On the South China Sea issue, Vietnam seems intent on uniting with the Philippines. #军史观察团#
In the past two days, Vietnam once again asserted its so-called "sovereignty" over some islands and reefs in the South China Sea and called on the Philippines to hold talks on sea-related issues. Such a move inevitably reminds people that Vietnam and the Philippines are planning to bypass China to "carve up" the South China Sea, which is very different from Vietnam's previous commitment to properly handle maritime issues with China and jointly maintain maritime security.
Regarding the "carving-up" of the South China Sea, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos has long extended an olive branch to Vietnam. At the time, Marcos said he intended to work with "South China Sea claimants" such as Vietnam and Malaysia to develop a so-called "code." Most of these "guidelines" are that these countries are prepared to temporarily shelve disputes over the South China Sea issue in order to unite against China.
However, because the Philippines was angered by the fact that the Philippines was constantly courting the United States, Japan and other external forces to interfere in the South China Sea, and other "South China Sea claimants" were more willing to put aside disputes with China and focus on developing economic and trade cooperation, Marcos's proposal fell through.
Vietnam's finding of the Philippines at this time may be related to the following things.
First of all, US Assistant Secretary of State Conda visited Vietnam not long ago. Although Kangda did not show any real benefits during his visit to Vietnam, at least in two ways, Vietnam was not very willing to further offend the United States at this time.
On the one hand, Vietnam itself has a demand for the United States. As Vietnam's largest export market, the importance of the United States to Vietnam cannot be overstated. In the past, Vietnam has repeatedly urged the United States on the issue of its market economy status, just because it wants to expand its exports to the United States.
On the other hand, the United States is very dissatisfied with Putin's previous visit to Vietnam. During Putin's visit to Vietnam, Russia and Vietnam signed a number of cooperation agreements, including in the field of energy. If Vietnam wants to preserve these gains, it naturally needs to exchange other aspects for the United States' "open side."
It cannot be ruled out that Vietnam has made some moves on the South China Sea issue for the United States to see.
Second, on the South China Sea issue, the so-called "sovereignty" claims of Vietnam and the Philippines actually overlap. In the past, Vietnam's comprehensive strength was stronger than that of the Philippines, and it was not worried about the Philippines provoking trouble, but now the situation is somewhat different, and the Philippines seems to be waiting for strong reinforcements.
Recently, US Marine Corps Commander Smith suddenly announced that they would deploy a "littoral combat regiment" on Guam, which is located in the "second island chain." Smith made it clear, saying that such a deployment was to protect regional allies such as the Philippines.
Perhaps to further boost the Philippines' confidence, Smith also directly warned China, threatening not to "attack" the Philippines if China did not want its ships to be sunk.
Some analysts have pointed out that although the US military's "littoral combat regiment" seems to have powerful mobility and long-range strike capabilities, it is also faced with difficulties in supply and lack of concealment, and may not be able to bring into play the desired results.
However, such a military deployment of the US military still has a considerable impact on the Philippines.
In the Philippine defense secretary's latest response to the Ren'ai Jiao issue, in addition to continuing to shout about the so-called "not giving up an inch of land," he also called on the Philippines to continue to carry out supply missions. The confidence of the Philippines may come from the above-mentioned "pro-Philippines" move of the US military.
Vietnam's approach to negotiations with the Philippines is probably to avoid being "mistakenly injured" in the confrontation between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, and to try to somehow temporarily "truce" with the Philippines. As for whether we really want to jointly confront China, those are all later words, and stabilizing the Philippines first is the top priority.
Finally, considering that the Vietnamese Prime Minister is about to visit China to participate in the Davos Forum, it is very likely that China and Vietnam will discuss economic and trade cooperation during this period. Therefore, it is unlikely that Vietnam will be too aggressive on the South China Sea issue at this time.
We speculate that Vietnam may reach some common ground with the Philippines on the South China Sea, but it is unlikely that the focus will be on countering China.
Rather than confronting China with the Philippines, Vietnam may want to put pressure on China in a relatively soft way. For example, once the peace talks between Vietnam and the Philippines are temporarily shelved, they cannot rule out that they will use this to create public opinion, so as to "restrict" the law enforcement of the Chinese coast guard to some extent.
But Vietnam's approach is risky, and ASEAN countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia have previously expressed direct or indirect dissatisfaction with the Philippines' actions in the South China Sea. Vietnam's united front with the Philippines at this time is tantamount to encouraging the Philippines to continue its provocations, which is bound to trigger strong protests from China and most ASEAN countries.
Especially for China-Vietnam relations, this will have a major impact on the mutual trust between the two countries.
In short, peace and stability in the South China Sea are in the interests of all countries in the region. If Vietnam really intends to play a positive role in resolving maritime issues for relevant countries in the region, the first thing it should do is to persuade the Philippines to stop provoking it, instead of adding fuel to the fire or fishing in troubled waters.