[The content of this article is based on authoritative historical data, and there are citations at the end of the article, please be aware.] 】
In 1948, the Huaihai Campaign was in full swing, and this battle was not only a contest of strength, but also a contest of wisdom and strategy. At this critical moment, Chen Yi sent an important telegram, directly angrily rebuking Su Yu, asking why he ignored Qin Jiwei's diversion role on the southern front in his strategic deployment.
The telegram not only revealed the tense atmosphere on the battlefield at the time, but also reflected the strategic differences and ideological collisions between the top leaders. What are the hidden strategic considerations behind this question? Is it just a question of battlefield communications, or is it a deep-seated battle over strategic layout?
Strategic Misunderstanding: Su Yu's Telegram and Chen Yi's Questioning
When Su Yu formulated the preliminary plan for the Huaihai Campaign, he advocated that Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping should be under unified command to ensure the coordination and centralization of the campaign. However, in his plan, Su Yu did not explicitly emphasize the role of Qin Jiwei's East China Field Army in didicating the enemy forces on the southern front.
This containment was the key to strategy, as Qin Jiwei's troops could effectively distract the attention and strength of the Kuomintang army and create a more favorable fighting environment for the main battlefield. After receiving Su Yu's telegram, Chen Yi was very dissatisfied, believing that ignoring the strategic significance of the containment on the southern front might affect the success or failure of the entire campaign.
So, on November 1, 1948, he sent an angry telegram asking Su Yu about his consideration. Chen Yi's telegram mentioned that the success of the Huaihai Campaign not only relied on the main forces of the Central Plains and East China Field Army, but also the role of the Southern Front could not be ignored. The telegram emphasized the need for a comprehensive strategic consideration of the role of all aspects in order to ensure the comprehensiveness and depth of the campaign.
In the telegram, Chen Yi's inquiring tone was distinctly inquiring, reflecting not only his attention to the details of the campaign, but also the seriousness with which he took the lack of strategy in the high-level military command. His inquiries prompted Su Yu to reassess his strategic layout, particularly in the complexities of coordinating front-line command and logistical support.
Through this telegram exchange, the communication between the two generals not only highlights the tension and pressure in wartime command, but also reflects the deep digging into details and immediate response to problems in the strategic decision-making process. In addition, this incident also revealed the rigorous attitude of strategic decision-making and the fine control of the overall situation of the campaign within the Communist Party of China.
Communication Barriers and Command Disputes
In the early days of the Huaihai Campaign, when Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping were faced with the question of command, they made an unequivocal refusal. On November 1, 1948, they replied to Chairman Mao's telegram, expressing their concerns about unified command, mainly because "the communication tools were too weak", which made it difficult for the front-line command to maintain effective communication with the central government and other theaters in a timely manner.
This statement directly pointed out the physical limitations of the battlefield command system at that time, and this communication barrier seriously affected the efficiency of the implementation of wartime decision-making. At the operational level, Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping pointed out that although they were in charge of command, due to the limitations of battlefield communication equipment, they could not guarantee instant communication with other troops, especially the three verticals and the broad vertical in Huaye.
In their reply, they mentioned that although they had ordered collusion, Huaye's three verticals had not yet established an effective communication link with their radio station. This technical challenge has a direct impact on command coherence and the implementation of tactics, thereby increasing uncertainty and risk on the battlefield.
On this basis, Chen and Deng further elaborated their positions, emphasizing that the issue of communication is not only a matter of physical equipment, but also related to the timeliness and accuracy of information transmission on the battlefield. They feared that communications delays could lead to tactical failures that could affect the progress of the entire campaign.
Therefore, they suggested that the CMC should exercise more direct command over operations on the side of Su Tan (Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin) to reduce the increased risk of passing orders through intermediaries. In reply to Chairman Mao's telegram, Chen and Deng also put forward their own countermeasures, planning to make up for the lack of battlefield communication by enhancing direct communication with the central government.
They proposed the establishment of more direct communication points and the optimization of existing communication networks, all of which were designed to ensure that orders were conveyed to each command unit accurately and accurately the first time. These views and measures of Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping embodied their pragmatic attitude in actual battlefield command.
In this way, they not only ensured the efficiency of the chain of command, but also tried to enhance the flexibility of command and the speed of reaction throughout the campaign by improving communication facilities. This process not only highlighted the tactical and technical challenges of the Chinese military at the time, but also showed the strategic considerations and response strategies of senior generals in wartime command.
Strategic Adjustment: Chairman Mao's Intervention and Decision-making
Chairman Mao played a decisive role in the strategic decision-making of the Huaihai Campaign. On November 1, 1948, in his response to Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping, he pointed out that the unified command of the entire campaign should fall on the shoulders of the two of them, which was a trust in them and a necessary guarantee for the coordination of the campaign.
In this way, Chairman Mao ensured that the command of the campaign would not become ineffective due to dispersion, and at the same time, it also reflected the Central Military Commission's overall control over the war situation. After receiving the communication difficulties raised by Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping, Chairman Mao did not stop his decision-making adjustments. He understood these practical difficulties in command, but at the same time demanded that they should not affect the overall situation of the campaign.
Chairman Mao was well aware of the importance of the Huaihai Campaign, which was not only a decisive military battle, but also a key political point, so he gave great attention and guidance in strategy. In the middle of the campaign, Chairman Mao continued to communicate closely with the front-line generals by telegram. He employed flexible tactical adjustments in his command, conveying his orders in a timely manner according to changes in the battlefield situation.
This includes the redeployment of troops, tactical details and enhanced logistical support. Through these adjustments, Chairman Mao ensured the continuity of the campaign and strengthened the coordination between the various theaters.
In addition, Chairman Mao once again emphasized the importance of unified command in the later stages of the campaign. In his telegram, he made it clear that no matter how difficult communications at the front were, it was necessary to ensure the consistency of orders and the accuracy of their execution. These decisions of his ultimately contributed to the smooth progress and successful conclusion of the Huaihai Campaign.
The strategic significance of containment on the southern front
Qin Jiwei's diversion on the southern front was crucial to the success of the Huaihai Campaign. This strategic action not only dispersed the Kuomintang military forces, but also created favorable conditions for the main battlefield.
The East China Field Army under the command of Qin Jiwei carried out the task of containing the Kuomintang troops on the southern front, which effectively restricted the movement and assembly of the Kuomintang troops, which played a decisive role in reducing the pressure on the main theater. By pinning down the enemy's main forces, Qin Jiwei's actions indirectly strengthened the offensive in the main theater and provided strategic convenience for Su Yu's military operations in the Huaihai battlefield.
In addition, the tactical flexibility and high efficiency displayed by Qin Jiwei's troops in carrying out the dispelling mission greatly enhanced the dynamic balance of the entire campaign and ensured the multi-point flowering of the strategy. Through effective containment on the southern front, the East China Field Army not only physically slowed down the pace of reinforcement of the Kuomintang army, but also psychologically put pressure on the enemy army and reduced its overall will to fight.
After the questions raised in Chen Yi's telegram, Su Yu's communication with the top management ensured that this strategic point was taken seriously. The success of this containment operation is not only a victory at the tactical level, but also the result of strategic planning and implementation, which shows the ability of the CCP's top leadership to fully control the war situation.
Through Qin Jiwei's southern front, Su Yu's strategic deployment in the main battlefield was carried out smoothly, and finally helped the CCP army achieve a decisive victory in the Huaihai Campaign. Strategic containment and close coordination between front-line commanders in this process were one of the key factors for the success of the entire campaign.
Post-war assessment and the establishment of historical status
Despite the tactical and communications challenges in the Huaihai Campaign, the final victory of the campaign still clearly reflected the strategic decision-making ability of the Chinese Communist Party's top leadership at a historical juncture. This battle not only left a deep mark in military history, but also played a turning point in political history, consolidating the leadership of the Communist Party of China in the War of Liberation.
The success of the Huaihai Campaign, especially at the tactical and command levels, highlighted the synergies between leaders such as Su Yu, Chen Yi, and Deng Xiaoping. Through close coordination and mutual support, they were able to overcome battlefield disadvantages such as communication barriers and complex geographical environments, and achieved rapid response and efficient execution of strategic intent.
In addition, the command structure and decision-making process of the campaign also demonstrated the CCP's adaptability and flexibility in the face of adversity. Through real-time battlefield feedback and direct communication with front-line commanders, the CMC was able to adjust tactics in a timely manner, which greatly strengthened the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the campaign.
In post-war assessments, the Battle of Huaihai was widely regarded as a model of Chinese Communist military strategy. It not only proves the army's combat effectiveness and tactical innovation ability under the party's leadership, but also shows the party's high ability in the united front and strategic coordination.
The success of this campaign deepened the strategic dilemma of the Kuomintang army, accelerated the collapse of Kuomintang rule, and laid a solid foundation for subsequent campaigns.
The victory in the Huaihai Campaign also had a far-reaching impact on the international community, enhancing the international image of the Communist Party of China and enhancing its position in the international communist movement. Through this battle, the world witnessed the ability of the Chinese Communist Party to organize large-scale military operations, which had an immeasurable role in promoting the subsequent national liberation strategy.
#长文创作激励计划#
Resources:
The Central Military Commission's telegram on preparing for three to five months of continuous combat and striving for complete victory in the campaign to Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, Deng Xiaoping, etc., 1948