[The content of this article is based on authoritative historical data, and there are citations at the end of the article, please be aware.] 】
In 1952, Marshal Peng Dehuai faced Soviet military advisers and experienced a deep clash of cultural and strategic ideas. The Soviet army, which was the victor of the Second World War, undoubtedly led the world in military science at that time.
However, in his many exchanges with Soviet advisers, Peng Dehuai gradually became aware of three major problems, which could not only hinder the further development of the Soviet army, but also become potential hidden dangers in its future. These findings deeply worried Peng Dehuai, who realized that if they were not corrected, they could have far-reaching consequences for the security of the Soviet Union and the world in the future.
At this time, a major question emerged: why did the Soviet army insist on its mistakes and refuse to change?
1. Strategic paranoia: over-reliance on nuclear weapons
During his visit to the Soviet Union in 1955, Peng Dehuai had a series of in-depth discussions with Marshal Zhukov, especially on the core weapons and tactics of future warfare. Zhukov believed that nuclear weapons and missile technology would become the key factors in determining the outcome of a war in the future, and that the Soviet Union was ready to launch a full-scale nuclear strike at any time.
He gave a detailed account of the Soviet Union's development of rocket-nuclear weapons and expressed firm belief in the strategic superiority of these weapons. Peng Dehuai was cautious about Zhukov's views. He argues that while the power of nuclear weapons is unquestionable, over-reliance on such weapons of high destruction can lead to the neglect of conventional military power, and thus the disadvantage of conventional conflicts without nuclear war.
He believes that a country's military strength should be comprehensively developed, including ground forces, navy, and air force, so that it can maintain strategic flexibility and response capability in various forms of warfare. Peng also stressed the importance of infantry and other traditional combat units.
He noted that in many conflicts, especially in complex terrain or urban environments, traditional infantry remains the decisive force on the battlefield. He gave the example of the Korean War in which the Volunteer Army relied on infantry units to gain tactical superiority in extreme conditions in the face of the United Nations forces.
Peng Dehuai believes that even today, when nuclear weapons and long-range missiles are becoming increasingly important, the role of traditional military forces cannot be ignored. This point of view became especially prominent in discussions with the Soviet military.
While the Soviet military leadership generally believed that future large-scale conflicts would be resolved primarily by quick and decisive nuclear strikes, Peng Dehuai proposed that a certain conventional military force should be maintained to maintain tactical diversity and defensive depth. He warned that relying on nuclear forces could undermine national security and military response capabilities in the absence of a nuclear war.
This difference reflects the fundamental differences in military strategy between the two countries. Peng Dehuai's position was based on China's national conditions and historical experience, emphasizing the balanced development of comprehensive national strength, while the Soviet Union was more inclined to ensure strategic superiority through technological superiority.
Peng Dehuai mentioned many times in the discussion that the building of military strength must match the actual situation of the country, rather than simply pursuing technological breakthroughs.
II. Inequality within the military: the conflict between doctrine and human rights
In his exchanges with Marshal Zhukov of the Soviet Union, Peng Dehuai noted that the Soviet army was practicing a highly centralized and authoritarian military system. The Soviet Union's military discipline was very strict, emphasizing the absolute authority of the commander, and this system was seen in the Soviet Union as the key to maintaining discipline and efficiency.
However, Peng Dehuai put forward a different view of the system, especially the inequality and morale problems that it could lead to among soldiers. Peng Dehuai pointed out that in the Soviet army, new recruits and ordinary soldiers were often oppressed by superiors and veterans, and even suffered unreasonable treatment.
For example, in the training and daily life of the Soviet army, superiors could arbitrarily order subordinates to perform additional or punitive work, and these practices often did not have a rational explanation or justification.
Although this authoritarian management style may maintain a high degree of unity and rapid response of the army in the short term, it may erode the self-esteem and enthusiasm of soldiers in the long run, and then affect the overall combat effectiveness of the army.
Between 1952 and 1953, Peng Dehuai deeply observed and analyzed the Soviet Union's military regulations and actual operations, and he found that many of the Soviet military regulations violated the personal rights and interests of soldiers, which was very different from the principle of equality and mutual respect between officers and soldiers emphasized by the Chinese People's Liberation Army.
The Chinese military has demonstrated a high degree of unity among officers and soldiers in wars such as the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, and this unity is based on mutual respect and effective communication. During the discussion, Peng Dehuai repeatedly stressed that the strength of the army comes not only from strict orders and rules and regulations, but more importantly from the spontaneity and initiative of the soldiers.
He believes that if soldiers feel respected and valued, they are more likely to demonstrate a high sense of responsibility and combat effectiveness on the battlefield. Therefore, in the construction of the Chinese army, he placed special emphasis on improving the treatment of soldiers, improving their quality of life, and implementing more humane management in training and operations.
This attitude and approach to soldiers was further emphasized at an army management conference in 1954. Peng Dehuai criticized the practice of mechanically carrying Soviet regulations to China, and he advocated that military management regulations suited to Chinese characteristics should be formulated in light of China's actual conditions.
This includes taking into account the opinions and suggestions of the soldiers in the formulation of the order, making the order more humane and motivating the soldiers.
3. Alienation of civil-military relations: ignoring the potential value of the people
In Peng's many discussions with Soviet advisers, an important topic involved the handling of civil-military relations. Soviet military advisers proposed that in order to ensure the security and strategic position of military facilities, it was proposed to relocate or completely clear the local population of important military areas.
In particular, when discussing the defensive layout of Lingding Island, the Soviet side suggested that all the inhabitants of the island should be moved away in order to eliminate the risk of security and espionage. This approach is based on the experience of the Soviet Union, which considers military security to take precedence over everything else, even if it means sacrificing the lives and interests of the population.
Peng Dehuai has a distinctly different view on this. At a military conference in 1953, Peng Dehuai mentioned that the eviction of residents not only ignored the importance of civil-military cooperation, but could also cause widespread social discontent and unrest.
In his opinion, the army should build good relations with the local population, using this relationship to strengthen the social base of national defense, and not simply perceive the population as a potential threat.
This difference reflects the difference in the fundamental concepts of the two countries in their treatment of civil-military relations. China's military strategy has long emphasized the "fish-water relationship," in which the military and the people are as inseparable as fish and water. This strategy argues that the population is an important part of the country's defense, and that one of the tasks of the military is to protect and support the well-being of the population, not to exclude them from the defense system.
Peng Dehuai stressed that taking into account the well-being and support of the people in the actual military layout can enhance the overall strength of national defense. For example, he proposed to carry out social and economic construction in border areas while strengthening border defense, so as to ensure that the local population can benefit directly or indirectly from national defense construction.
This not only helps to reduce social conflicts, but also increases the understanding and support of the population for the country's defense work. In addition, Peng Dehuai is particularly opposed to the mindset of treating people as obstacles in strategic decision-making. He argues that this model could lead to a gap between the government and the population, thereby weakening the country's internal cohesion in times of crisis.
On the contrary, by embracing and harnessing the power of the population, a stronger and more resilient defense system can be built. These views were further emphasized and expanded at the 1954 All-Army Political Work Conference.
At the meeting, Peng Dehuai proposed that the armed forces should act as the protector of the people rather than a ruler from above, and win the trust and support of the people through practical actions. He noted that the ultimate goal of the army is to serve the people, and any action that deviates from this goal is undesirable.
4. Misunderstanding of traditional tactics: the balance between offense and defense
In Peng Dehuai's many exchanges with Soviet advisers, a notable disagreement was about the application and importance of offensive and defensive tactics. Soviet advisers insisted that offense was the only effective means of winning the war, while Peng Dehuai believed that offense and defense should complement each other, and that over-emphasizing one side would lead to strategic imbalance.
Peng Dehuai, reflecting on China's experience in the long War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the Civil War, believes that flexible defensive tactics are the key to ensuring survival and ultimate victory when resources and technology are not superior. This differing understanding of offensive versus defensive tactics became even more evident in the 1954 discussion of military strategy.
In the discussion, Peng Dehuai cited the actual case of China in the Korean War, how to effectively deplete the opponent's strength and ultimately force the opponent to negotiate through flexible defense and mobile counterattacks under the overwhelming firepower superiority of the United Nations forces. He pointed out that if an effective defensive strategy is not adhered to, a simple offensive in that case will lead to huge losses.
In addition, Peng Dehuai criticized the Soviet military advisers for their contempt for defensive tactics. He made it clear that the choice of military operations should be based on the specific battlefield environment and actual conditions, rather than simply applying theory. He stressed that the goal of war is to protect the interests of the state and the population by any means necessary, and this includes the use of all available tactical methods, both offensive and defensive.
Peng Dehuai also mentioned that although the Soviet Union adopted a large number of offensive tactics in World War II, the Soviet army's successful defense in the early stage of the war, such as the Battle of Moscow and the Battle of Stalingrad, was the turning point, which fully demonstrated the value of flexible defensive tactics.
He used these historical examples to support his view that the balance between offense and defense should be considered in military strategy to adapt to changing battlefield conditions. These discussions were further expanded on at a high-level military-strategic conference in 1955.
Peng Dehuai pointed out at the meeting that for a country with a large population and a vast territory, such as China, the adoption of appropriate defensive tactics is not only a tactical need, but also a manifestation of strategic wisdom. Through the successful use of defensive tactics, it is possible to accumulate forces and timing for the offensive to implement strategic objectives more effectively.
5. The dilemma of dogmatism: the conflict between innovation and inheritance
In many discussions with Soviet advisers, Peng Dehuai frequently touched on the issue of dogmatism, especially on how to find a balance between following existing military doctrines and adapting to the realities of the new battlefield.
He recognized that the Soviet Union had rigorously standardized its military strategy in the latter part of World War II, and that this approach had in some cases led to a loss of flexibility, especially in the face of the specific circumstances of different countries and regions. At an important conference in 1954, Peng Dehuai specifically referred to the Soviet Union's over-reliance on preset models in its approach to military strategy.
He noted that Soviet advisers tended to promote a standardized set of military dogmas and expected other countries, including China, to accept those dogmas without modification. Peng Dehuai criticized this approach for ignoring each country's unique geographical, economic, and cultural background, all of which are critical to the development of military strategy.
This critique of dogmatism is not unfounded. For example, Peng Dehuai referred to the Soviet Union's experience in promoting its military models to Eastern European countries, emphasizing that Soviet models were not always perfectly adapted to the specific needs of those countries.
He believes that a country's military strategy must be adjusted and optimized according to its specific situation at home and abroad, and cannot simply be copied from one country to another. Peng Dehuai also stressed the importance of actual war experience in military theory. He believes that theory is a tool to guide practice, but it must be constantly updated and improved based on practical experience.
In numerous discussions with Soviet advisers, Peng often cited China's experience in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the War of Liberation to show how to incorporate these experiences into modern military strategy. This understanding of the relationship between innovation and inheritance was further elaborated at the 1955 All-Army Conference of Senior Cadres.
At the meeting, Peng Dehuai pointed out that military innovation should be based on a deep understanding of historical experience and combined with current scientific and technological progress and strategic needs. He opposed mere imitation and copying, and stressed the need to develop military theories and practices suited to China's own realities.
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Compiled by the Party History Research Office of the Jiangxi Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China. Historical data library of the Central Revolutionary Base Area Military system 12[M]. 2015