Editor's note: From the Battle of Kunaksa (401 BCE) where the Persians fought Greek mercenaries to the Battle of Zera (47 BC) when the Pontus army confronted Caesar, the sickle chariot – whose name derives from the giant scythe about 1 meter long at both ends of the axle – has been prevalent in the Middle East for nearly four centuries. It began in the Persian Empire, famous for Alexander's Battle of Gaugamela with Darius, and was later frequently used in the Seleucid Empire and the Kingdom of Pontus. As a "heavy tank" of the classical era, it was often able to destroy the dense formations of enemy infantry, bring serious physical and psychological trauma, and create great panic. Of course, on the domestic network, China, which was "affected" in the pre-Qin era, also used chariots in large quantities, so these sickle chariots can also be regarded as wind critics. Because there are always people who try to prove that the sickle chariot is a large and inappropriate weapon, and then form a chain of contempt from west to east and so on. So, in history, is this weapon so big and inappropriate that it can only serve as a background board for the chain of contempt? Or a heavy tank from the classical era?
The heavy tank of the ancient world, the scythe chariot
I heard that the sharp blade of the scythe chariot often tore apart its limbs and limbs in the chaotic slaughter, leaving the torso and falling to the ground, and the painful thoughts and consciousness caused by the rapid injury are still unknown - the ancient Roman poet Lucretius "The Theory of Materiality"
▲ Speeding sickle chariot
origin
As one of the first Greeks to fight this new weapon, Xenophon not only gave his first few practical records in his autobiography "The Long March" and the history book "Greek Chronicle", but also in the political education work "Cyrus Persuasion", he carefully told the story of Cyrus the great invention of the sickle chariot: "He (Cyrus) replaced the chariot used by the Trojans, and replaced it with a more suitable chariot, The wheels of this chariot are very strong and can withstand bumps, and at the same time, due to the use of long shafts, the wide chassis is also stronger, and the driver's seat is moved to something that can be called a high platform, which is made of hardwood and extends to the front of the chariot, leaving a place on the top of the body plate for the driver to drive the war horse. The handlers are fully equipped with only two eyes exposed. He also mounted a two-cubit(about 1 m) long scythe made by craftsmen on the wheels on both sides of the chariot, and another was mounted under a wooden frame, facing downwards, for occasional use. This was the case with the model system invented by Cyrus, which is still used among the subjects of the Persian Empire today. (Xenophon, Cyrus Exhortation, VI, 1, 27-30)
▲ Model of an early chariot of the Persian Empire
Although Xenophon gives a rather detailed and accurate description of the technical characteristics of the sickle chariot, as Cicero said, "Xenophon's account of Cyrus did not originate from historical purposes", and this political work based on historical themes is for educational purposes, attributing many of the Persian customs and even artifacts of the author's time to the protagonist Cyrus the Great. In fact, even during the expeditions of Darius and Xerxes to Greece, there is no reliable record of the sickle chariot. Herodotus went out of his way to detail the special classes of the Persian Empire—including the Wild Donkey Chariots of the Indian Clan and the Chariots of the Libyan Clan—but the Sickle Chariot never appeared in the History.
▲ Darius I went out hunting by car
According to Neferdkin (Нефёдкин) of the St. Petersburg State University of History, the sickle chariot should actually have appeared during the reign of Ataxerxes I (465-424 BC), a product of the Persian Empire's response to the Greek-style dense heavy infantry formation after the defeat of greece on two expeditions to Greece.
Tactical characteristics
The role of the original ordinary tanks in the Middle East in combat mainly depends on the play of vehicle-mounted combatants, who often fight in the workshop before infantry engagement, and are responsible for covering the flanks of their own front when infantry engage, and after the infantry engagement, they pursue or resist the pursuit of enemy vehicles. Occasional frontal attacks on enemy infantry are only when the enemy does not have a vehicle or the enemy vehicle has been driven out of the battlefield.
▲ Middle Eastern chariots from the first half of the 8th century BC
▲ Relief of assyrian chariots
The tactical function of the sickle chariot is very different from that of its predecessors, it completely eliminates the vehicle combatants, retains only the armored driver, so its lethality is derived entirely from the impact of the scythe protruding from the axle and the chariot itself. In the face of light infantry or light cavalry that come and go like the wind and loose formations, the sickle chariot is of course difficult to play, and may even help under the projected blows of the other side. As a result, its almost only way of fighting was to attack heavy infantry clusters that lacked the assistance of effective projection troops on a flat battlefield suitable for galloping. Next, we can explore the tactical performance of the sickle chariot one by one from the classical literature.
Battle of Kunaksa (401 BC): This was a battle between the Persian prince Ataxerxes (later Ataxerxes II) and Cyrus the Younger, whose aces were 10,400 Greek heavy infantry and 2,500 Greek light shields, plus 20 sickle chariots. Ataxerxes was much more powerful, but he still relied most on 150 sickle chariots. Theodoros notes that "Ataxerxes deployed many sickle chariots on the front of the front of the front", Plutarch argues that "Ataxerxes deployed the most powerful scythe chariots in a position facing the Greeks in order to divide the formation of the (Greeks) by using the impact of the chariots before close combat", and Xenophon mentions in the Long March that "in front of them (Ataxelxes) were the so-called sickle chariots, which were spaced at a certain distance between each other... Its intention was to drive the Greek army directly and to break its formation". It can be seen that both the mercenary leader of the Cyrusian side, Xenophon, or the imperial physician Ofsisius on the Ataxerxes side (the records of Theodoros and Plutarch are ultimately derived from this person's History of Persia), both fully realized the tactical role of the sickle chariot against the dense heavy infantry group.
However, the main factor that determines the outcome of the war is still people. The Greek art of war also developed greatly in the Peloponnesian War in the previous decades, and in terms of tactics, the equipment of heavy infantry was continuously strengthened, the tactical status of light shield soldiers was repeatedly raised, and simple heavy infantry clusters gradually withdrew from the stage of history. In terms of experience, the Greek mercenaries who participated in this battle can almost all be said to be brave veterans for the rest of their lives. Far from this was the case for the Persians at this time, as Xenophon put it: "The [Persian] commanders were so indifferent to the chariot soldiers that they were smugly believing that the untrained would be able to achieve their goals in the same way as those who were trained." In this way, the tank soldiers can be hastily formed, but before they even rush to the enemy position, half of them have already fallen into their chariots, and others will jump out of the chariots on their own. Those squads had no one to drive the chariot, and thus inflicted more damage on their own people than they did to the enemy. These Persians today... Always want to give up the fight... The help of the Greeks must be relied upon to face the enemy. (Xenophon, Cyrus Exhortation, VIII, 8, 24-25)
This was the case in Kunaksa, where Greek mercenaries attacked the opponents at a distance of 3-4 yta (about 500-700 meters) between the two fronts, and they also used their spears to strike shields to scare the horses, and for a moment they were frightened to flee in front of the Persian army. The sickle chariot troops did not accelerate the impact space, but also fell into chaos because of the frightened horses and the lack of training of the drivers, and even abandoned the car and fled, and some of the sickle chariots that had lost control caused tragedy in their own queues, and some rushed to the Greek mercenary queue and forced the Greeks to evade the gap, but no other troops could follow up and use the fighters. Thus, the Battle of Kunaksa did prove the tactical function of the sickle chariot against heavy infantry, but the poor quality of the Persian army at the time made it difficult to function.
▲ Hypothetical diagram of a sickle chariot from the Kunakosa period
Battle of Daschileon (395 BC): The battle was fought between the Spartan king Agsilaus and the Persian governor of the province of Phrygia, Fanabazos, who had already gained Greek hegemony, and Sparta, who had already gained Greek hegemony, sent king Agsilaus to lead 2,000 "new citizens" and 6,000 allies to Asia Minor in 396 BC. According to Xenophon in Book IV, Chapter 1 of the Chronicles of Greece, in the winter of 395 BC, while Greek soldiers were scattered to collect grain near the Phrygian capital of Daskileon, Fanabazos commanded 2 sickle chariots and 400 cavalry to attack. The Greeks saw that the situation was not good, and when they saw persian chariots and cavalry approaching them, they quickly assembled into a dense formation of about 700 people. But Fanabazos immediately decided to put the chariot at the forefront, followed by himself and his cavalry, and then ordered an attack on the Greeks. The chariots burst into the dense battle line, charging the Greeks to pieces, while the cavalry quickly followed, killing about 100 Greek soldiers, and the rest fled back to the camp. As a Persian "turnaround battle" in which the Persians won more with less, the Battle of Dasquilion amply illustrated how a good commander should use a scythe chariot. First of all, Fanabazos practiced the principle that soldiers are not expensive, and only 400 cavalry and a mere 2 chariots can complete the coordination of troops relatively easily. Second, the suddenness of the attack gave the Greeks no time to construct a complete front with a certain amount of projected forces. Finally, the sickle chariot gave full play to its surprise power, acting as a heavy cavalry for later generations when the cavalry was not yet capable of tearing apart the dense formation of the Greek infantry, destroying the Formation of the Greek Infantry and opening their doors to the following Persian cavalry.
Battle between Persian cavalry and Greek infantry, 4th century BC
▲ Persian noble cavalry with spears, 4th century BC
Battle of Gaugamela (331 BC)
The classical history provided by Arian, Kurtius Rufus and Theodoros against Darius and Alexander also made Gaugamera the most well-documented battle for the Sickle Chariot. Decades of experience in victory and defeat had made the Persians aware of the importance of cavalry and chariot coordination. According to Arian' account, the Persian army deployed Cypriot cavalry, 1,000 Bactrian cavalry and 100 sickle chariots on the left flank, and Armenian and Cappadodian cavalry and 50 sickle chariots on the right flank. However, although the 50 sickle chariots in front of the Chinese army should be accompanied by war elephants, they may not have acted in actual combat, probably because they were afraid that the elephants would frighten their horses. Curtius Rufus and Theodoros also point out that Darius set out to strengthen the armament of the chariot, adding spears and longer, wider scythes to the rims and axle ends.
According to classical tradition, the left wing of the Macedonian army was relatively weak, and the light infantry on this wing was only a few Cretan archers and mercenaries from Achaia, and such projected firepower did not seem to be enough to prevent the combined operation of sickle chariots and cavalry. According to Kurtius Rufus, 50 chariots on the Persian right flank charged at full speed on the Macedonian left flank on a specially leveled battlefield before the war, followed by 1,000 cavalry (3,000 cavalry, Theodoros says). As a result, "some of the Macedonian soldiers were torn apart by spears that extended far ahead of the rut, while others were torn apart by the scythes facing down from both sides of the chariot." Instead of retreating gradually, the Macedonians fled in a scattered manner, throwing their queues into chaos." After that, the Persian right-wing cavalry even broke into the Macedonian fortifications, and at one point captured the weight and rescued Darius's family. The reason why the Macedonian left wing fell into such a tragedy was obviously due to the close coordination of the Persian cavalry that followed: they could not only kill and injure the Macedonian light infantry, reduce the loss of the vehicle, but also use the gap created by the chariot to turn the Macedonian infantry's retreat and dodge into a rout.
Theodoros' account vividly depicts the killing effects of the sickle chariot: the enormous thrust and the sharp blade that turned killed many Macedonian soldiers, causing a variety of injuries. The sharp knife and the powerful force made it cut off everything it hit, including many arms, shields, weapons and other equipment, and many examples were when the head was quickly cut off from the neck, the eyes were still open when it landed on the ground, the frightened expression did not change, and in some cases, the ribs were cut to bring a fatal incision, so that the injured person died quickly. (Theodoros, History Series, XVII, 58) However, Arian, who was good at secrecy about His Holiness, ignored the above situation and instead focused on describing the very different situation on the right wing of the Macedonian army. Long before the chariot attack, Darius rushed to dispatch the Cypriot cavalry and Bactrian cavalry, and was eventually repulsed by the Macedonian cavalry. At this time, although the sickle chariot lacking cavalry cooperation tried to break up the Macedonian phalanx, it was also severely attacked by the Macedonian light infantry covering the cavalry, and after a round of fierce projection, the impact power of the chariot was sharply reduced, although a few rushed into the phalanx, it also caused a few terrible traumas, which was ultimately useless.
▲ Persian cavalry image in the mosaic of the ruins of Pompeii
End
Although Arian wrote the scythe chariot as almost a waste in his Alexander Expedition, which mainly references to his successor Ptolemy, many successors were quite honest. In 301 BC, in the Decisive Battle of Ipsus, which determined the fate of Alexander's empire, the victorious Seleucid army dispatched at least 100 sickle chariots. Until the Romans unified the Mediterranean, the sickle chariot played an important role in large and small battles on the ruins of the empire. Later, although the sickle chariot was no longer a weapon in actual combat, it never left the minds of weapons experts and designers, and until the mid-to-late 19th century, people could still find the successor of the sickle chariot. In a word, to paraphrase a phrase on the Internet, describe the attitude of the ancient Greeks to the scythe chariot, "Say no, the body is still honest." ”
▲ In the first half of the 2nd century BC, the Seleucid sickle chariot was conceived
John Cowan's 1855 steampunk rhapsody, circular self-propelled scythe chariot
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