Confluence 目錄穿越漏洞導緻代碼執行CVE-2019-3398

0x00 漏洞詳情

Confluence Server和Data Center産品在downloadallattachments資源中存在一個路徑穿越漏洞。有權向頁面和（或）部落格添加附件，或建立新空間或個人空間，或者對空間具有“管理者”權限的遠端攻擊者可以利用此漏洞将檔案寫入任意位置，最終導緻遠端代碼執行。

0x01 影響範圍

0x02 修複建議

更新Confluence Server或Data Center版本：

6.6.13

6.13.4

6.14.3

6.15.2

執行官方緩解措施：

停止Confluence編輯<install-directory>/conf/server.xml

如果你沒有為 Confluence 配置 context path，則将以下代碼添加至 <Host> 元素中：

<br/>&lt;Context path="/pages/downloadallattachments.action" docBase="" &gt; &lt;Valapp className="org.apache.catalina.valapps.RemoteAddrValapp" deny="*" /&gt; &lt;/Context&gt;

如果你為 Confluence 配置了 context path，比如說 /wiki，則需要将以下代碼添加至 <Host> 元素中：

<br/>&lt;Context path="/wiki/pages/downloadallattachments.action" docBase="" &gt; &lt;Valapp className="org.apache.catalina.valapps.RemoteAddrValapp" deny="*" /&gt; &lt;/Context&gt;

0x03 環境搭建

wget https://www.atlassian.com/software/confluence/downloads/binary/atlassian-confluence-6.13.0.zip<br/>unzip atlassian-confluence-6.13.0.zip<br/>cd atlassian-confluence-6.13.0/confluence/WEB-INF/classes<br/>

編輯confluence-init.properties

修改confluence.home

啟動：

cd atlassian-confluence-6.13.0/bin

./start-confluence.sh

0x04 漏洞複現

第一步上傳檔案：

第二步：打包下載下傳（觸發漏洞）

第三步：通路shell

http://192.168.56.248:8090/cmd13.jsp?comment=whoami

0x05 漏洞分析

使用idea 進行遠端調試

首先需要在catalina.sh 添加如下代碼

export JAVA_OPTS='-Xdebug -Xrunjdwp:transport=dt_socket,server=y,suspend=n,address=8002'<br/>

在idea中配置：

此時可以進行遠端調試了

`public String execute() throws Exception {

List<Attachment> latestAttachments = this.attachmentManager.getLatestVersionsOfAttachments(this.getPage());

Iterator var2 = latestAttachments.iterator();

while(var2.hasNext()) {
        Attachment attachment = (Attachment)var2.next();
        File tmpFile = new File(this.getTempDirectoryForZipping(), attachment.getFileName());
        InputStream inputStream = this.attachmentManager.getAttachmentData(attachment);
        Throwable var6 = null;

        try {
            OutputStream fileOutputStream = new FileOutputStream(tmpFile);
            Throwable var8 = null;

            try {
                ByteStreams.copy(inputStream, fileOutputStream);
            } catch (Throwable var31) {
                var8 = var31;
                throw var31;
            } finally {
                if (fileOutputStream != null) {
                    if (var8 != null) {
                        try {
                            fileOutputStream.close();
                        } catch (Throwable var30) {
                            var8.addSuppressed(var30);
                        }
                    } else {
                        fileOutputStream.close();
                    }
                }

            }
        } catch (Throwable var33) {
            var6 = var33;
            throw var33;
        } finally {
            if (inputStream != null) {
                if (var6 != null) {
                    try {
                        inputStream.close();
                    } catch (Throwable var29) {
                        var6.addSuppressed(var29);
                    }
                } else {
                    inputStream.close();
                }
            }

        }
    }

    File zipFile = new File(this.getConfluenceTempDirectoryPath() + File.separator + this.getZipFilename() + ".zip");
    FileUtils.createZipFile(this.getTempDirectoryForZipping(), zipFile);
    FileUtils.deleteDir(this.getTempDirectoryForZipping());
    this.downloadPath = this.prepareDownloadPath(zipFile.getPath()) + "?contentType=application/zip";
    this.gateKeeper.addKey(this.prepareDownloadPath(zipFile.getPath()), this.getAuthenticatedUser());
    return "success";
}`           

漏洞産生在：

ByteStreams.copy(inputStream, fileOutputStream);

跟蹤fileOutputStream

attachment有title參數：

attachment.getFileName() 擷取的值就是title

title 值來源

<br/>InputStream inStream = this.getStreamForEncoding(this.httpServletRequest);<br/>this.fileUploadManager.storeResource(new InputStreamAttachmentResource(inStream, this.filename, this.mimeType, this.size, (String)null, this.minorEdit), (ContentEntityObject)content);<br/>if (this.withEditorPlaceholder) {<br/>this.jsonResult.put("htmlForEditor", this.dragAndDropService.getAttachmentEditorHtml(this.filename, (ContentEntityObject)content, this.isVFMSupported, this.contentType));<br/>}<br/>

對filename 沒有進行任何過濾

0x06 參考連結