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The first general of the national army in the later period went out to fight Su Yu, and he had found a way to restrain himself, why couldn't he fight it

author:Brother Rabbit talks about history

In the civil war during the Republic of China, General Du Yuming of the Kuomintang can be said to be one of the most outstanding military strategists in the later period. He was well versed in the art of war and had a deep insight into the nuances, and he had already seen through the shortcomings of the Kuomintang's traditional combat thinking, and put forward his own two major counteroffensive strategies in an attempt to turn the tide of the war. It is a pity that Chiang Kai-shek did not cherish this real military expert, but ignored Du Yuming's advice and made his own opinions, which led to the heavy defeat of the Nationalist army in the Huaihai Campaign. It is really sad that such a respected general is so despised. What compromise did Du Yuming propose?

The first general of the national army in the later period went out to fight Su Yu, and he had found a way to restrain himself, why couldn't he fight it

In 1948, the Chinese civil war entered a white-hot stage. The Kuomintang was losing ground in East China and was facing tremendous military pressure. At this critical juncture, Chiang Kai-shek transferred Du Yuming, a veteran general, to the post of deputy commander of the "Suppression Chief" in Xuzhou, intending to use his military wisdom to turn the tide of the war.

As a veteran general from the Whampoa Military Academy, Du Yuming made many miraculous achievements during the Anti-Japanese War, especially in the Battle of Kunlun Pass, where he caused heavy casualties to the Japanese army and became famous. He is not only extremely proficient in command of war, but also has a unique way to manage the whole army, and is a veritable military expert. At this time, he was transferred to Xuzhou, and Jiang undoubtedly wanted to balance the offensive of the People's Liberation Army.

The first general of the national army in the later period went out to fight Su Yu, and he had found a way to restrain himself, why couldn't he fight it

As soon as he took office, Du Yuming deliberated again and again, and made two major plans at the strategic and tactical levels:

At the strategic level, he suggested concentrating the forces of Xuzhou to organize into four field mobile corps, temporarily putting aside Xuzhou and other big cities, taking advantage of the reorganization of Huaye to attack Shandong, encircling and annihilating Huaye, recapturing Tai'an and Jinan, and at the same time clamping down Zhongye so that it could not support Huaye.

At the tactical level, he suggested completely abandoning the traditional combat mode of sticking to big cities in the past, and concentrating all available forces to carry out a surprise annihilation war against the communist army, so as to directly target the living forces of the communist army.

The first general of the national army in the later period went out to fight Su Yu, and he had found a way to restrain himself, why couldn't he fight it

It seems that Du Yuming has completely recognized the stubborn problems of the current national army's operations: resting on his laurels, making no plans, and being superfluous. He suggested putting down the burden, looking at the overall situation, and attacking decisively, which completely drew on the strategic and tactical thinking of the PLA at that time. This is undoubtedly a shot in the arm, and as long as it is implemented, it will surely turn the tide of the war and reverse the declining trend.

Unfortunately, these two proposals were not taken seriously by Chiang Kai-shek. On the contrary, the "Generalissimo" continued to go his own way, following his own set of outdated ideas:

The first general of the national army in the later period went out to fight Su Yu, and he had found a way to restrain himself, why couldn't he fight it

First of all, Jiang suddenly transferred Du Yuming to the northeast battlefield and asked him to command the retreat instead of Wei Lihuang. This move was tantamount to killing chickens with a knife, which completely disrupted Du's counteroffensive strategy.

What's more, when Du returned to Xuzhou, the original plan to concentrate troops to counterattack Shandong had already died, and the Chiang clan was unwilling to implement even the basic military and political officials, and Bai Chongxi even started a new stove and fought alone. As a result, Du Yuming's strategic plan was nullified.

Second, Chiang once intended to transfer the Xuzhou troops to the south of the Huai River, and adopted Du's advice to avoid confrontation in the big cities, but he gave up halfway and resumed the old routine, making Du's tactical ideas in vain.

The first general of the national army in the later period went out to fight Su Yu, and he had found a way to restrain himself, why couldn't he fight it

The most ridiculous thing is that at the critical moment, Chiang Kai-shek interfered everywhere, violating the basic principles of war command. For example, when Huang Baitao's corps was surrounded, Du Zeng suggested that he should first concentrate his forces to defeat Liu Bocheng and then turn back to rescue him, which was strangled by Jiang's anxiety. Later, Huang Baitao was defeated, Du urgently transferred troops to break through to the south, and Jiang immediately decided to change the route, but was swallowed by Su Yu in one go.

I see, even Zhuge Liang back then would never be able to parry Jiang's blind command and chaotic actions! Chiang completely failed to realize the professionalism of war command, was complacent, stubborn, and only talked about his personal will, completely ignoring practical means. He changed his orders at the moment and reversed the battle on the spot, violating the basic characteristics of the timely and continuous command of the war, leaving Du Yuming at a loss and his plan in vain.

The first general of the national army in the later period went out to fight Su Yu, and he had found a way to restrain himself, why couldn't he fight it

Chiang's practice of emphasizing only will and despising science is rooted in traditional Chinese thinking about generals, but it is completely out of date in contemporary warfare. What is needed for war command is to rationally and efficiently use the existing forces and flexibly adapt to changes and advance in a coherent manner on the premise of unwavering strategic principles.

The defeat in the Huaihai Campaign showed the complete bankruptcy of the traditional military style of the Kuomintang. Chiang Kai-shek was just blindly confined to the so-called "will of the leader" and rested on his laurels, turning a deaf ear to the enterprising strategy put forward by Du Yuming, a famous general, and finally lost his last chance. War command is originally a discipline that requires professional training and systematic thinking, and without expert checks, it is inevitable that it will be defeated step by step.

The first general of the national army in the later period went out to fight Su Yu, and he had found a way to restrain himself, why couldn't he fight it

This defeat dealt a heavy blow to the Nationalist army, and from another angle, it also reflected the rotten nature of the Chiang and Kuomintang systems, and it is not difficult to understand why they were defeated in Taiwan. In short, the loss of a capable general like Du Yuming is undoubtedly a big loss for the national army. On the other hand, the communist army's professional and rigorous training system and its strategy to keep up with the times can be seen from the fact that the battle was able to win such a decisive victory. We must learn from history, draw experience and wisdom from it, and do not follow the old path.

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