The founding monarch of the Nguyen Dynasty, Nguyen Phuc Anh, went into exile in Siam in his early years and served in the court of Rama I. During the Vietnamese Civil War, Nguyen Phuc Anh received Siamese military aid by offering gold and silver trees and high-value agricultural products to Rama I. After the establishment of the Nguyen Dynasty, the personal relationship between the two monarchs profoundly influenced Vietnam's foreign policy decisions on the Indochina Peninsula. Due to the long period of exile of the Nguyễn regime, its Confucianism mostly remained in a kind of Confucianism learned in military battles, and the distinction of civilization emphasized by the "Huayi Distinction" was not within its vision. For a long time after the establishment of the Nguyễn Dynasty, this idea was not the guiding principle of its diplomacy with Siam. During the Ming Dynasty, the level of Confucianism in Vietnam improved, and the idea of "Huayi Discernment" gradually returned. When Ming Ming applied Confucian ideas to the affairs of the Indochina Peninsula, he failed to successfully pull diplomatic relations with Siam into the Confucian discourse system, causing the Nguyen dynasty's "tributary system" to be greatly incoordinated between theory and practice, and it was not resolved until the relationship between the two countries broke down.
For a long time, there was a System of International Relations centered on China in East Asia. Monarchs of Korea, Vietnam (Annam), Ryukyu and other countries paid tribute to the Chinese emperor and accepted the canonization. The interaction between China and these tributary states is based on a mature and complete discourse system centered on confucian concepts such as "ritual", "monarch", and "Huayi".
In 1802, the Nguyen Dynasty of Vietnam was established. As its territory expanded significantly to the south, the Nguyễn dynasty also gradually moved its diplomatic center southward. Compared with previous dynasties, the Nguyen Dynasty was more involved in the affairs of the Indochina Peninsula. When writing historical materials of the Vietnamese dynasty, they were deeply influenced by the Confucian tradition of writing history, and when describing the relationship between Vietnam and neighboring countries and regions, they often used Confucian concepts such as "Huayi Discernment" to make value judgments. Many scholars in recent generations have noticed this point and have put forward relevant concepts about the model of vietnam's relations with the countries of the Indochina Peninsula, such as the "Yazong-fan relationship" as described by Dai Kelai and Sun Jiandang, and the "Great Southern Imperial Order" by Korean scholar Liu In-sun. [1] In addition, Alexander Barton Woodside explores and discusses vietnam's imitation of the Qing regime structure in the early Nguyen dynasty. [2] However, these studies remain a brief description of these concepts and lack an understanding of the inherent complexity of the system.
In addition, academic research on the Vietnamese tributary system often a priori believes that the regular tribute of countries around the Indochina Peninsula to the Nguyen Dynasty (Vietnam) represents the establishment of this system. In fact, in the history of international relations, it is a common phenomenon for small and weak countries to pay regular tributes to the powerful neighboring countries as a sign of submission, while receiving the protection of the latter. The Siamese vassal states had a tradition of paying tribute to the "gold and silver tree", and in the 7th century Arabia also paid tribute to the Byzantine Empire. The operation of the East Asian tributary system can be different from other systems because it contains a set of discourse systems with the "Huayi Discernment" as the core, and its essence is the superiority of the Chinese civilization that the suzerainty emphasizes "cultivating and reading the heirlooms". However, whether this feature was "inherited" by the Nguyen Dynasty, or to what extent, has not paid much attention to in previous studies.
In 1855, the Nguyen Dynasty promulgated the "Case of the Great Southern Society of king", in which the foreign-related affairs part was mostly placed under the "Ministry of Rites", and the diplomatic objects were divided into "diplomatic relations" and "Rouyuan": the former involved the affairs of China (Qing Dynasty), and the latter involved the affairs of Southeast Asian countries, Britain, France and vietnamese ethnic minority areas. [3] In addition, as early as 1834, the Nguyễn Dynasty promulgated another document of the nature of the canonical nature that little scholars know about, the Compendium of the Great South Society. Under the book "Rebbe", the Nguyen Dynasty divides foreign-related affairs into two categories: "Neighbor Good", the former involving the Qing Dynasty and the Siamese Bangkok Dynasty, while the latter involves the affairs of the Khmer, Nam Cho and Vientiane and other vassal states and the surrounding ethnic minority areas of Vietnam. [4] Although the volume of the Compendium is much smaller than that of the Canon, the most intriguing thing in comparison is that Siam's status has been changed from "neighborly" to "rouyuan". Why did Vietnam, which has always advocated the "Huayi Distinction" in foreign relations, once elevate Siam, which should have been listed as a "barbarian" outside the Chinese character cultural circle, to an "equal" status with itself, and then downgraded it to a "rouyuan" country twenty years later? This is a problem that has long been ignored by the academic community.
With this as a starting point, this article explores the official archives, anthologies and historical materials of the Nguyen Dynasty, and on the basis of Chinese, English, Vietnamese and French studies, focuses on the relationship between the Nguyễn Dynasty of Vietnam (including the Nguyễn Dynasty during the Nguyen Phuc Anh period) and the Bangkok Dynasty of Siam between 1784 and 1833, discusses how the Nguyen regime brought its historical experience about the "East Asian tributary system" to its diplomacy with Siam, and examines the theoretical and practical dilemmas it encountered, as well as the adjustments and compromises made in this regard. Thus revealing the influence and significance of the Vietnamese-Siamese Alliance on the Nguyen Dynasty's Indochina Policy. [5]
I. Relations between Nguyen Phuc Anh during the Restoration period and Siam
(1) Nguyen Phuc Anh into the Bangkok Dynasty (1784-1787)
Vietnam in the 18th century was in a period of antagonism between the "North Tran Nam Nguyen". The northern Lord Zheng held the real power of the Later Lê Dynasty in Vietnam for a long time, and from 1673 onwards, he and the southern Nguyễn Lord were bounded by the Jing River, which was nearly 17 degrees north latitude. In order to survive, Nguyễn constantly expanded new lands to the south, encroaching on champa and Khmer territories. By the reign of the eighth Nguyễn lord Nguyễn Phuc Quoc (1738-1765), Nguyễn had begun to proclaim himself "vua troi", and although he still served as the Later Lê Dynasty, he seemed to be an independent kingdom. [6] The balance of power between the two families of Trần and Nguyễn was broken by the Thuc Son Uprising in the 1770s. In 1777, the Thuy Son Army almost wiped out the southern Nguyễn regime, and the latter, under the leadership of Nguyễn Phuc Anh, began a twenty-year exile to "restore the country". After repelling the intervention of the Qing dynasty army, the Xishan Army requested Qianlong to be canonized, and finally recognized by the Qing Dynasty in 1789 as the "orthodox" dynasty of Vietnam.
Although Vietnam and Siam are both Southeast Asian countries, political exchanges between the two countries are quite recent. Because of its geographical location, Siam has long used Vietnam more as a halfway supply station and haven for its own fleet to trade and pay tribute to China. [7] It was not until the Nguyen regime's territory continued to extend near the Gulf of Siam that the two countries had meaningful diplomatic exchanges.
In 1784, Rama I received a request from the Nguyen Phuc Anh general Zhu Van to send someone to meet the desperate Nguyen Phuc Anh in Long Chuan and invite him to take refuge in Siam. After much deliberation, Nguyen went to Bangkok with the remaining thirty or so subordinates and dozens of his entourage. [8] Rama I and Nguyen Phuc Anh were ultimately able to move towards unity depending on the preferences of both parties. In the face of the complicated situation of the Vietnamese civil war at that time (Th Trầng, Nguyễn, Emperor Đại Lần, and the Tay Son Army), Rama I had a greater affinity for the weakest Nguyễn regime, and even directly rejected the request for alliance made by the envoys of Sai Son. [9] Nguyen Phuc Anh also believed that he was a weak soldier and had no choice but to deal with the Sai Son Army for the time being, "for the sake of the present, Mo Ruoxian thought that it was a quick help." [10] These two points contributed to Nguyen's choice of Siam as his home base.
Nguyen Phuc Anh's position in the Siamese court was more delicate. Rama I arranged it near Bangkok and gave him a certain amount of money and rewards. Nguyen Phuc Anh was placed to attend the Siamese court every day, in the same schedule as the Minister of The Janissaries (Krom Tamruat). Rama I also authorized officials in Samut Prachuap Lam to allow Nguyen Phuc Anh's entourage to trade at sea and exempt them from customs duties to cover daily expenses. [11] The Khmer was a Siamese vassal state at the time, still under Siamese control, and the Khmer king, Ang Eng, was placed under house arrest in Bangkok. Rama I gave the Nguyen clan the same treatment as An Anh during his stay in Bangkok. [12]
As a history book of official cultivation of the Nguyen Dynasty, the Records of The Great South contains a more obscure description of Nguyen Phuc Anh's actual situation during Siam, which is also in line with the tradition of Confucian historical narratives of "keeping secrets for His Holiness". It mainly focuses on the "respect" shown by Rama I for Nguyen Phuc Anh's character and ability. [13] In contrast, chen Wenke, who was accompanying him at the time, wrote a posthumous account of what he later wrote: "The monarch bowed to the Siamese court and prepared for the hardships... Chen has the general Zhu Wenjie... To Siam
The city (i.e. Bangkok——— the introducer's note) entered the King of Siam and first met the ancestors. The general hugged his knees and cried for a long time. Therefore, the king of Siam took over the name of the great general and knew to respect the ancestors. If you have a presence, you must sit down. At that time, when Burma attacked Siam, Rama I ordered Nguyen Phuc Anh to lead the Siamese troops into battle, and won a great victory, but "harvested a lot of grain ships and equipment to return to Siam, and blackmailed for the Siamese officials, helpless." [14] All of this gives a glimpse of Nguyen Phuc Anh's embarrassing position of "humiliation" and "powerlessness" in the Siamese court at that time.
Shortly after Nguyen Phuc Anh arrived in Siam, in late 1784 Rama I sent his nephew Krom Luang Thepharirak to lead 20,000 sailors and 300 warships to help Nguyen Phuc Anh retake Gia Dinh (present-day Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam). However, at the Battle of Ryo Chui (present-day Qian Giang Province, Vietnam), the Siamese army was ambushed by the Thuy Son Army and returned with a major defeat. Nguyen Phuc Anh attributed the defeat to the Siamese soldiers who plundered everywhere, causing the people to complain and be unpopular. [15] After the defeat, Nguyen Phuc Anh abandoned the illusion of relying on the Siamese army for a rapid recovery and returned to the path of self-reliance. Since then, Siamese aid has focused mainly on military equipment.
Nguyen Phuc Anh served intermittently at the Siamese court until 1787. In addition to leading troops to resist the Burmese attack, when there was no war, he visited Rama I as a member of the government, and even trained some dancers to dance the Vietnamese court dance for important ceremonial occasions. [16] However, Nguyen Phuc Anh was ultimately a man with ideals of restoring the country and eradicating the "Thieves", and his perception of the prospects for continuing his service at the Siamese court began to shift. He believes that "since the defeat of The Siamese in Kotatsu (1784), although they have spoken loudly, but their hearts are jealous of the western mountains like tigers", the courtesy given to him is only for the sake of disguised detention. [17] Privately, Nguyen also complained to Bishop Baitol Loc of the Paris Foreign Missionary Church about the hypocrisy of the Siamese, believing that they ostensibly helped him restore the empire, but in fact "only wanted to enslave his people in his name and turn them into his own captives".
In August 1787, Nguyen Phuc Anh finally decided to end his sojourn in Siam. Fearing that Rama I would not let him go, he left his book in his apartment and then absconded by boat at night. According to Siamese historical records, in his farewell letter, Nguyen Phuc Anh expressed his gratitude to King Rama I for hosting him over the years, and also said, "After leaving, I will gather my subordinates to restore the country." If there is a shortage of weapons and ammunition in the future, I will write to you to ask you to fund some weapons and ammunition until I win. On the day of the restoration of the country, I will bow down to Your Majesty." It was after receiving this promise from Nguyen Phuc Anh that Rama I ordered his brother to abandon his pursuit. The phrase "bow down to one's subjects" is clearly taboo in Vietnamese historical sources, so no corresponding record has been found. But what is certain is that for Nguyen Phuc Anh and the Nguyen regime it represents, survival is the most urgent task, and the idea of "Hua Yi Discernment", which involves the superiority of Confucian civilization, belongs to a higher level of "dignity needs" and is not the object of Nguyen Phuc Anh's concern at this stage.
(2) The problem of "gold and silver trees"
From his departure from the Siamese court in 1787 to the establishment of the Nguyen Dynasty in 1802, Nguyen Phuc Anh sent envoys to Siam more than ten times, reporting on the war situation and requesting assistance in military supplies. Six of these were given the task of offering the "gold and silver tree", namely: in 1788 (to make a good deal, request for gunpowder, ammunition, and soldiers' assistance), in 1790 (to report for employment), 1793 (to report on victory), 1795 (to report on military affairs), and in 1801 (to report on victory). [20] "Gold and silver trees" became an unavoidable theme in the study of relations between the two sides during this period.
In 1450, the "White Elephant King" of the Ayutthaya dynasty, Delilolo Gana, promulgated the Kot Mont'ien Ban (Court Law), which required certain vassal states to pay tribute to Ayutthaya with gold and silver trees, a provision that has continued into modern times. [21] Malaysian scholars believe that Nguyen Phuc Anh "faithfully recognized the status of vassal" to Siam by offering gold and silver trees. [22] The American scholar Michuel Eiland agreed that Nguyen was very clear about the symbolism behind it, and that his submission placed the responsibility for protecting the vassal state on Rama I. [23]
Although the above statements are very logical, it must be pointed out that these statements are not supported by historical data. Even the Chronicle of the Bangkok Dynasty, which represents the position of the Siamese royal family, does not associate the gold and silver trees offered by Nguyen Phuc Anh with keywords such as "tribute" and "vassal state". The record of Nguyen Phuc Anh's first offering of gold and silver trees is quite simple in the "Records of the Great South": "Making gold flowers, silver flowers, and so on." In the "Chronicle of the Bangkok Dynasty", some details are added: after Nguyen Phuc Anh recaptured Saigon and other places, in order to show his gratitude to Rama I, he specially prepared a gold tree and a silver tree to advance. Because of his ingenuity, the king ordered him to store it in the collection of the Phrachao Tower. [24] The next five offerings of gold and silver trees, as recorded in the Records of the Great Nam, are all related to reports on the recent fighting situation in Nguyen Phuc Anh, and are more unified. The Chronicle of the Bangkok Dynasty, on the other hand, does not mention the symbolic meaning behind these emissaries at all, or the national letter (table text) that indicates submission.
The gold and silver trees were of no universal significance to the Siamese states. Among Siam's many vassal states, only the Malay countries, such as Kedah, Pattani, Kelantan, etc., are required to pay tribute to Bangkok every three years, including gold and silver trees. [25] Chandler, an expert on Khmer history, also pointed out: "There is no evidence that the Khmer gave gold and silver trees to Siam, and these were the characteristics of tributes from other vassal states to Bangkok." [25] Nor did we find that the Siamese side had "forced" or "induced" Nguyen Phuc Anh to present gold and silver trees to him. It can be said that Nguyen Phuc Anh's move was an act of voluntarily abandoning the Confucian "Huayi distinction" and incorporating himself into a Siamese"." [26]
Is there a similarity between the offering of gold and silver trees and the "years of tribute" in the Sino-Vietnamese tributary relationship? Generally speaking, Vietnamese tribute envoys arrived in Beijing and after the ceremonial department completed the routine of paying tribute, visiting, and receiving rewards, they rarely had a substantive diplomatic mission. But every time Nguyen Phuc Anh offered a gold and silver tree, it was closely linked to the war situation at that time. When Nguyen Phuc Anh first offered the gold and silver tree, he asked Rama I for support for a large amount of gunpowder ammunition, and asked the army of the Khmer of the vassal state to jointly attack the Hou Giang region to capture the general of the Western Shan Army, Pham Van San, who had fled to this area. Rama I agreed to this request, and in the end Nguyen Phuc Anh managed to capture Pham Van San. During the second offering, Nguyen asked Siamese to send merchant ships to the Jiading area to sell corn for food. Later, in 1791, Rama I presented guns and iron. [27] Before the third offering of the gold and silver tree, Nguyen Phuc Anh sent Nguyen Ngum to Siam and asked the king of Siam to give him a seal so that he could purchase grain in Vientiane. [28] In 1795 and 1796, Siam presented elephant horses to Nguyen Phuc Anh as war supplies. [29] During the fifth and sixth offerings of the gold and silver tree, Rama I directly asked the messenger to bring back a large amount of gunpowder, silk fabrics, and boats at the moment of offering. [30] It can be seen that the offering of gold and silver trees has gone beyond the attributes of "etiquette" and has the meaning of "special envoy".
However, it is not feasible to occupy the "moral" high ground by merely expressing "submission" by offering gold and silver trees, and further by requiring the "suzerainty" to fulfill its obligation to assist itself in the form of a "vassal state". Given the huge expenditure of the war, if Rama I could not benefit from the war, then the dispatch of troops would be marked with a question mark. Therefore, equal attention must be paid to other items that are offered at the same time as the "gold and silver tree". Compared with the symbolism of the gold and silver tree, the other items offered by Nguyen Phuc Anh were of very high economic value and were probably more valued by Siam. The first time Nguyen Phuc Anh presented a gold and silver tree, he did not include other items; the second time he also included a glass lantern, a model of a large pear boat, and "500 kg of granulated sugar, 500 kg of stone sugar, and 500 kg of yellow wax". From the third time, 500 pounds of sugar and 500 pounds of wax became the custom when offering gold and silver trees. From the fifth time, another "ten two Qinanxiang" was added. [31] Sugar had an almost luxury status at the time, and beeswax was an important fuel for nighttime illumination in ancient times, and only the nobles could afford to enjoy it. As for Kinan incense, as a valuable variety of agarwood and one of the Vietnamese specialties, it can be used as a raw material for incense and is popular with the Siamese who regard Theravada Buddhism as the state religion. Therefore, these high-value agricultural products were an important driving force behind Siam's decision to provide military aid.
In its official documents against Siam, the Nguyen Phuc Anh regime sometimes referred to Rama I as the "Buddha King of Siam" and sometimes as the "King of Siam". [32] This mixture weakens the strict distinction between "emperor" and "king" under the original Confucian hierarchy, and more importantly, it gives a large space for interpretation of the act of offering gold and silver trees. In religious practice, the gold and silver tree is still one of the important ritual instruments enshrined in the Buddha statue in Theravada Buddhist monasteries, which can be seen in Bangkok, Luang Prabang and other places. Associating the "Buddha King" with religious significance to the gold and silver tree obscures the attributes of the "gold and silver tree" as a "vassal tribute" in the Siamese tributary system. Thus the donation of gold and silver trees was transformed from a political and diplomatic act into a "quasi-religious act." Such an approach would have prevented Nguyen Phuc Anh from being dwarfed in the relationship between the two countries. Externally, it is easy to be accepted by Siam, and internally, it can avoid the crisis of governance in the face of domestic scholars.
Judging from historical facts, Nguyen Phuc Anh used gold and silver trees as a "coat" to wrap high-value products such as cane sugar and beeswax as equivalents in exchange for Siamese military aid. Although neither side specified Nguyen Phuc Anh's vassal status, this tacit understanding brought a delicate balance between the Nguyen regime and the Bangkok Dynasty.
2. The Political Legacy of Nguyen Phuc Anh Siam
In June 1802, after an overwhelming victory in the war against Thuy Son, Nguyễn Phúc anthony announced in Hue that the Yuan would be changed to "Gia Long" and establish the Nguyen Dynasty. Thereafter, its relations with the Bangkok Dynasty of Siam entered a new phase. Although Nguyen Phuc Anh's identity is no longer that of an exiled Vietnamese prince, but as a monarch of a dynasty, Nguyen Phuc Anh's original experience in Siam has been a political legacy that has influenced the relationship between the Nguyen Dynasty and the Bangkok Dynasty.
(i) The Formal Establishment of Vietnamese-Siamese Diplomatic Relations and the "Personal Relations" with the Monarch
At the end of 1802, Nguyen Phuc Anh sent an envoy to Siam to report on the latest progress in the reform of the Yuan and the unification of Vietnam. [33] Although the Great Nam Chronicle and other official Vietnamese sources do not include the book, the Chronicle of the Bangkok Dynasty reveals that Nguyen Pheu Anh called himself "Emperor" (Emperor, Chao Phaen din Yai). Rama I did not dispute this, and continued the title to refer to Garon in later accounts. [34] It can be seen that the two countries have continued their previous tacit understanding and have not made a fuss about the "gold and silver tree" problem and the "territorial problem" caused by its linkage.
A few months later, Jialong stabilized the government, and for the first time the two countries officially exchanged envoys, which were of such high standard that they could glimpse each other's perceptions of their respective positions at that time. At the beginning of 1803, the Nguyễn clan took the Nguyễn Nguyễn and the team as their deputy envoys, and went to Siam with the national letter, official documents, and goods. The Nguyen Dynasty officials compiled a record of the emissaries of Vietnam and Siam during the Jialong period, called "The Case of Good Neighbors", which detailed the list of items brought by the mission, of which the "gold and silver tree" has disappeared. In addition, for different objects, Nguyen Dynasty also paid considerable attention to the use of words. For Rama I use "gift", "gift" for "vice-king", and "reward" for Siamese ministers. [35] The use of the word "gift" not only reflects Jialong's refusal to "submit" to Siam, but also shows that he does not regard Siam as a barbarian in the concept of "Huayi Distinction", but instead places it in the position of equal friend and neighbor.
As a return visit, Rama I sent a large delegation of 53 people to Vietnam. At the top of the list was a "jade-encrusted gold-encrusted crown" (malabiang-style headgear). Jia long accepted the other items, but returned the crown, because "this is the property of a person in a high position, and he does not dare to wear it, so please return it." This is confirmed by the official historical data of the two countries. [36] From the diplomatic practice of Siam and its vassal states, Siam often gave new monarchs of their vassal states such as "golden leaf boxes, golden goblets, golden spittoons, umbrellas, and guns" as a sign of Siam's recognition of their royal power. [37] Apparently, "jade inlaid gold crown" was not the traditional Siamese practice of treating vassal states. At least in rank, it can be seen that Rama I gave Jialong and his empire a courtesy higher than that of Siamese vassals. Garon, on the other hand, had a high degree of political wisdom and continued to gain the trust and favor of Rama I by showing weakness but without losing dignity.
Generally speaking, under the Tributary System of China and Vietnam, there was no "personal relationship" between the monarchs of the two countries. Most of the envoys of the two countries stop at the formal level of "etiquette". When the envoys saw the other monarch, they only made some simple response to the domestic situation. However, the emissaries between the Nguyen dynasty and the Bangkok dynasty showed great differences, with obvious pragmatic characteristics and "alliance". From the moment Nguyen Phuc Anh left the Siamese court to organize forces to attack the Thuy Son Army, he was very pragmatic in his dispatch of Rama I, either reporting on the situation of the battle or asking for weapons. This feature was also retained after Nguyen Phuc Anh ascended the throne, and the official documents carried by emissaries on both sides often included very specific matters to be resolved. Since there is no such thing as a "tribute period," there is no need to send envoys to Zhennanguan to agree on a date for switching, as is the case with Chinese envoys. Emissaries from Vietnam and Siam can be dispatched as they please. For example, in 1807, Siam suddenly sent envoys to Hue with goods and goods, and at one time carried three letters of state, one involving one request for Qinan and cinnamon, one obituary for the death of the three kings of the country, and a request for hospitality for ships that had been drifted to Binh Dinh Province in Vietnam. [38]
Even when "mourning" to the Nguyen Dynasty, an easily formalized "informative" type of dispatch, Jialong still treated it as an important diplomatic event. At the end of 1803, Rama I's younger brother, Crown Prince Sura Sinhana, died, and Kalong sent envoys to Siam to give gifts. In the Book of Kingdom, Garon reminds Rama I that he is getting older (66 years old) and that now that the crown prince is dead, only his son and nephew can succeed to the throne, but the two have equal power, which is very dangerous. Garon urged Rama I to appoint his eldest son as his heir as soon as possible, so that he could gain more power so that the political resources could be operated in an orderly manner. [39] The succession to the throne was one of the core internal affairs of the empire, and The fact that Kalong was able to intervene so directly in the matter of the Siamese Crown Prince, without shying away from expressing his preference for the selection of the Crown Prince, reflected the political mutual trust between him and Rama I, and also showed that the personal relationship between the two monarchs had transcended diplomacy, and that this mutual trust was the political legacy of Nguyen Phuc Anh's experience of taking refuge in Siam.
After the establishment of the Nguyen Dynasty, the practice of mixing "Buddha King" and "King" was continued. Not only that, but what is even more interesting is that in the "Nguyen Dynasty Chu Ben Archives" there is a translation of the national book given to JiaLong by Rama I in 1806, in which Siam also calls Jia Long "the King of the Buddha of Vietnam". [40] According to Nguyễn dynasty practice, when foreign envoys arrived in the border provinces of Vietnam, they first handed over the national documents to the officials of the border provinces for preview. If there is any irregularity, the border provincial officials will directly ask the other party to revise it. For countries that are not Han cultural circles, such as the water house state and the fire house country, there have even been examples of tribute forms directly written by the Nguyen Dynasty Ceremonial Department and modified by the Vietnamese emperor himself. [41] The Siamese translation was sent to Hue after being reviewed by the Jiading Border Ministers, indicating that the Nguyen Dynasty monarchs did not disagree with the name Siam. In a sense, this is a manifestation of an unconscious acceptance of the Siamese discourse system, which directly leads to the Confucian "Huayi Distinction" becoming nowhere to be found.
(ii) The Pride of Rama II and the Plight of Emperor Mingming
In 1809, Rama I died and was succeeded by Rama II. This marked the end of private diplomacy between the monarchs of Vietnam and Siam. Although Garlong's personal experience determined that he remained more or less friendly to Siam in his dealings with Rama II, for His successor, Emperor Mingming, his father's experience became a huge political burden in handling relations between the two countries. Here we can compare the different reactions of the two Nguyen monarchs when Rama II first sent envoys to Jialong and the first time to Ming.
At the beginning of 1810, a mourning mission sent by Rama II to Jiading, during the pre-examination of the Siamese State Book, found that "his writings were too big, thinking that if he received it, he would be proud, but he would be injured", so he reported the matter. However, Jialong did not want to dwell too much on this matter, believing that "the Siamese people are unwritten, this is all the fault of the Tang people, and it is not enough to blame", so he allowed the emissary to enter Beijing, and sent the emissary back to worship Rama I and celebrate Rama II's ascension to the throne. [42] Kalong's experience in Siam gave him an understanding of how Siamese politics worked. Although it is impossible to cut the arrogance of the Siamese Book from Rama II, It is a very clever practice for Kalong to avoid direct confrontation and blame the Chinese for the problems of the State Book: defusing the potential diplomatic storm externally, and appeasing the domestic scholars by hinting at the superiority of the Vietnamese (Chinese) civilization over the Siamese civilization.
However, after the ascension to the throne in 1820, the same reaction to the "arrogance" of Rama II was completely different from that of Garon. At that time, Ming ordered a mission with the Rebbe Counselor Pei Dejin as the envoy to Siam to report on the national funeral. [43] The Nguyen Dynasty historical sources such as the Great Southern Chronicles do not include the original text of the State Book, while the Siamese historical sources point out that the Nguyen Dynasty at that time recounted in detail the great deeds and merits of Jia Long's life in a "consciously offensive tone", full of expressions of the superiority of Vietnamese Confucian culture. In this regard, Rama II directly pointed out that the Nguyen Dynasty's practice of calling him "Emperor of Siam" was unnecessary, because this was Chinese saying, and Siam had its own independent culture that did not need to be borrowed from China at all. [44] Rama II rejected the Nguyen Dynasty's attempt to incorporate itself into the Confucian discourse system in a direct "bottom-of-the-bucket" approach. Apparently, the King of Siam had a clear understanding of the "Chinese origin" of the Ming Ming dynasty, so his rejection was to the point.
When Receiving Pei's delegation, Rama II proposed that he hope that the Siamese envoys would "give ten pounds of platinum to give alms" after they arrived in Vietnam, and Pei dejin agreed to this request. However, When Ming Ming heard about this, he was very angry, believing that Rama II's move was to cause the Vietnamese people to rob him, although it was called "blessing", but in fact it damaged the face of the empire. [45]
Later, Siam sent a delegation to Hue for incense and celebrations. After receiving the Siamese State Letter, the Vietnamese Ha Xian Bian vassal Gong Yu discovered that Rama II had called himself an "elder" to Ming Ming. In terms of age, Rama I was born in 1737 and belonged to the father of Jialong (1762). Kalung and Rama II (1767) were considered "contemporaries" and met during Kalong's refuge in Siam. Therefore, when facing Jialong's heir Emperor Mingming, Rama II naturally revealed a kind of arrogance of "uncle" to "nephew". In addition, Yu Gongyu also found that the goods brought by the Siamese mission had changed significantly in nature compared with the goods sent by Rama I when Jialong first ascended the throne. Different from the original "jade inlaid gold crown", this time Siamese gifts such as golden fugues, golden spit pots and other things are "all gifts given by Siam to subordinates". In fact, these items were not only rewarded to their subjects, but also traditional items given away when Siam was enthroned. [46] Rama II apparently wanted to use these means to imply to Ming Ming that his "Imperial Examination" had a special relationship with Siam at that time, which was wrapped in the "Golden And Silver Tree".
Duke Yu reported the situation of the Siamese mission to the imperial court, which triggered heated discussion among the Nguyen dynasty's monarchs. Nguyen Duc Trịn pointed out that "Yi Di is rude, it is better to ignore it." There is only the ear of war in discord.". And Li Bopin pointed out: "If he has no heart, won't he be hurt and angry?" Hopefully, there is room for manoeuvre in this matter. Ming Ming agreed with the latter, but explicitly pointed out the fact that "I am the enemy of Siam". After protests by vietnamese border ministers, the Siamese delegation revised the state book, saying that the "elders" in the state book were drafted by Siamese ministers, and that "the gold ornaments and utensils were cherished by the Buddha king, so they were given as gifts." [47] Although the matter ended with the explicit consent to allow the Envoy to enter Beijing, the unhappiness in his heart was certain.
Nguyen Duc Khun's direct call to Siam as "Yi Di" was rare in the Nguyen Phuc Anh era. Of course, this is related to Nguyen Duc Khun's own strong "hawkish" color in the military,[48] but it is also related to the shift in caliber of this "Huayi distinction" that appeared in the ming dynasty at the beginning of the ming dynasty. With the end of more than a hundred years of war and chaos in the country and the gradual recovery of the imperial examination, the level of Confucianism in the Vietnamese government and the opposition has increased rapidly, the northern scholars have been continuously supplemented into the decision-making level, and the idea of "Huayi distinction" in the diplomacy of the Nguyen Dynasty has gradually returned. However, this shift was not enough to divert the Nguyen Dynasty's policy toward Siam towards direct confrontation. Those voices of confrontation are often accompanied by the argument of "sudun neighborliness" with Siam. In the view of Ming Ming, who attached importance to Confucianism, although the Nguyen Dynasty regarded Siam as an imaginary enemy, on the surface, because of the friendship between "Huang Kao" and Siam for nearly forty years, it became a moral responsibility for Ming Ming to continue to maintain the alliance between the two sides.
Negotiations with the Tiger on the Khmer and Vientiane Issues
After the 17th century, the Khmer and Vientiane, located between Vietnam and Siam, have lost their former glory. Although both the Nguyen regime and the Siamese dynasties were committed to expanding their influence in the region, the Nguyen regime lost its voice due to the outbreak of the Thi Khanh Uprising in Vietnam. In 1802, after Nguyen Phuc Anh unified Vietnam, the Nguyen dynasty began to hope to "return" to the Khmer and Laos, and thus launched a series of negotiations with the Bangkok Dynasty, and even provoked confrontation. These diplomatic activities take on a complex face because of Nguyen Phuc Anh's once special relationship with Siam.
(i) The rivalry between Garon and Rama II over the Khmer
In the 17th century, the Khmer paid tribute to lord Nguyen, but did not pay tribute after the exile of the Nguyễn regime. [49] In 1796, King Ang Eng of the Khmer died, leaving behind a infant prince, whom Siam made a national symbol of the Khmer, in the name of Ang Chan II. The power of the Bangkok Dynasty facilitated the full takeover of the Khmer at this time.
Nguyen Phuc Anh, who was still in the period of restoration, had no intention of regaining control of the Khmer, and instead even recognized Siam's "exclusive" suzerainty in Khmer affairs. In 1799, Nguyen Phuc Anh wanted the Khmer and Vientiane armies to help while fighting the Thuy Son Army, but instead of making a request to the two countries, he sent a letter to Bangkok. After receiving the letter, Rama I said that due to the inconvenience of land routes during the rainy season, soldiers were prone to illness, so the Vientiane army could not take the road to Phu an ann to help Nguyen Phuc An, but could let the Khmer send troops to attack the Western Shan army in Quy Nhon. In the end, more than 500 people joined Nguyen Phuc Anh's army. [50]
In 1806, Anzan II officially ascended the throne in Bangkok, and the following year he applied to the Nguyen Dynasty for canonization. Therefore, Jialong immediately sent a military counselor to Wu Renjing to seal him as the "King of Gaomian" and determine the tribute period of three years and one tribute. [51] It was not until the sixth year of Gia Long (1807) that the Nguyen Dynasty regained the possibility of competing with Siam for the right to speak on the Khmer issue.
The Khmer became the official tributary state of the Nguyen Dynasty, which was very important to the latter, and the Nguyen Dynasty gained legitimacy to oppose Siam in Khmer affairs. This legal basis derives from the Confucian ethics of the tributary system, such as "succession to extinction", "small way of characters", "rise and fall and succession", that is, "China" has the obligation to assist tributary states that are in danger. Later, when negotiating with Siam on the Khmer issue, the Nguyen Dynasty repeatedly quoted this argument to provide a legal basis for its diplomatic actions.
Only one year after the death of Rama I, the Nguyen dynasty and the Bangkok dynasty almost lost fire over the Khmer issue. In 1810, Anzan II, under the name of "Secret Siam", killed two pro-Siamese officials, Kralahom Moeung and Chakrei Kêp. [52] This provoked resentment in Siam, and Rama II sent troops to the Khmer. Kalon immediately assumed the responsibility of protecting the "suzerainty", stationed troops outside the capital of the Khmer state, and sent people to Siam to deliver the letter of state, emphasizing that Anzan II's killing of his own courtiers had nothing to do with Siam. The move brought Vietnam and Siam from the brink of a hot war back to diplomatic negotiations. The following year, Siamese envoys were sent to Hue to debate the Gorah Sultanate and ask Anzan II to attend the funeral of Rama I in Bangkok, but this was dismissed by Kalong as "no case of personally going to Gyeongju since the existence of the kingdom of Chenla". [53] Subsequently, Jia Long hui sent Song Fu to Siam to mediate in the matter. Since Rama II proposed at that time that the two younger brothers of Anzan II should be divided into kings, song Fu played the state letter carried by the delegation to try to persuade the king of Siam for three reasons: 1. The three kings of the Khmer Dynasty would cause people's hearts to be turbulent; 2. The Nguyen Dynasty's dispatch of troops was "a small meaning, and had to be done", not out of self-interest; 3. Now that there are national mourning in Siam and burma outside, the Nguyen Dynasty garrison in Khmer can not only help Anzan II, but also help Siam in a timely manner. However, Song Fu played the mission did not end the controversy, and when he returned to China, he said that Anzan II "hated Siam with virtue and hatred, Siamese anger was not vented, and the matter of Chenla was not yet done." [54]
In April 1812, Siamese troops attacked the Khmer, and Anzan II fled to Take refuge in Vietnam. Vietnam and Siamese countries then continued to conduct diplomatic negotiations under the guise of good-neighborliness. In July, Siam sent envoys to Hue in the name of the late Nguyen Dynasty Empress Hya Khanh Kam Kam to make incense, hoping to persuade Kalong to return Anzan II. Kalong again uses the words of the tributary system: "The Chenla world is my subject, and must be the manager for it." To the king of Er: 'The king will return, and the king will have no deceit, and if there is no fear, then he will be in Dunlin and the meaning of the word is small.' [55] In October, Siamese sent envoys again, claiming that the brothers' discord before Anzan II had a negative meaning. Now the Siamese soldiers have sealed the treasury and built a castle to wait for their return. Finally, in May 1813, Garon sent a large army to escort Anzan II back to the city of Lovek in the Khmer. This process was not simply the Nguyen Dynasty's military force to force Siam to submit, because it was accompanied by the Siamese emissary Pi ya Maha Amer, and there were already Siamese generals waiting in Lobbi City waiting to hand over the treasury and castle to the Nguyen Dynasty army. [56] In the end, however, Anzan II's younger brother Ang Snguon did not dare to return to the Khmer and remained in Siam, which set the stage for the latter to continue to provoke a dispute over the Khmer throne in the future. Anzan II also agreed to pay tribute to Both Siam and Vietnam to preserve the peace of the kingdom. [57]
Vietnamese scholars called the incident the "Roby Alliance," and siam tacitly accepted that Vietnam also had the right to protect the Khmer. [58] This was the first time since the establishment of the Nguyen Dynasty that Vietnam and Siam had clashed over the leadership of the Indochina Peninsula. The pattern of behavior of both sides in dealing with this incident reflects the political legacy left by King Rama I to the two monarchs. On the one hand, the various build-ups of Vietnamese and Siamese troops in the Khmer have put the two sides on the brink of war; on the other hand, the two sides have maintained a high density of exchange of envoys, committed to resolving the dispute through diplomatic means, and both Rama II and Kallong opened the negotiations with friendly relations between the two sides. Although the Nguyen Dynasty continued to invoke the Confucian approach of "small character survival" to provide legitimacy support for its diplomatic actions, the "Huayi Debate" did not become the main ideological axis in the discussion of policy toward Siam within the Nguyen dynasty court.
In 1814, the year following the rabbi alliance, Siamese envoys were sent to Vietnam and presented the credentials: one recounting the peace between Siam and Burma,[59] and the other about Anzan II, emphasizing that Anzan II was originally a Siamese vassal and that if he did not go to Siam, Siam would not return to his brother. Li Wenyue, a minister of Jiading City, played a pre-examination of the state letter, advocating preemptive strikes, and Jialong immediately suppressed the matter: "I have a good relationship with the king of the first Buddha, and I am righteous to his father and cut down his son, and the neighbors call me what I am?" And the dry go is determined, and the people are happy. He did not want to work hard under the blade. Get a true wax, leave behind the hereafter, and do not do anything. [60] At a time when Siam was busy fighting with Burma on the Western Front, Vietnam did have a chance to take advantage of the Khmer issue on the Eastern Front. However, considering that the capture of the Khmer may cause the rupture of the Vietnamese-Siamese alliance, even though the Nguyen Dynasty has the "small survival of the word" as a reason, Jialong eventually chose to maintain the alliance as the most important thing, and the Khmer issue was good.
(2) The Zhao Anu Incident and its difficult aftermath
In 1827, vietnam and Siam were once again in conflict over the issue of dominance of the Indochina Peninsula, and this time the two sides of the dispute were replaced by Emperor Mingming and Rama III, focusing on the "Anouvong Incident of King Vientiane". In the course of negotiations between the Vietnamese and Siamese sides, Ming Ming had been trying to draw Siam into the discourse mode of the Confucian tributary system, so how effective had this attempt been?
The course of the Zhao Anu incident is not complicated. King Chao Anu of Vientiane, who had long been under siam's domination, saw that the British forces were gradually approaching Siam and decided to take advantage of this opportunity to rebel. Initial raids in Vientiane had good results, but were quickly reversed by Siam, and Cho Anu fled to Vietnam for refuge. The Nguyễn dynasty placed Vientiane as its vassal in the Sam Tsang region, and the following year sent troops to escort him back to China. However, Cho Anu soon launched another attack on Siam, and soon failed again and begged the Vietnamese, but the Nguyen Dynasty refused. Rama III then razed the capital of Vientiane to the ground and incorporated it into The Siamese province of Nong Khai. [61]
The Nguyen Dynasty exerted less influence on Vientiane than it could on the Khmer. After the exile of Nguyen Phuc Anh at the end of the 18th century, Siam became the sole suzerainty of Vientiane and had absolute authority over the abolition of the King of Vientiane. Thus, although in 1805 Vientiane made a request to the Nguyen Dynasty to pay tribute and establish a three-year tribute period,[62] in fact, the Nguyen Dynasty's interference in vientiane's internal and foreign affairs was very limited, and the relations between the two countries basically ended with regular tributes.
When Chao Anu first requested refuge in Vietnam, the Nguyen Dynasty monarchs had a debate about whether to accept Cho Anu. Li Wenyue, the general town of Jiading City, believed that the two countries "called neighbors, but they were actually enemies." Today is good, but not other days." At the same time, he stressed that if Siam were allowed to annex Vientiane, Siam would directly border Vietnam, posing a great threat to the Nguyen Dynasty's border defenses, while maintaining Vientiane's independence would play a role as a vassal. This remark was affirmed by Ming Ming, and it was also the consensus of the Nguyen Dynasty monarchs at this time. In the end, ming decided to use the Confucian tributary system concept of "rising and dying and then extinguishing" to exercise the right to protect Vientiane. [63]
However, Ming Ming also clearly realized that although Vientiane, as a vassal state, paid tribute to both Vietnam and Siam at the same time, the Nguyen Dynasty's concept of "rising and dying and then extinguishing" was not very feasible in practice. Ming Ming himself admitted that Vientiane was "a servant of the Siamese", and now Vietnam intervened in the war between the two countries, and installed Chao Anu in the country, which was easy to anger Rama III. Therefore, he stressed to the courtiers the need to appease the mood of the Siamese side and maintain the friendly state of the two countries. [64] In addition, in 1827, the Nguyễn Dynasty Ministry of Rites ordered the official Wu Gaolang to compile the edicts and chapters related to vientiane affairs during this period into a book, which was later titled "Records of the Handling of Vientiane by the State Dynasty". [65] In the Nguyen Dynasty's official anthologies dealing with indochina affairs, such "neutral" titles are rare. This also confirms from the side that the Nguyen Dynasty did not have much dominance in vientiane affairs.
In the spring of 1828, when the Nguyen Dynasty army escorted Zhao Anu back to China, Ming Order also sent the Ministry of Works Lang Zhong Lê Nhên Hee to Siam, and at the time of the mission's resignation, he specifically instructed him to pay more attention to the "circumscribe" and to instill in Rama III the two concepts of "small words" and "good neighborly friendship" to calm the controversy. [66] Judging from the results, although Lê Won-hee's mission halted the deterioration of relations between the two countries, it failed to reverse Vietnam's lack of substantive voice in Vientiane. However, Ming Ming still promoted the members of the mission in the name of "not dishonoring the national system". [67]
Although the Cho Anu Incident itself soon came to an end, the aftermath of the incident between Vietnam and Siam lasted for four years. This aftermath also reflects the plight of Nguyen Dynasty diplomacy with Siam.
From 1829 to 1832, there was no direct conflict between the Vietnamese and Siamese sides, and the two sides communicated state affairs by sending envoys to each other. At the beginning of 1829, the Ming Order sent Hubu Langzhong Bai Chun Yuan to Siam, mainly to talk about two things: one was to accuse Siam of not informing the Vietnamese envoys of the incident when the Chao Anu Incident broke out, and to condone local barbarian disturbances at the border; the other was to propose to severely punish the Siamese generals who attacked the Nguyễn Dynasty to escort the army back to The Cho Anu for no reason. Bai Chunyuan's delegation had just departed and arrived in Siam, and the Siamese delegation arrived in Jiading. When Ming Ming received the envoy, he proposed: 1. Although Vientiane is a small country, it cannot be left without a monarch for a day, and must be chosen as soon as possible; Extradition of pet shirts to Vietnam; Severely punished the Siamese generals who harassed the Vietnamese manna toast at that time. Finally, Ming Ming said half-threateningly: "If you want to be a neighbor for a long time, you should cook the three as soon as possible." [68]
In response to Ming's request, In 1830 Siam sent envoys to Vietnam, and the letter of state submitted by him was translated by the officials of Jiading City and delivered to Hue. In the Book of Kingdom, Rama III said: 1. In the future, it is guaranteed that it will not dare to invade the Vietnamese border toast; 3. Undertake that Vientiane will be notified to Viet Nam after the establishment of the candidate for state; The killing of Vietnamese officers and soldiers by pet shirts is a "meritorious service" from the Siamese standpoint, and please forgive Nguyen Dynasty. Ming Ming instructed his vassals to argue again on the matter of favoring the shirt, but in order to avoid injury and anger, Emperor Ming ming still agreed to let the emissary enter the capital. During the meeting with the Siamese emissaries, Ming Ming continued to question the other party about the pet shirt, but the two sides did not reach a consensus on this matter. [69]
Siam has always been very determined on the issue of Vientiane, with Rama III once stating: "The reason Why Chao Anu was able to pay tribute to Hue every three years was because Siam allowed him to do so, which had little to do with the 'glory' of Vietnam." Vietnam's adoption of Vientiane as a colony or vassal state would have been completely impossible. [70] Although Siam did not reject the Nguyen Dynasty's suzerainty over Vientiane, it was only when it was clearly stated that Siam's suzerainty was of practical significance, and when Siamese came into conflict with Vietnamese suzerainty, Siamese suzerainty was exclusive.
After the Return of the Siamese Emissaries, there was no news for two years, until August 1832, when a delegation was suddenly sent to Vietnam to complain about the funeral of the "Second King". Ming Ming said: The last time our country sent a letter of condemnation, we did not see a reply for a long time, and this time the envoy did not mention why? After instructing Jiading City to focus on asking the Siamese envoys: 1. 2. Why the appointment of the Crown Prince of Vientiane was not "notified of the establishment of the National Assembly"; Whether the pet shirt is punishable or not. The Siamese emissaries were rather vague in their answers to these two matters, but they were explicitly ordered to allow them to enter Beijing on the grounds that there was a national funeral in the country. After that, the Nguyen Dynasty sent Nguyen Youzhi of the Rebbe Lang and Chen Wenmiao, the chief of the military department, as the main and deputy envoys to mourn. Before leaving, he clearly commanded: "The envoy has a special responsibility, and when he waits for this trip, he may be asked to be guilty of the crime of favoring the shirt, and he shall be righteously responsible during the debate." If he had known to confess guilt, the mission would have been worth it. There is no need to be too harsh in order to preserve the national system. ”[71]
It is undeniable that in order to show the justice of the Nguyen Dynasty, the records of the four years of envoys in the Great Southern Records are largely whitewashed, but the plight of the Nguyen Dynasty in negotiating with Siam on the Vientiane issue can still be seen. Vientiane, as a vassal state of the Nguyen Dynasty, although the Nguyen Dynasty tried to expand its discourse power with the way of "small words survive", Siam responded little to this. It can be said that the diplomatic dialogue between the Nguyen dynasty and the Bangkok dynasty did not take place in the same "discourse system". Regarding the abolition of the governor of Vientiane, Ming Ming initially had to stress that he should quickly determine the succession to the throne, and four years later, he only protested to Siam about why he had not "informed the national assembly of the establishment". On the issue of the pet shirt, when Siam was acquitted, Nguyen Chao, in addition to unilateral protests, was not able to produce substantial diplomatic chips to force Siam to accept its position.
epilogue
The Nguyen dynasty's alliance with the Bangkok dynasty ended in 1833 (the fourteenth year of the Ming Dynasty) with the Siamese invasion of Vietnam and support for the outbreak of the "Lê Van" in the Gia Dinh region
Rebellion". Soon after the Siamese army invaded Vietnamese territory, the Ha Tien lands were lost one after another, and Ming Ming completely abandoned the illusion of "being good with siamese neighbors" and suppressed Le Wen
At the same time, the army declared war on Siam. The Nguyen dynasty army soon won the war. Although the remnants of Le Van persisted in southern Vietnam for several years, the Siamese army withdrew from Vietnam in only a few months, with only minor harassment.
After the end of this war, the Nguyen Dynasty court quickly gathered the edicts and chapters from the war and compiled them into a book called "The Strategy of The King's Suppression of Ping Siamese Kou". From the title of the anthology, it can be seen that the Nguyen Dynasty officially changed Siam from "neighbor" to "enemy country" in terms of diplomatic positioning. More importantly, it contains a February 1834 edict summarizing the diplomatic relations between the Nguyen Dynasty (including Nguyen Phuc Anh's exile) and Siam over the past forty years, and the rhetoric is very sharp. For example, it claims that in 1784, Siamese troops sent troops to help Nguyen Phuc Anh attack the Thuy Son Army and lost popularity because the Siamese were "reckless and greedy"; Ming Ming cited diplomatic events such as rejecting the proposal of a joint attack on Siam proposed by Burmese envoys to emphasize that Siamese helped Le Van this time
The rebellion invaded the Nguyễn Dynasty, "I begin with righteousness, and I end with Pyi... Abandon good and seek revenge, pervert reason and forget righteousness." Finally, ming ming linked the nature of the Siamese with the nature of the barbarians to prove that the Siamese were uncivilized barbarians from beginning to end: "Since the snake is a worm in the heart, it is difficult to be righteous... The Siamese people's unrighteous and nameless move is really disgusted by heaven... He who hated our great state for no reason, not only the strong and weak subject and guest forces were hanging each other, but the principle of straight and obedient, victory and defeat, was already clear. ”[72]
This encyclical put an end to the ambiguity of the Nguyen Dynasty on the siamese question and moved directly into the discourse system of the "HuaYi Debate". Later, in official historical records of the Nguyen Dynasty such as the Great Nam Shilu, Vietnam no longer disguised the use of the "Huayi Distinction" to show its cultural superiority over Siam. Emperor Minh no longer had to struggle to maintain a "Nguyen Dynasty-Bangkok Dynasty Alliance" that he never believed in or wanted. The war also marked the complete liberation of Ming Ming from the political legacy, or more accurately, the "political burden", left to him by emperor Kao Jialong.
Judging from the establishment of the Vietnamese-Siamese Alliance between Nguyen Phuc Anh (Gia Long) and Rama I, the "Hua Yi Debate" was not a natural choice in the early days of the Nguyen Dynasty's handling of diplomatic relations. Faced with the urgent task of restoring the country, Nguyen Phuc Anh himself took the initiative to integrate into the Siamese diplomatic system. Even after the establishment of the Nguyen Dynasty, Vietnam's policy toward Siam continued this historical inertia. Although Nguyen Phuc Anh's choice is forced by the situation, it is undeniable that this is also related to the Confucian level of the Nguyen regime to a certain extent. After the rise of the Tay Son Army at the end of the 18th century, the long-exiled Nguyễn Dynasty had a Confucian fault line, which was not comparable to the strong Confucian foundation formed by the long-term stability of the Red River Valley region in Vietnam. Even after the establishment of the Nguyen Dynasty in 1802, the imperial examination system was gradually restored, and the competitiveness of the southern scholars in the imperial examination was far inferior to that of the northern scholars. [73] Therefore, the Confucianism of the early Nguyễn Dynasty was mostly a kind of Confucianism learned in military battles, and the civilization division strictly guarded by the "Huayi Distinction" was naturally not within its vision.
The early relationship between the Nguyen dynasty and the Bangkok dynasty was based on a personal friendship between the two founding monarchs, which went beyond the traditional East Asian tributary system. Nguyen Phuc Anh's experience in Siam and their personal friendship became the "historical baggage" of Ming's diplomacy. During the Ming Dynasty, the level of Confucianism in Vietnam increased rapidly, and the idea of "Huayi Distinction" gradually returned. However, when the Ming Dynasty wanted to apply this idea to the affairs of the Indochina Peninsula, the first thing to face was how to pull diplomatic relations with Siam into the Confucian discourse system. The Khmer and Vientiane requested the Nguyen Dynasty for canonization, which provided a legal basis for the Nguyen Dynasty to intervene in the internal affairs of the two countries. Although on the surface the Nguyễn Dynasty naturally used the concepts of "Huayi Distinction" and "Rise and Fall", when this concept was in operation, the dominant role behind this concept was actually the complex Vietnamese-Siamese relationship. This once again brought the diplomacy of the Nguyen Dynasty into a dilemma. It can be said that as long as the alliance between the Nguyen dynasty and the Bangkok dynasty persisted, the tributary model in East Asia would have a huge incongruity between theory and practice in the Indochina Peninsula. From this point of view, the rupture of the Vietnamese-Siamese Alliance in 1833 had an important turning point in the diplomatic history of the Nguyen Dynasty.
According to this, the author Qian Shenghua is a doctoral student in the History Department of East China Normal University and the Institute of Modern and Contemporary History of the École Normale Supérieure in Paris. The original article is published in Shi Lin, No. 5, 2020.