Abstract: The May 2024 issue of the International Journal of Security and Defense (ESD) published an article by a senior engineer at the RAND Corporation, "On the eve of destruction". The article believes that the relevant subjects may adopt the method of amphibious landing to carry out operations against Taiwan. Therefore, the article proposes that Taiwan can prevent relevant subjects from carrying out amphibious landing operations by occupying ports through the scorched earth policy of destroying ports, so as to win the entire conflict. Based on the above articles, this paper mainly introduces the impact of port occupation on military conflicts. and explore the specific methods of Taiwan as a defensive party to destroy ports when necessary, so as to provide reference for relevant subjects; Finally, the challenges that Taiwan may face in implementing such a scorched earth policy are discussed, and these challenges may be the breakthrough points that deserve the attention of relevant subjects.
Keywords: Taiwan, amphibious landing operations, military ports, conflict in the Taiwan Strait, scorched earth policy
The rapid seizure of military port facilities is often an important goal for any large-scale amphibious landing. Conversely, effective measures aimed at destroying these facilities can significantly hamper the actions of the landing force. Taking the situation in the Taiwan Strait as an example, this paper discusses the important impact of the destruction of ports on anti-landing operations during operations, and examines the breakthroughs that can be exploited by the attackers in amphibious landing operations through the existing problems.
The impact of the landing of the relevant subjects in Taiwan
In any amphibious landing, the early capture of the port is an important prerequisite for victory. Transporting supplies and personnel from large warships to the beach by landing craft is very inefficient, both in terms of the time required and in terms of resources. Unless the terrain around the beach is very favorable, or there is a large road network, it may be difficult for the landing force to break through from the initial positions.
Landing on the beach may be necessary at first, but it is more advantageous to ship supplies and equipment through an established port. The use of ports and adjacent road infrastructure can significantly reduce the time it takes for troops to move from large warships to ground vehicles to critical targets. If the subject is to enter Taiwan by landing by sea, the port's ability to shorten the time it takes to operate is bound to be particularly important, as it needs to go inland quickly, rather than massing on uncovered beaches, otherwise it is vulnerable to bombing.
Landing craft eliminate the need for large warships to stay near the sea. By traveling back and forth between large warships and beaches, large warships can transport more personnel and equipment to Taiwan in less time, fast enough to catch the Taiwanese military off guard, thus limiting their combat effectiveness.
If the subjects involved in the landing operation had the ability to move so quickly, it could be intimidating to the Taiwanese military and even hasten the surrender of the Taiwanese army, as was the case with the French surrender to Germany at the speed of light in 1940. Given the long lead time for the transfer of troops to the Western Pacific, the rapid conquest of the relevant subjects would limit the effectiveness of any U.S. intervention or force the U.S. to refrain from doing so. Politically, a fait accompli will help to calm the voices of the international community in support of Taiwan in the protracted conflict. Eventually, the parties involved will be able to recover Taiwan quickly and unhindered, leaving much of Taiwan intact and able to maintain economic prosperity.
How Taiwan may destroy its ports
By understanding what specific measures Taiwan may take to destroy the port, it can provide some reference for relevant entities and prepare for specific measures.
The article proposes that Taiwan's sabotage activities against its ports can be divided into two types, namely, sabotage activities in port land areas and port waters.
On land, Taiwan may sabotage facilities in a number of ways:
- such as cutting wires, contaminating optical instruments, and smashing controllers to destroy cranes and other loading and unloading equipment; the use of light weapons to destroy pipelines, pumps and storage tanks; Take advantage of the built-in self-destruct mode of some devices, such as some electronic devices that heat up on their own until they melt down critical components or cause a fire to destroy the facility.
- Pre-programmed "self-destruct codes" and malware are planted into the device to detonate explosives in the harbor, destroy equipment and control centers, and then use long hoses to spray fuel at the fire, eventually burning all the residue.
- A large number of booby-traps are deployed throughout the port to trick the subjects into believing that everything they come into contact with is a potential threat, directly slowing down their movements.
- Small electronic jammers are placed in hidden locations around the port to interfere with communications and navigation.
- Explosives are planted along roads and railways around the port, or large quantities of small, concealed sharp objects are set up to puncture car tires.
- Use rock-like explosives to block roads and railways.
Figure 1. On December 24, 1950, U.S. troops evacuated Hungnam, North Korea, aboard the USS Sieger (APD-127) and blew up the facilities at Hungnam Port.
And in port waters, Taiwan may carry out extensive sabotage mainly through mines.
- For example, by laying minelayers, a large number of mines are laid throughout the perimeter of the port complex and on the waterways leading to the port.
- A variety of methods should be adopted to prevent the relevant subjects from using the signals generated by minesweepers simulating the characteristics of ships to detonate mines. For example, some mines are programmed to detonate only when they sense an analogue signal of the ship's signature multiple times, or have a certain probability of detonation after each signal is sensed. This may prolong the mine-clearance process for the subjects involved and give them a false sense of security.
Figure 2. U.S. Navy divers are being trained in mine detection and disposal. Despite technological advances, the harsh conditions typical of port areas make demining in damaged ports a dangerous and time-consuming task.
Challenges faced by port destruction operations and points available to the relevant actors
According to the analysis of the article, Taiwan faces three major challenges in implementing the scorched earth policy of destroying ports. Relevant entities can make use of this to find a suitable breakthrough point to promote the smooth progress of the landing operation.
The first challenge is how to coordinate the various tasks so that they do not interfere with each other or cause casualties to Taiwanese personnel. For example, when setting a fire, avoid harming the person who is planting the explosives; Mines should be spaced far enough apart to avoid explosions, etc. Destruction operations should only be carried out in situations where the port is likely to be subject to some degree of artillery fire and the relevant subjects are weakening tactical communications or using simulated information and commands to interfere with communications. As a result, the destruction operation could be interrupted at any time by the capture of the port.
In this regard, the relevant subjects can consider using overwhelming firepower to attack at the beginning, so as to make the landing operation quickly successful; or disrupt tactical communications or use analog information and directives to jam communications, making it impossible for Taiwan's operation to destroy port facilities to proceed smoothly.
The second challenge relates to command and control: to ensure that destruction operations are carried out when the fall of the port is inevitable. Subjects may infiltrate the command channel in order to capture the port as intact as possible. In addition, the relevant entities may also lead the Taiwan military to sabotage key ports that it has no intention of seizing. Both of these goals could be achieved through cyberattacks, information warfare, or the revocation of key orders disguised as members of the Taiwanese military. This poses a challenge to the Taiwanese military's accusation mechanism. In addition, consideration needs to be given to the psychological difficulties of our personnel in accepting the fact that scorched earth operations are being carried out on our soil, even if there is a good reason to do so.
In this regard, relevant entities may consider using cyber attacks, information warfare, or disguising themselves as Taiwan military personnel to revoke key orders to infiltrate the command channels of the Taiwan military. or through military deception to hide the intention of attacking the target port, so that the Taiwan military lacks sufficient information to judge whether it needs to destroy the target port, so as to successfully seize the port through a surprise attack; Or lead the Taiwanese military to destroy the wrong target port, causing damage to its infrastructure and army morale.
Figure 3. U.S. Marines conduct field training in the harbor. Using special forces to quietly occupy ports can limit port blockade operations to a few hours.
The third challenge has to do with speed. If the relevant subjects use special forces to quietly occupy the port, the whole process will take only a few hours. In addition, the relevant subjects can carry out artillery shelling on the troops that destroyed the port, preventing them from carrying out their work. Actors can use lethal weapons (e.g., artillery guns mounted on small drones) to hinder the destruction of port facilities without damaging them.
Therefore, the relevant entities can send special forces to occupy the port as quickly as possible, so that the Taiwan military does not have enough time to respond; or the use of small arms to prevent Taiwanese military personnel from destroying the port without destroying the port facilities.
summary
To sum up, the occupation of the port will have a great impact on the situation of the amphibious landing operation, and it is very likely that Taiwan will destroy the port to prevent the relevant subjects from occupying the port. Therefore, relevant entities need to pay attention to this information and be prepared to deal with it.