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Today, the editor brings the "Channel selection research of the doctoral dissertation 《Research on pricing and channel selection that considers consumer information and fairness concerns》”.
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内容摘要：Abstract
In this issue, we will introduce the doctoral dissertation "Research on Pricing and Channel Selection Considering Consumer Information and Fairness Concerns" 2.3 Channel Selection Research from three aspects: mind mapping, intensive reading content, and knowledge supplementation.
This issue's tweet will introduce the doctoral dissertation 《Research on pricing and channel selection that considers consumer information and fairness concerns》 from three perspectives: mind mapping, detailed content analysis, and supplementary knowledge, focusing on channel selection research.
思维导图：Mind mapping
精读内容：Intensive reading content
This subsection presents a literature review of channel selection. Firstly, the research on the impact of different channel structure analysis on supply chain pricing and profit is introduced, and then the difference between this paper and other studies is introduced, which focuses more on the classic problem of upstream supplier invasion.
This section presents a literature review on channel selection. It first introduces studies that analyze different channel structures and their impacts on supply chain pricing and profits. It then highlights the differences between this paper and other studies, noting that this paper's research on channel structure focuses more on the classic issue of upstream supplier encroachment.
The authors then present a literature review on vendor infiltration. There have been many well-established studies in the literature on supplier invasion, and many scholars believe that upstream supplier invasion will exacerbate market competition and hurt retailers' profits. However, there are also scholars who argue that supplier entry behavior can be profitable for channel members in some cases, and such studies explain the impact of supplier invasion on the possibility of channel selection. It also introduces the shortcomings of previous studies, and none of the vendor invasion literature in the above review has taken into account the role of intrusion strategies in pricing based on consumer behavior information. Finally, the research on supplier intrusion is introduced, and Chapters 4 and 5 of this paper focus on the strategic relationship between supplier incursion strategy and BBP, and analyze the changes in decision-making and the impact of incursion on profits in different scenarios. Chapter 4 begins with an exploration of the impact of supplier entry on various BBP implementation strategies, as well as the eventual supply chain equilibrium.
Then, the author presents a literature review on supplier encroachment. There is already a wealth of mature research on supplier encroachment, with many scholars believing that upstream supplier encroachment intensifies market competition and thus harms retailers' profits. However, some scholars argue that supplier entry can be profitable for channel members in certain situations. This type of research explains the broader potential impact of supplier encroachment on channel selection. Additionally, the author points out the shortcomings of previous studies, noting that the aforementioned literature on supplier encroachment does not consider the impact of encroachment strategies on pricing based on consumer behavior information. Finally, the paper's research on supplier encroachment is introduced. Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the strategic association between supplier encroachment strategies and BBP (Behavior-Based Pricing), analyzing the changes in decisions and profit impacts under different scenarios. Chapter 4 first explores the impact of supplier entry or non-entry on various BBP implementation strategies and the resulting supply chain equilibrium.
Finally, the authors introduce the research contributions of this paper on supplier invasion: (1) Chapter 4 studies price discrimination based on consumer behavior information, and depicts the dynamic process of obtaining information through consumers' pre-consumption behavior through the model; (2) This chapter considers various forms of price discrimination, such as BBP for retailers, BBP for direct sales channels under the premise of supplier invasion, and wholesale price discrimination for retailers in traditional distribution channels for suppliers; (3) This chapter finds that there is an equilibrium area where BBP can stimulate supplier invasion when wholesale price discrimination can be implemented, which points out the possibility that price discrimination and invasion tactics can play multiple roles. Chapter 5 considers the role of consumers' cognitive preferences, and argues for the cross-application of invasion and BBP at a deeper level, that is, the actual and practical problem of consumers' perception of fairness preferences is considered as a factor of strategy change. This chapter further broadens the literature on supplier incursion and finds that fairness concerns have a non-negligible impact on both channel members' pricing and supplier intrusion.
Finally, the author outlines the contributions of this paper's research on supplier encroachment: (1) Chapter 4 investigates price discrimination based on consumer behavior information, modeling the dynamic process of acquiring information from consumers' previous consumption behavior. (2) This chapter considers various forms of price discrimination, where retailers can implement BBP (Behavior-Based Pricing). In the context of supplier encroachment, suppliers can implement BBP in direct sales channels, and the study extends to suppliers being able to implement wholesale price discrimination against retailers in traditional distribution channels. (3) This chapter finds that when wholesale price discrimination can be implemented, there exists an equilibrium region where BBP can stimulate supplier encroachment, highlighting the multiple potential impacts of price discrimination on encroachment strategies. Chapter 5 considers the role of consumer cognitive preferences, demonstrating the deeper intersection of encroachment and BBP by incorporating consumers' perceptions of fairness into the strategy considerations. This chapter further broadens the literature on supplier encroachment, revealing that fairness concerns significantly impact both the pricing of channel members and supplier encroachment.
知识补充：Knowledge supplement
1、渠道冲突 Channel conflict
Channel conflict is a state of hostility or disharmony between the organizations that make up a marketing channel. Channel conflicts arise when a channel member behaves contrary to the expectations of their channel collaborators. There are three types of conflicts: horizontal, vertical, and multi-channel conflicts. The main reasons for this are the incompatible goals of the channel members, the different understandings of reality, and the conflicts between their respective domains.
Channel conflict is the state of hostility or disharmony among the organizations that make up a marketing channel. Channel conflict arises when the actions of one channel member are contrary to the expectations of their channel partners. There are three types of channel conflict: horizontal conflict, vertical conflict, and multi-channel conflict. The main causes of channel conflict are incompatible goals among channel members, different perceptions of reality, and conflicts within their respective domains.
Horizontal channel conflict refers to the conflict between intermediaries at the same level in the same channel model. Most of the reasons for horizontal conflicts are that the production enterprises do not make a reasonable plan for the number of intermediaries in the target market, so that the intermediaries are competing with each other for their own interests. This is because after the production enterprise has opened up a certain target market, the middleman must strive for more market share in order to obtain more benefits, and launch a "land enclosure movement" in the target market.
Horizontal channel conflict refers to conflicts between intermediaries at the same level within the same channel structure. The primary cause of horizontal conflict is the production enterprise's failure to reasonably plan the allocation of intermediary numbers and regions within the target market, leading intermediaries to undercut each other for their own benefit. This happens because, after the production enterprise has developed a certain target market, intermediaries inevitably compete for more market share to gain more profits, engaging in a "land grab" within the target market.
Vertical channel conflict refers to conflict between different levels of the same channel and is more common than horizontal channel conflict. Vertical channel conflicts are also known as channel upstream and downstream conflicts. On the one hand, more and more distributors start from their own interests and adopt a combination of direct sales and distribution to sell goods, which inevitably has to compete with downstream dealers for customers, which greatly dampens the enthusiasm of downstream channels; On the other hand, when the strength of downstream dealers has increased, they are not willing to accept the current position, and hope to have greater rights in the channel system, and have launched a challenge to the upstream channels. In some cases, in order to promote their own products, manufacturers directly supply to secondary distributors by bypassing the first-level distributors, resulting in contradictions between upstream and downstream channels. Therefore, manufacturers must take a holistic approach, properly resolve vertical channel conflicts, and promote better cooperation among channel members.
Vertical channel conflict refers to conflicts between enterprises at different levels within the same channel. This type of conflict is more common than horizontal channel conflict and is also known as upstream-downstream channel conflict. On one hand, an increasing number of distributors, acting in their own self-interest, adopt a combination of direct sales and distribution to sell products, inevitably competing with downstream distributors for customers, which significantly discourages the downstream channel's enthusiasm. On the other hand, as the strength of downstream distributors grows, they become dissatisfied with their current position and seek greater power within the channel system, challenging upstream channels. In some cases, production enterprises, in order to promote their products, bypass first-level distributors and supply directly to second-level distributors, creating conflicts between upstream and downstream channels. Therefore, production enterprises must address vertical channel conflict from a holistic perspective to promote better cooperation among channel members.
With the increasing number of customer segments and available channels, more and more enterprises are adopting multi-channel marketing systems, that is, using channel combination and integration. The conflict between different channels refers to the conflict that arises when different channels serve the same target market after the manufacturer establishes a multi-channel marketing system.
Inter-channel conflict arises as customer segmentation and available channels increase, with more and more enterprises adopting multi-channel marketing systems that utilize channel combinations and integrations. Conflicts between different channels occur when a production enterprise establishes a multi-channel marketing system and different channels serve the same target market.
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References:[1] Jiang Yu. Research on pricing and channel selection considering consumer information and fairness concerns [D]. Hefei: University of Science and Technology of China, 2023.
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