Governance of "micro-corruption" behavior of village cadres: effectiveness and path

Author: Wang Jianqin, Zhang Qin

Abstract: Village cadres are a special group different from state civil servants, and their characteristics of being both officials and citizens make them have a composite identity, and they have the dual or triple identities of villagers' agents, government agents, and grassroots cadres of the party. Before the reform of the national supervision system, there was an institutional gap in the supervision mechanism of village cadres. Long-term wandering in the gray area of the national supervision system, the party's discipline inspection system, and even the national legal system is one of the important reasons for the frequent occurrence of "micro-corruption" among grassroots village cadres and the difficulty of governance. The reform of the supervision system and the implementation of the "Supervision Law" have enabled village cadres to be included in the scope of supervision and supervision duties of the supervision organs, and remarkable results have been achieved in the special and routine management of their corrupt behaviors. In the new era, focusing on the key links in the key areas of rural revitalization and identifying the point of supervision, we must adhere to the guidance of party building, strengthen the party's overall leadership over rural work, and give full play to the advantages of the politicized mobilization mechanism of discipline inspection and supervision organs to form a joint force of supervision; Improve the convergence of discipline and law, and give play to the co-governance effect of the coordinated advancement of party discipline and state law; Realize the forward movement of the pass and make better use of the "four forms" of supervision and discipline; Strengthen the supervision and management of small and micro powers, and actively explore and promote the village-level power list system; Deepen the treatment of both the symptoms and the root causes, and promote the construction of the "three non-corruption" systems and mechanisms in an integrated manner.

I. Formulation of the problem

"Micro-corruption" is a major problem that the Communist Party of China must face and urgently solve in the process of promoting the comprehensive and strict governance of the Party to the grassroots and in-depth development, continue to rectify corruption and unhealthy trends around the masses, promote social fairness and justice, and protect the legitimate rights and interests of the masses. In 2016, the Sixth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection proposed "micro-corruption" for the first time, especially emphasizing that "'micro-corruption' can also become a 'big scourge'". "Micro-corruption", as the behavior of grassroots cadres using the small and micro public power in their hands to seek private interests for themselves or others, and then harm the vital interests of the masses, usually has the following typical characteristics: first, it mainly occurs at the grassroots level; Second, the main body of "micro-corruption" is grassroots cadres; Third, the object of "micro-corruption" is mainly small and micro public power; Fourth, the purpose of "micro-corruption" is to seek relatively small amounts of private gain. [4] (p76) Although the amount of money involved in "micro-corruption" is often small, it is highly concealed, stubborn, and repetitive. In this sense, "micro-corruption" is not a micro problem, let alone a micro problem, but should be seriously treated from the height of modernizing the party and the state's governance system and governance capacity, and comprehensively and strictly administering the party to the grassroots level and developing in depth.

The proposal and implementation of the rural revitalization strategy fully reflects our party's insistence on solving the "three rural" problems as the top priority of the whole party's work. The rural revitalization strategy is inseparable from a special group - village cadres. As the leaders of rural social governance, village cadres are not only the "backbone" of the peasant masses, but also the "executors" of the party and the government's strategy for governing the country in rural society. For some time now, in the vast number of grassroots rural areas, a small number of village cadres have abused their power for personal gain in the course of managing rural affairs, resulting in a unique phenomenon of corruption among village cadres. [5] (P93) In the five years after the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, discipline inspection and supervision organs across the country punished a total of 278,000 secretaries of village party branches and directors of village committees, accounting for 18.08% of the total number of people punished in the same period. (1) In the five years after the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, discipline inspection and supervision organs across the country investigated and dealt with 299,000 corruption and work style problems in the field of poverty alleviation, and imposed party discipline and government sanctions on 202,000 people, and investigated and dealt with 48,000 corruption and work style problems in the field of rural revitalization, and gave party discipline and government sanctions to 46,000 people. (2) This shows that the phenomenon of "micro-corruption" among rural grassroots cadres is prone to occur frequently, in many quantities and in a wide range of areas, and the anti-corruption situation is still relatively grim. How to start from the group of village cadres, strengthen grassroots supervision to promote rural governance, and resolutely rectify unhealthy trends and corruption in the field of rural revitalization is an important content and key link to improve the modernization level of the party and state governance system and governance capacity in the new era.

In recent years, the research on the problem of "micro-corruption" with the members of the "two committees" of the village (community) as the main body has received extensive attention, involving the connotation, characteristics, manifestations, harms, causes and governance paths of "micro-corruption", and the research perspectives are mainly concentrated in the fields of Marxist theory, political science, economics, public administration, sociology, law, etc., and the research methods are mainly normative research and empirical research, and a number of research results with rich theoretical and practical value have been obtained. At the same time, in the context of comprehensively governing the country according to law and comprehensively and strictly governing the party, this paper discusses how to give full play to the institutional achievements brought about by the deepening reform of the national supervision system, more effectively standardize the operation of village-level power in the process of rural governance modernization, continuously improve the rural supervision system, strengthen the construction of rural party style and clean government, and provide a strong institutional guarantee for the rural revitalization strategy in the new era.

Second, the reform of the supervision system has improved the supervision system and mechanism for village cadres

Village cadres (3) are a special group that is different from state civil servants. On the one hand, they are outside the state administrative cadre system, and they are not on the staff and are not out of work; On the other hand, they are both officials and the people, and they are the bridge and link between the party and the government and the villagers, an indispensable and important subject of rural governance, and the most basic and important force for the party to rely on in rural areas. [6] (P14) Generally speaking, village cadres mainly include members, deputy secretaries, and secretaries of village party branches (general party branches), members of villagers' committees, deputy directors, and directors, while village accountants, cashiers, clerks, women's directors, and even the heads of village collective economic organizations, village affairs supervision organizations, and other village-level economic and social organizations are also included in the category of village cadres under certain circumstances. The group of village cadres has a wide range of implications, and their characteristics of being both officials and citizens often make them complex in identity. Some scholars believe that village cadres have the dual identities of "state agents" and "villagers as family members"; [7] (p39) Some scholars believe that village cadres have the dual status of "state functionary" as a village "official" and "non-state functionary" as a village "agent". [8] (p110) At the same time, most village cadres also have the status of rural grassroots party members or party cadres. To sum up, the group of village cadres has at least two or three identities as villagers' agents, government agents, and grassroots party cadres, and needs to be subject to both state laws and party regulations. Clarifying the role of village cadres in the national legal system and the party's internal legal system is the premise for effective governance of village cadres' "micro-corruption" behavior.

(1) Before the reform of the supervision system, there were institutional gaps in the supervision mechanism of village cadres

Before the reform of the state supervision system, the anti-corruption functions of the party and the state were exercised by the administrative supervision organs, the procuratorial organs, and the party's discipline inspection organs, but the group of village cadres, due to the particularity of their status, could not be completely covered under the anti-corruption system of separate governance, and wandered in the gray area of the party and state supervision system for a long time. The lack of a strict and effective institutionalized supervision mechanism is one of the important reasons for the frequent occurrence of "micro-corruption" in rural areas at the grassroots level.

First of all, in the mainland's administrative supervision system, the group of village cadres does not belong to the supervision objects of the administrative supervision organs. The Administrative Supervision Law of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the Administrative Supervision Law) stipulates that the scope of supervision targets includes two categories: state administrative organs and their civil servants, as well as other personnel appointed by state administrative organs. (4) Among them, civil servants refer to the staff who perform public duties in accordance with the law, are included in the state administrative establishment, and are paid wages and benefits by the state finance, (5) the scope of its implementation includes party organs at all levels, organs of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, administrative organs, organs of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, judicial organs, procuratorial organs, as well as organs of democratic parties and federations of industry and commerce, etc., (6) village cadres are not within this scope. On the other hand, "other personnel appointed by state administrative organs" refers to personnel appointed by state administrative organs in enterprises, public institutions, and social organizations in the form of appointments, dispatches, etc., and (7) village cadres are obviously not included in this list. According to the above-mentioned provisions, village cadres are not subject to the supervision of administrative supervision organs.

Second, in the criminal legal system, village cadres can become the objects of supervision by the procuratorial organs under certain conditions. Before the reform of the state supervision system, the people's procuratorates had the power to investigate crimes of corruption and bribery, crimes of dereliction of duty committed by state functionaries, crimes of infringing on citizens' personal rights committed by state functionaries using their powers, and crimes infringing on citizens' democratic rights. (8) From the analysis of the constitutive elements of the above three types of crimes, it is necessary to conduct a specific analysis as to whether village cadres can become the subject of crimes. On the one hand, according to the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the "Criminal Law"), the subject of the crime of embezzlement and bribery is a state functionary, so whether village cadres can be regarded as state functionaries is the key to whether the procuratorial organs can supervise them. According to article 93 of the Criminal Code, the scope of State functionaries is limited to those engaged in public affairs in State organs; Personnel engaged in public affairs in state-owned companies, enterprises, public institutions, and people's organizations, and personnel appointed by state organs, state-owned companies, enterprises, and public institutions to engage in public affairs in non-state-owned companies, enterprises, public institutions, and social organizations, and at the same time set up a catch-all clause, that is, other personnel engaged in public affairs in accordance with the law shall be regarded as state functionaries. According to the above provisions, on the one hand, village cadres can be interpreted as state employees by means of "other persons engaged in public affairs in accordance with the law"; On the other hand, according to the 2000 legislative interpretation of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, when personnel of villagers' committees and other grass-roots organizations assist the people's government in engaging in specific administrative work, (9) they are "other persons engaged in public affairs in accordance with the law" as provided for in Article 93 of the Criminal Law. The legislative interpretation clarifies that personnel of villagers' committees and other grass-roots village organizations may become the subject of crimes of embezzlement, embezzlement of public funds, and bribery when engaging in official duties as provided for in the preceding paragraph. Therefore, in the mainland's criminal legal system, village cadres can only be the object of supervision by the procuratorial organs under certain conditions, that is, "when they assist the people's government in carrying out specific administrative work".

Finally, in the Party's discipline inspection system, whether village cadres can be the subject of supervision by the Party's discipline inspection organs depends on whether they have party membership. Before the promulgation of the Regulations of the Communist Party of China on the Work of Rural Grassroots Organizations, many village cadres, including directors of village committees, were the main leaders of villagers' autonomous organizations and village collective economic organizations that were not party members, and could not be supervised and constrained by party discipline and party rules. In particular, with regard to the "violation" behavior and work style of some non-party cadres and village cadres, a situation often arises in which "the law cannot be handled adequately and the party discipline cannot be controlled." As grassroots mass autonomous organizations, township and town party committees do not have the right and cannot directly appoint and dismiss them from their posts, and some village cadres are thus able to use their non-party membership to wander in the gray area of the party and government supervision system.

Combined with the above analysis, it can be seen that before the reform of the national supervision system, especially before the reform and opening up to the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, due to the particularity of the identity of village cadres, especially non-party cadres, they have long wandered in the gray area in the national supervision system, the party's discipline inspection system and even the national legal system, which has increased the difficulty of controlling their corruption to a certain extent. At the same time, the low cost of corruption has caused the corrupt behavior of village cadres to be frequent. The so-called "low cost" mainly includes relatively low political risk, relatively low psychological pressure, and relatively light punishment. At the same time, "micro-corruption" is a low-risk, high-return behavior under certain circumstances, coupled with factors such as imperfect laws and regulations, the lack of a rural grassroots supervision system, etc., the phenomenon of "micro-corruption" among village cadres occurs frequently, and has become a major problem in rural governance that must be paid great attention to and urgently solved.

(2) After the reform of the supervision system, village cadres are included in the scope of supervision and supervision duties of the supervision organs

The legislative purpose of the Supervision Law of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the "Supervision Law") is summarized as "to deepen the reform of the national supervision system, strengthen supervision of all public officials exercising public power, achieve comprehensive coverage of state supervision, carry out in-depth anti-corruption work, and promote the modernization of the national governance system and governance capacity". (10) Among them, Article 15, Item 5 clearly includes "personnel engaged in management in basic-level mass autonomous organizations" within the scope of supervision and jurisdiction. After the promulgation of the Regulations for the Implementation of the Supervision Law of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the "Implementation Regulations"), the specific scope of "personnel engaged in management in grassroots mass autonomous organizations" was further clarified. (11) According to the above-mentioned legal provisions, the group of village cadres has the legitimacy to become the objects of supervision under the Supervision Law, ensuring that the discipline inspection and supervision organs have a clear legal basis for investigating and dealing with their illegal and criminal activities abusing public office.

Compared with the relevant provisions of the Administrative Supervision Law (12), the supervision content of the supervision organs is richer, and the supervision responsibilities are more clear, and on the basis of the full coverage of the supervision objects, the supervision methods are further enriched, the supervision channels are expanded, and the supervision mechanism is improved, so as to effectively enhance the supervision efficiency. Among the various duties of the Supervision Organs, the supervisory duties are unique to the Supervision Organs, such as "carrying out education on integrity for public employees, and supervising and inspecting their performance of their duties in accordance with the law, impartial use of power, honest government practice, and ethical conduct" (13), which is the first duty entrusted to the Supervision Organs by the Supervision Law, and fully reflects the political, basic and extensive characteristics of the supervision work. Supervision and investigation, on the other hand, refers to the investigation of violations and crimes abusing public office by public employees, involving a total of 91 specific crimes in 6 categories, (14) far exceeding the scope of investigation of job-related crimes by procuratorial organs before the reform of the supervision system. The supervision organ's handling duties are to provide feedback and response to supervision and investigation results and to ensure that the first two duties are effective,[9](p174) including making governmental punishment decisions against public employees who violate the law in accordance with the law; Hold accountable leaders who fail to perform their duties and are derelict in their duties; where crimes abusing public office are suspected, the results of the investigation are to be transferred to the people's procuratorate for review and prosecution in accordance with law; There are four types of supervision suggestions, such as submitting supervision suggestions to the unit to which the subject of supervision belongs. It can be seen that in terms of breadth and depth, the reform of the supervision system has completely included village cadres in the supervision objects and the scope of supervision duties of the supervision organs from the perspective of horizontal to edge and vertical to the end, and through the comprehensive use of the three functions of supervision, investigation, and disposal, it has ensured that the exercise of public power by village cadres is subject to comprehensive, standardized, and effective supervision and restraint.

(3) The "first line of defense" of the Party's internal laws and regulations to standardize the operation system of village-level power

On December 28, 2018, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued the Regulations of the Communist Party of China on the Work of Rural Grassroots Organizations, which clearly stipulates that "the Party's rural grassroots organizations shall strengthen the unified leadership of all types of organizations" and that "the secretary of the village party organization shall serve as the director of the villagers' committee and the person in charge of the village-level collective economic organization and cooperative economic organization through legal procedures, and the members of the village 'two committees' shall serve in cross-posts". (15) The above-mentioned provisions clarify the institutional arrangement of "one shoulder" of the two committees at the village level in rural governance, which is an institutional innovation to promote the construction of rural grassroots organizations in the new era. Therefore, giving full play to the normative and leading role of party laws and regulations to strengthen the construction of grassroots party organizations and promote rural revitalization is an important institutional guarantee in the modernization of the rural governance system and governance capacity in the new era.

In the "micro-corruption" behavior of village cadres, violations of party discipline are generally associated with illegal acts such as job-related crimes. In the course of undertaking state resources, managing collective resources, managing village affairs, and implementing villagers' self-government, village cadres generally commit illegal acts while violating the party's political discipline, organizational discipline, integrity discipline, mass discipline, work discipline, and life discipline, except in a few cases where the circumstances are relatively minor. In the statistics of the cases of "corruption and unhealthy practices around the masses" reported on the website of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the proportion of village cadres involved in cases who have been transferred to judicial organs for criminal responsibility has always remained high, which not only shows that the punishment of village cadres involved in cases is highly dependent on the national legal system, but also shows that some party organizations have insufficient use of internal party laws and regulations, and have failed to give full play to the party's role in discipline and punishment, treating diseases and saving people. To this end, it is necessary to build the first line of defense against corruption and degeneration among village cadres, and it is all the more necessary to give full play to the role of political, organizational, and ideological supervision within the party. On the one hand, it is necessary to start with education, management, supervision, and service within the party to improve the quality of the vast number of party members and cadres at the grassroots level in rural areas, so that they can strengthen their ideals and convictions and strengthen their party spirit. This is also the basic requirement for the building of a clean and honest party style and the anti-corruption struggle to prevent the slightest slightest, to move the threshold forward, and to do a good job in the daily supervision of cadres. In this sense, intra-party regulations play an extremely key role in the party's discipline requirements and constraints, and are the first line of defense to prevent the further evolution of "micro-corruption" behavior of village cadres. On the other hand, intra-party supervision is the general starting point for the coordination of various types of supervision, and only when the main responsibility of the Party committee for supervision and the special responsibility for supervision of the Discipline Inspection Commission are truly implemented can an effective joint force of supervision be formed. In the process of supervising the operation of small and micro powers at the village level, the construction of a clean and honest government within the party is the most important institutional line of defense. Generally speaking, "micro-corruption" at the grassroots level, and violations of discipline and law by party members and cadres are only the appearance, and the root problem lies in the grassroots political ecology. Therefore, only by extending and deepening the comprehensive and strict management of the party to the grassroots can we provide a good political guarantee for a more perfect mechanism for supervising the operation of power, and can the political ecology of the rural grassroots be clearer.

3. The effectiveness of the governance of "micro-corruption" behavior of village cadres after the reform of the supervision system

This paper selects the typical rural cases reported in the column "Corruption and Unhealthy Practices Around the Masses" in the "Supervision and Reporting" column of the website of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the State Supervision Commission for empirical research, with a time range from May 2015 to February 2023, and the selected samples are authentic, comprehensive and representative. Through the statistical induction and summary analysis of the above cases, it is helpful for us to more accurately grasp the main characteristics of the phenomenon of "micro-corruption" at the rural grassroots level in recent years, and analyze the governance effectiveness of the "micro-corruption" behavior of village cadres before and after the reform of the supervision system.

(1) The main characteristics of village cadres' "micro-corruption" behavior

Through the analysis and summary of the above cases, the "micro-corruption" behavior of village cadres has the following obvious characteristics: First, the proportion of illegal crimes committed by the "top leaders" of the two village committees is high. In grassroots villages, power is mainly concentrated in the hands of the village party secretary and the village director, who often have the final decision-making power over village affairs, and can easily become the main body of "micro-corruption". Among the above cases, the proportion of village party secretaries committing crimes alone is the highest, accounting for nearly half of the total; The proportion of village chiefs committing crimes alone is close to 20 percent. At the same time, village accountants and bookkeepers hold the financial power of the village and lack corresponding supervision, which is also a high incidence of "micro-corruption".

Second, the areas in which corruption occurs are relatively concentrated, and the regional characteristics are obvious. In the above cases, the corruption of village cadres is mainly concentrated in the fields of land requisition and demolition, engineering construction, poverty alleviation funds, funds benefiting farmers, subsistence allowances, pensions, etc. Among them, in Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu and other economically developed provinces, the corruption of village cadres is mainly concentrated in the fields of land acquisition and demolition, engineering construction, and the amount of corruption is huge, resulting in many "village cadres worth tens of millions"; However, in economically underdeveloped areas such as Gansu, Xinjiang, and Tibet, the corruption of village cadres is mainly concentrated in the poverty alleviation funds invested by the state, such as subsistence allowances, pensions, subsidies for cultivated land, compensation for returning farmland to forests, and poverty alleviation materials such as seeds, fertilizers, cattle and sheep, and the amount of corruption is relatively small.

In the early days, the "micro-corruption" behavior of village cadres was mainly in the form of explicit methods such as eating and taking cards, accepting red envelopes, etc. Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, with the in-depth development of the mainland's new rural construction, targeted poverty alleviation, and rural revitalization strategies, the various resources and powers that village cadres have come into contact with and have mastered have increased significantly, and their corrupt behaviors have more space and soil, and thus have the characteristics of more diverse forms and more hidden means. At the same time, the intensity of resources and power has led to a large increase in mass corruption such as collusion among village cadres, which has seriously damaged the political ecology and development environment of grassroots rural areas.

Finally, the potential harm of corruption among village cadres is enormous. As village-level managers, village cadres have a specific scope of power and can mobilize and control relatively limited resources. In the above case statistics, 50.90% of the cases were less than 30,000 yuan, 41.82% were between 30,000 yuan and 200,000 yuan, 5.50% were between 200,000 yuan and 3 million yuan, and 1.78% were more than 3 million yuan. Overall, 92.72% of village cadres are embezzled with less than 200,000 yuan, which shows that due to the constraints of power and resources, the amount of money involved in the case of village cadres is generally not high, but the harmfulness of this cannot be ignored. First, such cases often directly infringe on the interests of the masses. Under the condition that the rural economy is still underdeveloped, even small funds have a great impact on the lives of farmers; Second, the corruption cases of village cadres have seriously undermined the implementation of the party's and the state's policies of benefiting the people in rural areas, and worsened the image of village cadres in the hearts of the masses; Third, corrupt behavior directly harms the collective interests of the village and the individual interests of the villagers, and can easily lead to incidents of joint reporting, collective petitioning, and even petitioning at higher levels, resulting in a decrease in the credibility of the party and the government and seriously affecting the stability of rural society.

(2) The effectiveness of the governance of village cadres' "micro-corruption" behavior before and after the reform of the supervision system

For the sake of research, this paper divides the occurrence time of the above cases into three stages: the first stage is from May 2015 to March 2018, which reflects the governance of the "micro-corruption" behavior of village cadres before the implementation of the Supervision Law; The second stage, from April 2018 to December 2018, is the initial stage of the implementation of the Supervision Law, reflecting the effectiveness of the governance of "micro-corruption" of village cadres in the early stage of the reform of the supervision system. The third stage is from January 2019 to February 2023, which is the period of stable implementation of the Supervision Law, reflecting the actual results achieved in the normalization of the "micro-corruption" behavior of village cadres after the reform of the supervision system.

In terms of the number of cases investigated, there were 3,256 cases in the first phase, 538 cases in the second phase and 426 cases in the third phase; In terms of the average annual number, there were 542 cases in the first stage, 717 cases in the second stage, and a significant decrease of 106 cases in the third stage. If the average annual number of cases in the first stage is taken as the benchmark, the average annual number in the second stage does not decrease but increases, reflecting that due to the formal implementation of the "Supervision Law" in this stage, all localities are in the stage of "destocking" strict law enforcement, and the discipline inspection commissions and supervision commissions at all levels have actively self-examined and reversed investigations, and the number of cases has shown an upward trend, demonstrating the confidence and determination of the party and the state to vigorously rectify "micro-corruption"; In the third stage, the average annual number of cases showed a precipitous downward trend, which decreased by 80.5% and 85.3% respectively compared with the first and second stages, which is enough to show that the implementation of the "Supervision Law" has achieved a very significant effect on the governance of "micro-corruption" behavior of village cadres, and has initially formed a deterrent effect of "dare not be corrupt".

It should be noted that the Regulations of the Communist Party of China on Intra-Party Supervision, adopted at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in October 2016, clarified the "four forms" of supervision and discipline (16) as an important principle of intra-Party supervision. The "four forms" of supervision and discipline are interlocking and checked at all levels, reflecting the organic unity of strict management and love. Taking this as a criterion to analyze the proportion of the results of the handling of village cadres involved in the case in the three stages, it can be found that the degree of viciousness and the proportion of violations of law among village cadres are relatively high, and at the same time, it also reflects the "zero tolerance" attitude of the Party Central Committee towards the behavior of harming the interests of the masses and violating laws and disciplines at the grassroots level in rural areas. Since the above-mentioned reported cases mainly show the results of treatment of the second, third, and fourth forms or more, only the relevant proportions of these three forms are counted in the statistical results.

In the first stage, the second form accounted for 39.14%, the third form accounted for 22.90%, and the fourth form accounted for 37.69%. In the second stage, the second form accounted for 53.89%, the third form accounted for 21.42%, and the fourth form accounted for 24.69%. In the third stage, 39.13% of the village cadres involved in the case were dealt with in the second form, 21.73% in the third form, and 39.14% in the fourth form. From the perspective of horizontal comparison, the second form always ranks first, followed by the fourth form, and the third form accounts for the least. In terms of proportion, the fourth form has always accounted for a relatively high proportion, and there is a certain gap with the expectation of the Party Central Committee that "serious violations of discipline and suspected of violating the law will become a very small minority", indicating that the current degree of viciousness of "micro-corruption" is still relatively serious, and the proportion of suspected serious violations of discipline and law is very high.

At the same time, after the reform of the supervision system, the state's supervision resources have been effectively integrated, and special supervision activities in important areas have also achieved outstanding results. On February 19, 2021, the 18th meeting of the Central Committee for Comprehensively Deepening Reform deliberated and adopted the "Opinions on Continuously Preventing and Rectifying the Problem of "Village Tyrants". The meeting pointed out that it is necessary to summarize and absorb the successful experience and effective practices of the special struggle to eliminate gangsters and vices since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China and rectify outstanding problems such as "village tyrants", adhere to the simultaneous development of construction and treatment, treat both the symptoms and the root causes, strictly implement the main responsibility of party committees at all levels, especially county and township party committees, to comprehensively and strictly govern the party, and promote the formation of a long-term mechanism to prevent and rectify the problem of "village tyrants" from the organizational point of view, so as to create a safe and stable social environment for comprehensively promoting rural revitalization. Among the above-mentioned cases, there were only 7 typical cases of "gang-related corruption and 'protective umbrella' issues" reported in the first phase, 48 cases in the second phase, and 60 cases in the third phase. This reflects the breakthrough progress made in the governance of the problem of "village tyrants" since the implementation of the Supervision Law. The reason for this achievement is that, on the one hand, the implementation of the Supervision Law provides a clear legal basis for dealing with the problem of "village tyrants"; On the other hand, the party and the state attach great importance to the social and environmental problems in rural areas at the grassroots level, so that the problem of "village tyrants" has been dealt with in a concentrated, rapid and accurate manner.

4. Governance of "micro-corruption" behavior of village cadres in the new era: path and thinking

Adhering to the dialectical unity of comprehensively governing the country according to law and comprehensively and strictly governing the Party is a major achievement and basic experience of the CPC Central Committee in promoting the modernization of the national governance system and governance capacity since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. In this context, in order to uphold and strengthen the party's overall leadership over rural work and improve the party's ability and level of comprehensive leadership over rural work in the new era, the party central committee has paid more attention to and continuously strengthened its leadership over rural party building, and promoted the extension of comprehensive and strict governance of the party to the grassroots level. Combined with the implementation of the Supervision Law, it is of great significance to further establish and improve the supervision system for the operation of rural power, promote the modernization of the rural governance system and governance capacity, and consolidate the party's ruling foundation in rural areas.

Rural governance is the foundation and key to social governance, and an important part of the modernization of the national governance system and governance capacity. In 2019, the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council issued the "Guiding Opinions on Strengthening and Improving Rural Governance", which pointed out that it is necessary to "increase the punishment of corruption in small and micro power at the grassroots level······ Establish and improve the supervision system of small and micro powers, and form a real-time, multi-party networked supervision system for the whole process, such as mass supervision, supervision of village affairs supervision committees, supervision of higher-level departments, accounting supervision, and audit supervision. Weave a dense 'clean government protection network' for the operation of power at the grassroots level in rural areas, and vigorously carry out the rectification of micro-corruption at the grassroots level in rural areas." The report of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China emphasized that "adhering to the clear orientation of grasping the grassroots and grasping party building to promote rural revitalization" will be regarded as an important part of the new great project of in-depth promotion of party building in the new era. Strengthening grassroots party building, adhering to the guidance of party building, and strengthening the party's overall leadership over rural work are the fundamental adherence to the governance of "micro-corruption" behavior of village cadres in the new era.

The reform of the discipline inspection and supervision system of the Party and the state, at the level of rural governance, first of all, has effectively improved the rural supervision system, integrated different types of supervision forms with political guidance, and played an important role in improving the efficiency of rural governance and standardizing the operation of power. The state supervision organs are political organs, not simply case-handling organs, and this determines that the supervision functions of the supervision organs have not only the functions of prevention and punishment, but also the connotation of supervision and improvement, such as carrying out education on clean government for public employees, and supervising and inspecting their performance of duties in accordance with the law, impartial use of power, integrity, and moral conduct. At the same time, the co-location of discipline inspection and supervision organs reflects the party's centralized and unified leadership over the building of a clean and honest government and the anti-corruption work, and is of decisive significance for further improving the rural supervision system and standardizing the exercise of power. Second, in the form of law, village cadres are included in the scope of supervision objects, so as to achieve full coverage of supervision objects, disposal forms, punishment situations, and punishment rules, and further enhance the effectiveness of supervision. Finally, the main responsibility of the party committees at the county and township levels has been strengthened. By strengthening political supervision, promoting the integration and coordination of main responsibility, supervision responsibility and regulatory responsibility, focusing on the key links in key areas of rural revitalization, identifying the point of supervision, keeping an eye on the "key minority" and the grassroots cadre team, and providing a strong guarantee for the comprehensive promotion of rural revitalization with more scientific, accurate and effective supervision.

(1) Give full play to the advantages of the politicized mobilization mechanism of discipline inspection and supervision organs to form a joint force for supervision

After many years of system building, townships and towns have a relatively complete supervision system, including functional departments responsible for professional supervision, as well as discipline inspection, supervision, auditing, and other departments as specialized supervisory organs. [10] (P81) At present, the main body of supervision in rural governance includes the intra-party supervision force mainly composed of county-level dispatches, inspection teams and township discipline inspection commissions, the administrative supervision force dominated by county-level supervision, auditing and the competent departments of various industries, the supervision force such as the supervisor's office dispatched by the county-level supervision commission to the township and township, and the village-level democratic supervision force dominated by the village affairs supervision committee. [11] From the perspective of the main body of supervision, as the "last mile" of supervision work, although the supervision system of segmentation and multi-headed management can play a certain role in daily supervision work, there are also problems such as scattered supervision forces, poor information communication, and insufficient exchange of clues. For example, it can be seen from the data reported by rural petitions that many corruption problems in rural areas are related to the "three capitals" of village collectives, and although the relevant agriculture-related departments in townships and towns have the responsibility of professional supervision, their forces are often scattered and their responsibilities are not clearly defined, resulting in chronic problems in the management of the "three capitals" of village collectives, and it is difficult to achieve better results in routine supervision. In response to such problems, it is necessary to carry out special supervision work, and coordinate and integrate supervision resources through a politicized mobilization mechanism. Under the high-pressure situation of anti-corruption, the building of a clean and honest party style is the top priority of the work of grass-roots party committees, and it is also easy for discipline inspection and supervision organs to transform the special supervision work into the central work of the party committees, and through politicized mobilization, coordinate and integrate scattered supervision resources, carry out centralized rectification actions, and reconstruct an institutionalized supervision order. ［10］（P86）

At the Second Plenary Session of the 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, it was emphasized that party committees (party groups) should play a leading role in promoting the integration of various supervisory forces, the integration of procedures, and the integration of work. Upholding the party's centralized and unified leadership over discipline inspection and supervision work is the primary prerequisite for integrating and using supervisory forces and solving difficulties and blockages in rural grassroots supervision work. After the reform of the supervision system, the discipline inspection and supervision organs have returned to the main responsibility and main business, so that the supervision network covers the whole process of rural governance, and the supervision method has also moved from the result supervision to the whole process of supervision, and through sorting out the clues to the problem, it can effectively find various deviations in the implementation of the system, and then use the "four forms" of supervision and discipline to supervise and rectify, so as to promote the implementation of the system to exercise power in strict accordance with the system norms. ［10］（P86-87）

In the discipline inspection and supervision work at the grassroots level, special attention should be paid to adapting measures to local conditions, and it is possible to actively explore and introduce local supporting documents and detailed rules in light of the characteristics of the locality. For example, the Chongqing Municipal Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision has innovated its work ideas, adhered to the problem orientation, and implemented the "three lists" system including the list of problems, the list of systems, and the list of work, so as to promote the integration of discipline and law and the convergence of law and law. [12] Zhejiang has built a big data supervision and application platform for grassroots public power, which accurately identifies integrity risks in the operation of grassroots public power through data capture and collision comparison, focusing on improving the quality and efficiency of grassroots supervision. [13] Taking the opportunity of deepening the reform of the discipline inspection and supervision system, Tongzhou District of Beijing has gradually formed a supervision framework of district-level management sections, street-town and township management areas, and village-residential management points in practice, and explored the construction of a three-level linkage supervision system of "district-street-town-township-village", and strived to solve the problem of difficult supervision at the grassroots level. Through the issuance of documents, the coordination mechanism of the area has been improved, and the overall planning of personnel strength, special supervision, key cases, and difficult problems has been strengthened, and individual combat has been transformed into a concentrated battle. [14] The practical explorations and typical experiences of various places provide many useful ideas for continuously strengthening and improving rural governance and standardizing the operation of village-level power.

(2) The convergence of discipline and law, and the convergence of law and law, give play to the co-governance effect of the coordinated advancement of party discipline and state law

After the reform of the state supervision system, the party's discipline inspection work and the state supervision work have become more closely linked, which means that the party and the state have shifted from the simple concept of discipline before the law, discipline being stricter than the law, and separating discipline from law to a deeper mode of discipline and law convergence on the issues of supervising public officials and controlling corruption. [15] First of all, there is the convergence of legislative concepts, and the Regulations on Disciplinary Punishment make it clear that the Party's disciplinary work should adhere to the principle of "punishing the former and punishing the latter, treating the sick and saving people"; The Supervision Law clarifies that the national supervision work should adhere to the principle of "combining punishment and education, and blending leniency and severity", indicating that the legislative concept of discipline inspection work and supervision work attaches more importance to adding preventive measures to achieve the advancement of supervision; Secondly, with the continuous strengthening of the governance capacity building of "administrative to the countryside", "service to the countryside" and "supervision to the countryside" in rural governance, the process of rural grassroots supervision not only involves the overall planning and coordination of supervision of regulations and blocks, but also involves the connection and coordination of village affairs supervision and other types of supervision in the process of villager autonomy. Therefore, on the one hand, in the main responsibility of discipline inspection and supervision, it is necessary to focus on promoting the overall cohesion and integration of discipline supervision, supervision and supervision, stationed supervision, and patrol and inspection supervision. Coordinate and make good use of information from departments such as for the supervision of party and government style, petition reporting, case supervision and management, supervision and inspection, review and investigation, and the dispatch agencies and inspection agencies stationed there, strengthen statistical analysis, classification and summary, and timely grasp the general situation and work requirements through forms such as work joint meetings and circulars, and enhance the pertinence and effectiveness of supervision. [16] On the other hand, in the design of the system, it is necessary to carry out more specific and detailed connections, especially the rules and arrangements for the convergence of discipline and law, and conscientiously handle the relationship between the Supervision Law and other legal norms, Party discipline supervision and State law supervision. Although after the reform of the national supervision system, the group of village cadres has been included in the scope of supervision targets in accordance with the law, so that the discipline inspection and supervision organs have a clear legal basis for investigating and dealing with their illegal and criminal activities abusing public office, in the practice of supervision, due to the complex nature of the identity of village cadres, accurately grasping and accurately identifying the objects of supervision is still an issue that needs special attention in rural grassroots supervision work, and it is also where the particularity of supervision and supervision work lies. The key to judging whether a person performing public duties is the target of supervision is to see whether he exercises public power and performs official duties, rather than whether he has public office. For example, if a villager is temporarily hired to a village committee to assist the township government in the distribution of relief materials, although he is not a member of the village committee, he falls within the scope of personnel assisting the people's government in administrative management as provided for in the "Regulations for the Implementation of the Supervision Law", and may be designated as a target of supervision. However, after completing the above-mentioned assistance work, it is no longer subject to supervision. [17] In the work of rural supervision at the grassroots level, the identity of village cadres is both official and private, and the boundaries between public and private and the boundaries between circumstances and law may not be very clear, so it is particularly necessary to pay attention to the precise design of the details of the system, do a good job in the connection and coordination of the Supervision Law, the Regulations for the Implementation of the Supervision Law, the Criminal Law, the Criminal Procedure Law and other laws and regulations, and promptly issue relevant judicial interpretations. At the same time, it is also necessary to do a good job of cohesion and coordination with the "Regulations on Disciplinary Actions of the Communist Party of China" and other intra-party regulations, and give full play to the co-governance effect of party discipline and state law in the operation of rural governance and normative power.

(3) Move the pass forward and make better use of the "four forms" of supervision and discipline

The "four forms" of supervision and discipline enforcement are major practical and theoretical innovations in comprehensively and strictly administering the party, and embody the organic unity of strict management and love. Discipline inspection and supervision organs are first and foremost political organs, not mere case-handling organs. The Supervision Law prominently clarifies that the primary responsibility of the supervision organs is to "carry out clean government education for public employees, and supervise and inspect their performance of duties in accordance with the law, impartial use of power, honest government practice, and ethical conduct", which fully reflects the need for supervision work to have a high degree of political responsibility. Therefore, in the process of tackling corruption among village cadres, it is necessary to effectively use the "four forms" of supervision and discipline enforcement, strengthen daily supervision, move the pass forward, grasp the small ones as early as possible, prevent the micro ones, and control the small and micro powers with the supervision idea of dispelling the micro diseases and curing the diseases before they occur. Statistics show that from 2015 to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the national discipline inspection and supervision organs handled a total of 2.048 million person-times, and the "four forms" accounted for 46.7%, 39.9%, 7.6% and 5.8% respectively. (17) Since the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, discipline inspection and supervision organs nationwide have handled 9.336 million person-times, with the "four forms" accounting for 67.2%, 25.5%, 3.8% and 3.5% respectively. (18) From the above proportions, it can be reflected that the discipline inspection and supervision work makes full use of the "four forms" of supervision and discipline enforcement, puts discipline in front of the law, coordinates the use of party spirit education, policy inspiration, and discipline and law deterrence, so as to achieve the integration of discipline and law, and the education has saved a group of cadres, and the supervision of discipline enforcement has expanded from "punishing a very small minority" to "controlling the majority", improving the system and mechanism of not daring to be corrupt, not being able to be corrupt, and not wanting to be corrupt, and improving the comprehensive effect of treating both the symptoms and the root causes.

Judging from the above statistics, the fourth form of village cadres' "micro-corruption" behavior still accounts for a relatively high proportion, which to a certain extent indicates that when the discipline inspection and supervision organs intervene, the violations of discipline and law by village cadres have developed to a relatively serious level, reflecting that there is still a certain gap in the implementation of the supervision concept of grasping small problems early and preventing micro problems in grassroots rural areas. To this end, it is all the more necessary to give prominence to the political and contemporary requirements of strictly administering the party by strictly administering the party, namely, being stricter with discipline than the law, putting discipline before the law, and putting discipline and rules in the forefront.

(4) Strengthen the supervision and management of small and micro powers, and actively explore and promote the village-level power list system

The list of powers is an innovative institutional arrangement in the reform of the mainland's political system, especially in the reform of the administrative system. From a formal point of view, the list of powers is an administrative system norm that refines the administrative functions and powers of government administrative entities and their legal basis into the organizational behavior norms of government departments and the job behavior requirements of public employees, and makes them public. The fundamental purpose of the power list system is to reduce the discretionary limits of administrative power and the flexible space for administrative subjects to enforce the law through institutionalized means, so as to ensure that administrative power can only operate within the duties and powers conferred by law. ［18］（P67）

The list of small and micro power at the village level is a more effective institutional way to standardize the operation of village-level power and strengthen the construction of rural party style and clean government, which was first implemented by Ninghai County, Zhejiang Province, and the list comprehensively collects and summarizes the power matters of village-level organizations and village cadres, digests and cleans up and summarizes the agriculture-related policies and systems to form the "36 items of the village-level power list in Ninghai County", covering 19 public power matters and 17 convenient service items, and basically realizing the full coverage of village-level power. [19] Shantou City, Guangdong Province, is committed to "empowering village organizations and benefiting village (resident) people", and actively explores and implements the village-level small and micro power list, negative list, village-level affairs list, public service list, and village affairs open list, effectively standardizing the operation of village-level power. [20] (P61) In 2021, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs and the National Rural Revitalization Administration issued the Notice on Promoting the Use of the List System in Rural Governance. In recent years, in light of actual conditions, all localities have actively explored the popularization and application of the list system in terms of standardizing rights and responsibilities, reducing the burden on the grassroots, improving the level of public services, protecting the rights and interests of farmers, improving the efficiency of rural governance, and strengthening the relationship between the party and the masses, which has played a positive role in strengthening and improving rural governance and promoting rural harmony and stability. At the same time, it will also help to restrain the arbitrary exercise of power by village cadres and protect the rights and interests of peasants.

(5) Deepen the treatment of both the symptoms and the root causes, and promote the construction of the "three non-corruption" systems and mechanisms in an integrated manner

In the new era, with the in-depth implementation of the rural revitalization strategy in mainland China, the group quality of rural grassroots village cadres has also been significantly improved, the age structure has been further rationalized, and the sense of role identity has been continuously enhanced. The CPC Central Committee has placed poverty alleviation in a prominent position in governing the country, and has historically solved the problem of absolute poverty. The village cadres who are fighting on the front line have received unprecedented attention from the party and the government, and have received great attention and recognition from the whole society, which has fundamentally improved the political and social status of the village cadres, and their economic treatment has also been markedly improved. [21] (P51) At the same time, with the implementation of the rural revitalization strategy in the new era and the sending of various resources to the countryside, the requirements for the comprehensive quality and ability of village cadres are getting higher and higher, and higher requirements are put forward for their political literacy, economic vision, management ability and public service ability. Therefore, from the perspective of deepening rural governance, improving the level of villager autonomy, and standardizing the operation of small and micro power at the village level, it is an important part of consolidating the construction of the strategic system and system of rural revitalization in the new era.

The first is to insist on strict punishment in accordance with the law and not relax, and build an environmental foundation that "dare not be corrupted". The Third Plenary Session of the 19th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection emphasized that not daring to be corrupt, not being able to be corrupt, and not wanting to be corrupt is an organic whole, not a division of three stages, nor a separation of three links. This reveals the logical relationship between not daring to be corrupt, not being able to be corrupt, and not wanting to be corrupt, and contains profound philosophical thinking. At present, rural grass-roots supervision is still a relatively weak link in the state supervision system, and problems such as "supervision at higher levels is too far, supervision at the same level is too soft, and supervision by the masses is too weak." Problems such as the arbitrariness and anomie of village cadres in the use of power, the paternalistic style of work, and the one-size-fits-all approach still exist. Therefore, it is necessary to adhere to the main tone of strictness and not relax, carry out in-depth work on the special governance of "micro-corruption" at the grassroots level and job-related violations and crimes in the field of agriculture, pay close attention to the management of the "three capitals" of village collectives, land requisition and demolition, subsidies for benefiting farmers, and other fields, and conduct thorough investigations, restrain the operation of public power with iron-fisted anti-corruption norms, and ensure the improvement of people's livelihood with a positive style and discipline, which is still the core work and key link of the anti-corruption work at the grassroots level in rural areas. The second is to continue to weave a tightly knit supervision network for the operation of small and micro powers, plan and promote together with the improvement of the grassroots governance system and the enhancement of grassroots governance capabilities, and build an institutional foundation that "cannot be corrupted". In addition to various centralized special rectifications, it is necessary to start with the "sesame things" around the villagers, sort out and refine the supervision list for the operation of small and micro powers, clarify the main body of responsibility, the main body of supervision and the basis of policies, and give full play to the respective advantages of the villagers' democratic supervision, the operational supervision of departments and units, and the special supervision of the Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision, so as to better unite the joint force of supervision. Discipline inspection and supervision organs should pay special attention to making good use of discipline inspection and supervision proposals, and promote rural grassroots organizations to continuously improve their systems and rectify problems. The third is to strengthen party spirit education, build a strong ideological line of defense, and build a self-discipline foundation of "not wanting to be corrupt". Through the comprehensive and strict governance of the party to the grassroots extension, to the grassroots, "put the party's political construction in the first place", "to enhance the organizational strength as the focus, highlight the political function", give full play to the role of the grassroots party organizations as a fighting fortress and the vanguard and exemplary role of party members, solve the world outlook, outlook on life, values of the "general switch" problem, establish the fair use of power, the use of power in accordance with the law, for the civil rights, the use of power honestly and honestly, and fundamentally further stimulate the enthusiasm and initiative of village cadres and officials to start a business.

Original title: Governance of "micro-corruption" behavior of village cadres in the context of the reform of the supervision system: effectiveness and path

Fund:This work was financially supported by the Ministry of Education's major research project "Research on Improving the Ability and Level of Integrated Promotion of 'Three Non-Corruption'" (22JZD022); Key Project of the Research Center for Intra-Party Laws and Regulations of Guangxi Normal University (GXDN23Z01);

Authors: Wang Jianqin, Zhang Qin, Party Regulation Research Center, China University of Political Science and Law

Source: Journal of Governance Modernization Research

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