russian-Chinese relations, in accordance with the spirit of the declarations of 1919 and 1920 and the views expressed in my letter to your superintendent."
In conclusion, Garrahan said that he would not be able to hold discussions with Wang Zhengting until the Chinese government had changed its position.
3. The question of Outer Mongolia behind the negotiations of the Sino-Soviet Agreement
At the request of the Beijing government, Garrahan agreed to continue negotiations. After a period of difficult negotiations, on February 25, 1924, Wang Zhengting submitted to Garrahan a draft agreement on the outline of the settlement of the outstanding Sino-Russian disputes.
The draft agreement drawn up by the Chinese side consists of 13 articles, of which Article 5 on the question of Outer Mongolia reads:
"The Soviet Government, which regards Outer Mongolia as a part of the territory of China, is now ready to withdraw all its troops at once, and declares that all treaties with Outer Mongolia will be annulled."
Garrahan disagreed with several key elements of the draft, especially the above-mentioned clause on the question of Outer Mongolia, insisting that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Outer Mongolia and the cancellation of the Soviet-Mongolian treaty should be discussed at the meeting.
On 1 March, Garrahan proposed amendments to the draft Sino-Russian agreement on the settlement of outstanding cases, which was revised by the Soviet side to 15 articles, and the article on the question of Outer Mongolia was changed to "The Soviet Government regards Outer Mongolia as a part of the entire Chinese territory and declares that the conditions for the withdrawal of troops (i.e., the time limit and the guarantee for stopping the White Party) will be withdrawn from all troops once agreed at the meeting."
On March 3, Wang Zhengting submitted his draft agreement of February 25 and the amendment of March 1 to the President and the State Department, and on March 8, he gave an explanation at the State Council. Members of the Beijing government's cabinet were dissatisfied with the provisions on several key issues, such as Mongolia and the China Eastern Railway.
That evening, Wang Zhengting and Garrahan had long negotiations.
On several minor issues, the Soviet side made some concessions, and there was still no progress in the negotiations on the Outer Mongolia issue. Wang Zhengting demanded that the abrogation of the Soviet-Mongolian treaty be clearly stipulated, but Garrahan resolutely refused.
Wang Zhengting said:
"Since Outer Mongolia is Chinese territory, it cannot recognize the presence of an official Russian representative there, and the government of the Russian-Mongolian Entente cannot legally recognize its existence."
Garrahan Says:
"The Chinese government can not recognize it, because the Russian government did not notify the Chinese government at the beginning, and it has not asked the Chinese government to recognize it."
On March 11, the State Council in Beijing was reconvened. Members of the Cabinet remained dissatisfied with the provisions of the draft agreement on the withdrawal of troops from Outer Mongolia and the abrogation of the Soviet-Mongolian treaty. Wang Zhengting was instructed to consult with Garrahan again.
On March 12, the State Council met again, and after the meeting, Wang Zhengting went to negotiate again. The cabinet meeting on the morning of 13 June listened to Wang Zhengting's report on the negotiations on 12 July, but was not satisfied. The members of the Cabinet agreed to meet at the presidential palace in the afternoon of the same day to prepare for a final decision. President Cao Kunto was not present, and the cabinet members were not present, so the meeting could not be held.
Wang Zhengting went to negotiate with Garrahan again in the afternoon of this day. When the cabinet members were at a loss at the presidential palace, Wang Zhengting called and said that the Soviet side did not accept the demands of the cabinet meeting on the Outer Mongolia and other issues, and that it was inconvenient to delay the negotiations. The cabinet members present said that they would meet again on the 14th to discuss it.
In the evening of the same day, Wang Zhengting and Garrahan held all-night negotiations and made minor changes to the text of the draft agreement.
At 8 a.m. on the morning of 14 July, Wang Zhengting and Garrahan respectively made visas with initials on the draft agreement, and agreed to formally sign the agreement after the original draft of the agreement was completed and submitted to their respective governments for approval.
The Chinese State Council met on 14 April to hear Wang Zhengting's report, and the cabinet members held that the draft agreement was still inappropriate, and Wang Zhengting said that it was not easy to reach such a point, and there was really no hope for further progress. The cabinet members demanded that Wang Zhengting make representations with the Soviet side again.
On the morning of 15 July, Garrahan telephoned Wang Zhengting and said that the Sino-Soviet agreement must be signed in the afternoon of the same day, otherwise all the previous discussions would be cancelled.
The cabinet members believed that the Soviet-Mongolian treaty and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Outer Mongolia still needed to be resolved, and asked Wang Zhengting to continue to negotiate with the Soviet side.
On March 16, Gallahan sent a letter to Wang Zhengting, saying that he would not be bound by the agreement after the deadline of three days, pending the recognition of the draft agreement by the Chinese government. If the negotiations between the two sides break down, the Chinese Government shall be responsible for all the consequences arising therefrom.
Wang Zhengting reported the contents of the Soviet representative's letter to the State Council, requesting that the plan be decided quickly.
The State Department made its decision on March 17:
"This note from the Russian representative is a me-dear ultimatum that is contrary to international practice"; The Chinese Government is carefully considering the draft outline of the agreement and has not denied it. Otherwise, it would be a violation of international etiquette and a great regret to impose all the responsibility on the mainland government. Moreover, the points in the original outline of the agreement were not properly agreed upon, and the representative should also bear the responsibility for the failure of the representative to respect the sovereignty of the mainland very much, and if it is unfortunate that there is a rupture of its own. ”
On the same day, the State Council sent a letter to Wang Zhengting, asking him to hold further sincere consultations with Garrahand.
4. The conclusion of the "Sino-Russian Agreement on the Outline of the Settlement of Outstanding Cases".
On 19 March, Garrahan sent a letter to Wang Zhengting, accusing the Beijing Government of following the foreign powers, supporting the old Russian White Party, and going against the friendly wishes of the Chinese people and the Soviet Union, saying that the Beijing Government's reluctance to recognize the draft agreement signed by Wang Zhengting was influenced by the powers hostile to the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Government's patience had reached the limit.
The letter stated in the name of the Soviet government that negotiations with the Chinese representatives had come to an end; After the expiration of the three-day period referred to in the letter of 16 March, the Soviet Union reserves the right to freedom of movement in the event of a future agreement with China; If the Chinese government wants to resume negotiations in the future, it must first unconditionally restore diplomatic relations. The Chinese Government should not make irreparable mistakes that would affect future diplomatic relations between the two countries.
On the same day, Gallahan sent a note to Chinese Foreign Minister Gu Weijun and made the same statement.
At this time, the Beijing government had no real power, and in case of trouble, it had to consult with powerful factions in various places, especially the faces of several powerful warlords.
There were such major twists and turns in the Sino-Soviet negotiations, and the Beijing government could not afford to bear the responsibility.
On March 20, the Beijing government issued a presidential decree declaring:
"The Sino-Russian negotiation relationship is very important, and since Wang Zhengting made preparations for the meeting, although his views with the Russian representatives have gradually become harmonious, but the terms have not yet been determined, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be instructed to accept and handle them, and the Russian representatives should continue to discuss and proceed with them as soon as possible, so as to take up their duties."
On the same day, the State Council sent two telegrams to Wang Huaiqing, Feng Yuxiang, Wu Peifu, Qi Xieyuan, and other important generals, as well as to the provincial governors and governors of various provinces, informing them of the course of Sino-Soviet negotiations, explaining that the Sino-Soviet negotiations were of great importance and that the government had no choice but to proceed cautiously.
On March 22, Gu Weijun, the chief foreign minister of the Beijing government, sent a letter to Garrahand, explaining that Wang Zhengting had signed the draft treaty without the government's prior approval, and that the Chinese government believed that the negotiations had not yet been concluded. China's diplomacy is not subject to interference by other countries; The Chinese Government has the sincerity to restore diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and the Minister General of Foreign Affairs has been instructed to take over the Sino-Soviet negotiations and is ready to continue negotiations with your representatives.
In a reply dated 25 March, Garrahan accused the Chinese State Council of sabotaging the agreement by not adopting the draft agreement signed by Wang Zhengting, continued to hold that the Chinese government was influenced by the foreign powers in doing so, and said that the Chinese government's reluctance to formally sign the agreement was a lack of sincerity in restoring diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.
The letter concluded by stating that diplomatic relations between the two countries must be restored immediately before negotiations could continue.
On April 1, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Beijing government sent another letter to Garahan, pointing out that Wang Zhengting had not been granted the right to sign, and that Garrahan refused to continue negotiations on the pretext that the Chinese government had not adopted the draft agreement agreed upon by Wang Zhengting, because he did not want to resolve the problems in Sino-Russian relations. The move of signing a contract within a time limit is "close to intimidation".
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Beijing Government requested the following three amendments to the draft agreement negotiated by Wang Zhengting:
(1) The Soviet side should clearly declare that all treaties and agreements concluded between the Soviet Union and a third party since the "October Revolution" in Russia that hinder China's sovereignty and interests are null and void. This was in fact a call for the abrogation of the treaty between Soviet Russia and Outer Mongolia.
(2) The text on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Outer Mongolia should be revised, and the Soviet Government should make a more tangible commitment to withdraw its troops from Outer Mongolia, and the detailed methods for the withdrawal could be negotiated at future meetings, but the withdrawal should not be conditional.
(3) The question of the transfer of the property of the Russian churches in China to the Soviet government will be discussed in detail at the conference.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Beijing government said that if the Soviet side agrees to make the above changes, the Chinese government is willing to formally sign the agreement. As long as the agreement is formally signed, diplomatic relations between China and the Soviet Union will naturally be restored.
The representative of the Soviet Union did not reply to China's proposal for delay. Gu Weijun tried to hold informal talks with the representatives of the Soviet Union, "and it took a lot of time to block."
From mid-May 1924, Gu Weijun and Garrahan stepped up negotiations and negotiated more than 20 times. In late May, the parties reached an agreement. On May 30, the State Council of the Beijing Government deliberated and approved the draft agreement, which was also approved by the President. On May 31, 1924, the Sino-Russian Agreement on the Outline for the Settlement of Outstanding Cases was officially signed in Beijing.
5. Comparison of the two treaties signed by the Soviet Union and Tsarist Russia
Articles 2, 4 and 5 of the Sino-Russian Agreement on the Outline for the Settlement of Outstanding Cases are relevant to the Outer Mongolia issue.
Article 2 provides:
"The Governments of the two States Parties agree to convene a meeting within one month of the signing of this Agreement to negotiate detailed measures for the implementation of all outstanding cases, in accordance with the provisions of the following articles." This detailed procedure shall be completed expeditiously, but in any event not later than six months from the date of commencement of the meeting referred to in the preceding paragraph. ”
Article 4 provides:
"The Soviet Government, in accordance with its policy and the declarations of 1919 and 1920, declares that all treaties, agreements, etc., concluded between the former Russian Imperial Government and third parties shall be null and void if they interfere with China's sovereignty and interests......"
In connection with this article, the Agreement is accompanied by a declaration stating that:
"With regard to Article 4 of the Outline Agreement, the two sides understand that the Chinese Government does not recognize as valid any treaties, agreements, etc., concluded by Russia with third parties since the imperialist Russian government, which have hindered China's sovereignty and interests, and will not be or are in the future."
This is something that the Beijing government fought over over the Soviet-Mongolian treaty. However, it only said that the Chinese Government did not recognize the Soviet-Mongolian Treaty, and the Soviet Government understood China's position, and the Soviet side did not promise to cancel the Soviet-Mongolian Treaty.
Article 5 provides:
"The Government of the Soviet Union recognizes Outer Mongolia as a part of the Republic of China and respects the sovereignty of China within that territory. The Government of the Soviet Union declares that, as soon as the question of the withdrawal of the troops of the Government of the Soviet Union in Outer Mongolia is concerned, that is, the period of withdrawal and the means of tranquillity of the borders between them, it is agreed at the meeting provided for in Article 2 of this Agreement that all the troops of the Government of the Soviet Union will be withdrawn from Outer Mongolia. ”
After the occupation of Outer Mongolia by Soviet Russian troops in 1921, the Chinese government negotiated with Soviet Russia (Soviet Union) on this issue for nearly three years, and the Beijing government seized the opportunity of the Soviet Russian (USSR) government to obtain China's recognition of China's sovereignty and insisted that Soviet Russia (Soviet Union) recognize China's territorial sovereignty over Outer Mongolia and withdraw its troops from Outer Mongolia.
The policy of the Soviet (Soviet) government on the question of Outer Mongolia has undergone a process of evolution.
In the early stage, it attempted to restore the status created by the Sino-Russian-Mongolian Entente during the Tsarist era, and was later forced to legally recognize China's complete sovereignty over Outer Mongolia.
Compared with the provisions of the 1915 Sino-Russian-Mongolian Entente on the status of Outer Mongolia, the 1924 Sino-Russian Agreement on the Outline of the Settlement of Outstanding Cases has a fundamental difference in the status of Outer Mongolia. The former stipulates that China has only "suzerainty" over Outer Mongolia, and that Outer Mongolia's status is actually similar to that of a vassal state, and that it is a master-subordinate relationship with China. Although the treaty contains the words "Outer Mongolia is part of China's territory," in fact the Chinese Government has basically deprived Outer Mongolia of its territorial sovereignty.
The latter, however, made Outer Mongolia "a complete part of the Republic of China" and that the Soviet Union "respects China's sovereignty within that territory."
According to the provisions of the 1924 Sino-Soviet Agreement, the Chinese Government has the right to exercise jurisdiction over all persons, objects and events in Outer Mongolia, that is, it has full sovereignty, and Outer Mongolia, as an integral part of China, is in exactly the same position as other parts of China.
The Soviet government had to recognize China's territorial sovereignty over Outer Mongolia and promised to withdraw its troops from Outer Mongolia, but it was unwilling to relinquish control of Outer Mongolia.
It adopted a two-faced approach, while verbally recognizing China's territorial sovereignty over Outer Mongolia, it tacitly recognized the Outer Mongolia authorities through the signing of a 1921 political treaty with the Outer Mongolia authorities; It delayed the Sino-Soviet negotiations on the Outer Mongolia issue, used this time to consolidate the political power of the Outer Mongolia People's Party, and improved the Soviet Union's control system over Outer Mongolia, making it difficult for the Chinese government to resume its jurisdiction over Outer Mongolia by agreement.
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