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今天小编为您带来博士论文《考虑消费者信息和公平关切的定价及渠道选择研究》2.3 渠道选择研究。
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Today, the editor brings the "Channel selection research of the doctoral dissertation 《Research on pricing and channel selection that considers consumer information and fairness concerns》”.
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内容摘要：Abstract
本期推文将从思维导图、精读内容、知识补充三个方面介绍博士论文《考虑消费者信息和公平关切 的定价及渠道选择研究》2.3 渠道选择研究。
This issue's tweet will introduce the doctoral dissertation 《Research on pricing and channel selection that considers consumer information and fairness concerns》 from three perspectives: mind mapping, detailed content analysis, and supplementary knowledge, focusing on channel selection research.
思维导图：Mind mapping
精读内容：Intensive reading content
本小节介绍了渠道选择的文献综述。首先介绍了关于不同的渠道结构分析其对供应链定价和利润的影响的研究，又介绍了本文与其他研究的不同，本文渠道结构相关的研究更多关注于上游供应商入侵这经典一问题。
This section presents a literature review on channel selection. It first introduces studies that analyze different channel structures and their impacts on supply chain pricing and profits. It then highlights the differences between this paper and other studies, noting that this paper's research on channel structure focuses more on the classic issue of upstream supplier encroachment.
然后作者介绍了关于供应商入侵的文献综述。供应商入侵的文献已有诸多成熟研究，很多学者认为上游供应商入侵会加剧市场竞争从而损害零售商的利润。然而，也有学者论证供应商的进入行为在一些情况下会让渠道成员有利可图，这类研究解释了供应商入侵对渠道选择存在更多可能性的影响。并介绍了以前研究的不足之处，上述综述的供应商入侵文献，均没有考虑入侵策略对基于消费者行为信息的定价的作用。最后介绍了本文关于供应商入侵的研究，本文第四章和第五章则重点讨论供应商入侵策略同BBP的战略关联，分析入侵在不同的情形中决策的变化和利润的影响。第四章先探究供应商进入与否对多种BBP实施策略的影响，以及最终供应链均衡的情况。
Then, the author presents a literature review on supplier encroachment. There is already a wealth of mature research on supplier encroachment, with many scholars believing that upstream supplier encroachment intensifies market competition and thus harms retailers' profits. However, some scholars argue that supplier entry can be profitable for channel members in certain situations. This type of research explains the broader potential impact of supplier encroachment on channel selection. Additionally, the author points out the shortcomings of previous studies, noting that the aforementioned literature on supplier encroachment does not consider the impact of encroachment strategies on pricing based on consumer behavior information. Finally, the paper's research on supplier encroachment is introduced. Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the strategic association between supplier encroachment strategies and BBP (Behavior-Based Pricing), analyzing the changes in decisions and profit impacts under different scenarios. Chapter 4 first explores the impact of supplier entry or non-entry on various BBP implementation strategies and the resulting supply chain equilibrium.
最后作者介绍了本文关于供应商入侵的研究贡献：（1）第四章研究基于消费者行为信息的价格歧视，且通过模型刻画出通过消费者前期消费行为获得信息的动态过程；（2）本章考虑了多种形式的价格歧视，零售商能实施BBP，供应商入侵前提下在直销渠道能实施BBP，再扩展到供应商也能在传统分销渠道对零售商实施批发价歧视；（3）本章发现在能够实施批发价歧视的情况下，存在BBP能够刺激供应商入侵的均衡区域，这指出价格歧视同入侵策略有多种作用的可能性。而第五章思考了消费者认知偏好的作用，论证入侵与BBP更深层面的交叉应用，即将消费者对公平偏好这一实际而现实的认知问题纳入策略变动因素进行考量。该章节进一步拓宽供应商入侵方面文献，并发现公平关切对渠道成员的定价和供应商入侵都有不可忽视的影响。
Finally, the author outlines the contributions of this paper's research on supplier encroachment: (1) Chapter 4 investigates price discrimination based on consumer behavior information, modeling the dynamic process of acquiring information from consumers' previous consumption behavior. (2) This chapter considers various forms of price discrimination, where retailers can implement BBP (Behavior-Based Pricing). In the context of supplier encroachment, suppliers can implement BBP in direct sales channels, and the study extends to suppliers being able to implement wholesale price discrimination against retailers in traditional distribution channels. (3) This chapter finds that when wholesale price discrimination can be implemented, there exists an equilibrium region where BBP can stimulate supplier encroachment, highlighting the multiple potential impacts of price discrimination on encroachment strategies.Chapter 5 considers the role of consumer cognitive preferences, demonstrating the deeper intersection of encroachment and BBP by incorporating consumers' perceptions of fairness into the strategy considerations. This chapter further broadens the literature on supplier encroachment, revealing that fairness concerns significantly impact both the pricing of channel members and supplier encroachment.
知识补充：Knowledge supplement
1、渠道冲突 Channel conflict
渠道冲突是组成营销渠道的各组织间敌对或者不和谐的状态。当一个渠道成员的行为与其渠道合作者的期望相反时，便会产生渠道冲突。有水平冲突、垂直冲突和多渠道冲突三种类型。其原因主要在于渠道成员间不相容的目标，对现实的不同理解，以及各自的领域冲突等。
Channel conflict is the state of hostility or disharmony among the organizations that make up a marketing channel. Channel conflict arises when the actions of one channel member are contrary to the expectations of their channel partners. There are three types of channel conflict: horizontal conflict, vertical conflict, and multi-channel conflict. The main causes of channel conflict are incompatible goals among channel members, different perceptions of reality, and conflicts within their respective domains.
水平渠道冲突指的是同一渠道模式中，同一层次中间商之间的冲突。产生水平冲突的原因大多是生产企业没有对目标市场的中间商数量分管区域作出合理的规划，使中间商为各自的利益互相倾轧。这是因为在生产企业开拓了一定的目标市场后，中间商为了获取更多的利益必然要争取更多的市场份额，在目标市场上展开"圈地运动"。
Horizontal channel conflict refers to conflicts between intermediaries at the same level within the same channel structure. The primary cause of horizontal conflict is the production enterprise's failure to reasonably plan the allocation of intermediary numbers and regions within the target market, leading intermediaries to undercut each other for their own benefit. This happens because, after the production enterprise has developed a certain target market, intermediaries inevitably compete for more market share to gain more profits, engaging in a "land grab" within the target market.
垂直渠道冲突指在同一渠道中不同层次企业之间的冲突，这种冲突较之水平渠道冲突要更常见。垂直渠道冲突也称作渠道上下游冲突。一方面，越来越多的分销商从自身利益出发，采取直销与分销相结合的方式销售商品，这就不可避免要同下游经销商争夺客户，大大挫伤了下游渠道的积极性；另一方面，当下游经销商的实力增强以后，不甘心目前所处的地位，希望在渠道系统中有更大的权利，向上游渠道发起了挑战。在某些情况下，生产企业为了推广自己的产品，越过一级经销商直接向二级经销商供货，使上下游渠道间产生矛盾。因此，生产企业必须从全局着手，妥善解决垂直渠道冲突，促进渠道成员间更好地合作。
Vertical channel conflict refers to conflicts between enterprises at different levels within the same channel. This type of conflict is more common than horizontal channel conflict and is also known as upstream-downstream channel conflict. On one hand, an increasing number of distributors, acting in their own self-interest, adopt a combination of direct sales and distribution to sell products, inevitably competing with downstream distributors for customers, which significantly discourages the downstream channel's enthusiasm. On the other hand, as the strength of downstream distributors grows, they become dissatisfied with their current position and seek greater power within the channel system, challenging upstream channels. In some cases, production enterprises, in order to promote their products, bypass first-level distributors and supply directly to second-level distributors, creating conflicts between upstream and downstream channels. Therefore, production enterprises must address vertical channel conflict from a holistic perspective to promote better cooperation among channel members.
渠道间冲突随着顾客细分市场和可利用的渠道不断增加，越来越多的企业采用多渠道营销系统即运用渠道组合、整合。不同渠道间的冲突指的是生产企业建立多渠道营销系统后，不同渠道服务于同一目标市场时所产生的冲突。
Inter-channel conflict arises as customer segmentation and available channels increase, with more and more enterprises adopting multi-channel marketing systems that utilize channel combinations and integrations. Conflicts between different channels occur when a production enterprise establishes a multi-channel marketing system and different channels serve the same target market.
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参考文献：[1] 江豫. 考虑消费者信息和公平关切的定价及渠道选择研究 [D]. 合肥: 中国科学技术大学, 2023.
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审核|Wang