On September 12, 1948, the Liaoshen Campaign broke out. At that time, the Nationalist army in the northeast had been isolated in several major cities such as Shenyang, Changchun and Jinzhou, and was in a passive situation in the overall situation. At that time, the total strength of the Northeast National Army was 550,000 people, while the total strength of the Northeast Field Army had reached 700,000 people, and there were 300,000 local troops.
Although the situation is passive and the troops are at a disadvantage, the national army with the two aces of the new one and the new six is not easy to fight. These two units not only had all The American armaments and equipment, but also underwent complete American training, they beat the Japanese army on the Battlefield of India and Burma to lose their armor and armor, which was the trump card of the National Army.
In addition to the elite soldiers, there were also many famous generals in the Northeast National Army, such as Wei Lihuang, Zheng Dongguo, and Liao Yaoxiang. In addition, the Northeast China Army had sea and air superiority, and could get support from the navy and air force at any time, so the Liaoshen Campaign was not easy to fight.
Unexpectedly, however, this seemingly difficult battle ended in a fiasco for the Nationalist army, which annihilated 470,000 enemy troops and captured 186 officers above major general. So the question is, why did the nationalist army with the two aces of the new one and the new sixth lose so badly? This person is the biggest shortcoming.
This man is Lao Jiang. Don't look at the old Chiang Kai-shek is the principal of the Whampoa Military Academy, there have been many famous generals under him, but his personal military command ability is not high, Bai Chongxi once ridiculed the old Chiang's level can be a battalion commander at most. However, the old Chiang kai-shek was obsessed with self-confidence and stubbornly believed that his military ability was first-class, so he often interfered in the command of his subordinates.
And these remote control commands often bring more serious consequences, specific to the Liaoshen Campaign, lao Jiang made many mistakes in command, the most serious of which were two points. The first point was to insist on appointing Hou Jingru as the commander of the Eastern Advance Corps, which was improperly employed.
Although Hou Jingru graduated from the Huangpu Phase I, he joined our party as early as 1925 and participated in the Nanchang Uprising. In 1931, due to the dangerous environment of the struggle and other reasons and organizational contact, he was forced to serve in the Nationalist Army, and accumulated military merits and was promoted to commander of the 17th Corps of the Kuomintang.
When Lao Jiang appointed him commander of the Eastern Advance Corps, Hou Jingru first used the excuse that his troops had not come, returned to Tangshan to pick up the troops, and left for two days. During this period, Que Hanqian, the commander of the 54th Army, was appointed by Lao Jiang as the acting commander-in-chief, responsible for directing the Nationalist army on Huludao to attack Tashan.
At that time, the Nationalist army in Huludao was a joint operation of the army, navy and air force, but Que Hanqian was only a Whampoa IV graduate, not to mention commanding the air force and navy, and even the commander of the same level as him could not command. Therefore, in the first two days of the Tashan Blockade Battle, although the Nationalist army invested a lot of troops, it basically fought each other, lacked cooperation, and its combat effectiveness was obviously affected.
On the morning of the third day, Hou Jingru finally arrived at Huludao, and judging that Fan Hanjie of Jinzhou was gone, he said to his deputy commander Liu Chunling and chief of staff Zhang Boquan and others: "According to our current situation, we cannot penetrate Into Tashan and Jinzhou, and if we do, we cannot get out, and if we do not enter, we can maintain it for a few more days."
Zhang Boquan agreed with Hou Jingru's judgment and repeatedly instructed his concubine troops to preserve their strength. Therefore, although there are many troops of the Nationalist Army participating in the war, not many of them really contributed to the death. Hou Jingru's delay and deliberate preservation of strength have reduced a lot of pressure on Wu Kehua's four columns.
At the beginning of the formation of the Eastern Advance Corps, Wei Lihuang recommended to Lao Jiang his deputy Chen Tie, who was then the deputy commander of the Northeast "Suppression General", to be the commander of the corps. Chen Tie graduated from the Huangpu Phase I, participated in the Eastern Expedition and the Northern Expedition, and was highly qualified among the generals of the Nationalist Army, and was a very suitable candidate for the commander of the Eastern Advance Corps.
However, for some reason, Old Jiang rejected Wei Lihuang's proposal and insisted on appointing Hou Jingru as the commander of the Eastern Advance Corps. It turned out afterwards that this was clearly a mistake in employing improperly. If Chen Tie is used as the commander, I am afraid that no one can say whether the strength of the four columns alone can block the all-out onslaught of more than 100,000 national troops with the cooperation of the navy and air force.
Old Jiang's second serious mistake was to remotely command Liao Yaoxiang, and after Hou Jingru's Eastward Advance Corps was blocked at Tashan, Old Jiang constantly urged Liao Yaoxiang's corps to accelerate towards Jinzhou. After all, Liao Yaoxiang was a famous general of the Nationalist Army, and his level was higher than that of old Jiang, and after he set out from Shenyang, he had been cautious, afraid of being ambushed by Dongye.
The westward marching corps stopped and stopped, much to the displeasure of old Chiang, who repeatedly and strictly ordered Liao Yaoxiang to advance at full speed in order to retake Jinzhou against Hou Jingru from east to west, and sternly stated that "if there is any further delay, it will be carried out under military law." Liao Yaoxiang had no choice but to continue his westward march with a hard scalp.
On October 16, 1948, when the Westward Advance Corps arrived at Xinlitun, Liao Yaoxiang learned that Hou Jingru had stopped his attack on Tashan a day earlier, and he thought that if he ventured forward, he would probably crash into Dongye's net.
So Liao Yaoxiang ordered the troops to stop at Xinlitun and proposed to Lao Jiang that the troops should no longer advance towards Jinzhou, but would instead divert to Yingkou and retreat by sea to preserve their strength. Judging from the situation at that time, Liao Yaoxiang's proposal was still relatively reasonable, and in the case of no hope of retaking Jinzhou, it was better to preserve strength to facilitate future operations.
Du Yuming, then deputy commander-in-chief of the Northeast "Suppression General", agreed with Liao Yaoxiang's proposal, but the old Chiang Veto refused and insisted on retaking Jinzhou. Liao Yaoxiang, on the other hand, was determined to divert to Yingkou and retreated from the sea, saying, "As long as I can rescue the main force of the corps, I will decide to do it, personal responsibility, and I will talk about it later." ”
Finally, after 5 days of debate, a compromise plan was reached: the Westward Advance Corps moved south of the Great Tiger Mountain in Montenegro, and the Shenyang 52nd Army entered and occupied yingkou to ensure the rear road; then the Westward Advancing Corps attacked the Black Mountain Great Tiger Mountain, if the attack was successful, it would retake Jinzhou, and if the attack was blocked, it would retreat to Yingkou under the cover of the 52nd Army.
Due to the stubbornness of old Chiang, Liao Yaoxiang's army delayed for 5 days in Xinlitun Baibai, and did not begin to attack Montenegro until the 21st, but it was too late. Liang Xingchu's 10 columns used these 5 days of precious time day and night to rush to Montenegro and build a blocking position.
In the end, Liao Yaoxiang failed to take Montenegro, and was surrounded by 6 columns of Dongye, and was defeated and captured. If Old Chiang agreed to Liao Yaoxiang's suggestion at the beginning, the Westward Advance Corps would most likely flee by sea from Yingkou, and the Nationalist army would not have been so defeated. Therefore, from this point of view, the old Chiang Kai-shek is the biggest shortcoming of the Nationalist army.