Wen|Mumu
Editor|Stargazing
Salt is a necessity in daily life, the so-called "family of ten, salt for ten people; A family of 100 people, a hundred people eating salt". During the Northern Song Dynasty, salt played the role of a tool for frontier strategy.
At the beginning of the Northern Song Dynasty, Taizu adopted a soft attitude towards the northwest, and the Xiazhou regime maintained a good relationship with the Northern Song Dynasty in non-aggression and mutual exchanges.
During Emperor Taizong's reign, a power crisis occurred when Li Jihuan succeeded Xiazhou as the envoy of the Dingjian army, and Emperor Taizong wanted to use this to bring the territory of Xiazhou under the jurisdiction of the Song Dynasty. This move was opposed by the party clan headed by Li Jiqian, and the two sides fought repeatedly for more than a decade.
Because the Xiazhou regime possessed the production areas of green and white salt, the "Fanbu" mostly exchanged green and white salt for grain with the people in Yan, Yan, Huan, Qing, Yi, Wei and other places along the border of the Northern Song Dynasty and Shaanxi, forming a salt grain barter channel.
In order to reduce the pressure on Li Jiqian and stabilize the northwestern frontier, after comprehensively considering the economic structure of Xiazhou and the livelihood needs of the "Fanbu", Zheng Wenbao, deputy envoy of Shaanxi Province, proposed economic sanctions measures of "banning salt and controlling summer".
The issue of green and white salt between Song and Xia has always been the concern of scholars. The Japanese scholar Miyazaki Ichisada first studied this issue, focusing on the Northern Song Dynasty's ban on green and white salt on raising the national consciousness of the party and establishing an independent regime.
It is believed that "the rise of Western Xia was the result of the Song banning the import of green and white salt, and the Song salt law also had a great influence on other foreign peoples." After that, the former Soviet scholar Kechanov sorted out the process of banning salt in the Northern Song Dynasty.
It is pointed out that while the Song Dynasty pursued political goals and banned salt, private trade on the border was not banned.
Mainland scholar Liao Longsheng believed that the Qingbai salt issue was "a factor affecting peace and war in the relationship between the Song and Xia Dynasties", and although the salt ban in the Northern Song Dynasty was not effective, it was always maintained for financial purposes.
In addition, Du Jianlu, Ma Shuqin, Han Yinsheng, Ren Changxing, Ye Kai, etc. all discussed the relationship between the fact of salt ban in the Northern Song Dynasty and the Song and Xia dynasties. The discussion of the Qingbai salt problem in other related works is basically similar to that of the above scholars, and it is not specifically discussed here.
On the whole, since Miyazaki put forward the view that the salt ban in the Northern Song Dynasty was an opportunity for the rise of Western Xia, other scholars have mostly conducted empirical research on the fact of the salt ban in the Northern Song Dynasty, and the salt ban policy itself has been less discussed.
This paper places salt ban in the research framework of frontier economic strategy, and analyzes the background, preset purpose and implementation dilemma of salt ban policy.
This is an examination of the difference in the effectiveness of the northwest and southwest regions of the Northern Song Dynasty. Furthermore, it deepened the understanding of the role of salt as a frontier economic tool in ancient Anbian.
First, the proposal and preset purpose of the strategy of "banning salt and summer" in the Northern Song Dynasty
"Banning salt and making summer" was an important summer strategy in the early Northern Song Dynasty. As far as can see, the Northern Song Dynasty implemented a salt ban a total of three times.
In the seventh year of Emperor Taizong's reign (982), Li Jihua succeeded the Dingyan army and did not receive the unanimous support of the clan, and there was a situation of "disrespectful fathers, and many clans disagreed".
Li Jihuan was unable to resolve the internal disputes of the clan, and in desperation, he expressed to the Song court that he was willing to stay in Beijing and sacrifice the prefecture and county under his administration. Emperor Taizong immediately "sent an envoy to Yixia Prefecture to escort him to Que and continue to eat in the county."
Li Jiqian's younger brother Li Jiqian did not obey the edict of the Song court and "rushed with dozens of his party into the land of the Song people" and raised the banner of resistance against the Song Dynasty. Since then, the Li clan of Xiazhou has been divided into two: one headed by Li Jihuan, with the Song Dynasty attached to it; One was headed by Li Jiqian, who resisted the Song Dynasty and stood on its own.
In July of the second year of Chunhua (991), Li Jiqian returned to obedience after many years of struggle with the Northern Song Dynasty, and the Northern Song Dynasty gave him favorable political treatment, "granting him the observer envoy of Yinzhou, giving him the surname of the country, and the name Baoji".
However, he "showed that he was obedient and loyal to him, luring the desolate and the barbarians to the side." At the end of the third year of Chunhua, in response to Li Jiqian's constant disturbance of the border, Zheng Wenbao, deputy envoy of Shaanxi Transport, proposed to "ban salt and make summer".
"Song Shi Zheng Wenbao" recorded: The north of the silver summer, thousands of miles are not hairy, but to sell green and white salt as a fate, please forbid it. Xu merchants sold two pools of salt from Anyi and Xie County in Shaanxi to help the people. The official gains his benefits, but he is in trouble, and the successor can be surrendered without a fight.
The premise of the "ban on salt and summer production" is the unity of the economic structure of the "Fanbu", "the Zhuqiang tribes have little arborism, but they use pond salt to trade grain and wheat with border people."
Zheng Wenbao, who had "crossed the dry sea from the Huanqing Department to the Spirit Martial Arts 12 times, knew the love of the Fanbu, and learned the language", had a certain understanding of the situation of the "Fanbu", and believed that the unity of the economic structure of the "Fanbu" could play an important role in the trapping of Li Jianqian.
From an economic point of view, the trade relationship between the Song and Xia dynasties is asymmetric.
Sima Guang of the Song Dynasty once pointed out: "The residence of Western Xia, the old soil of Qiang and Qiang, the one who produces the land, but the sheep and horse felt blanket." Its use in the country is inexhaustible, and it is bound to push the rest to trade with other countries. It is all Rong Di on three sides, and it is not for sale, but the Chinese, the sheep and horse felt carpet lose, and the tea department store comes from it. Therefore, its people are like babies, and China breastfeeds. ”
According to Du Jianlu's statistics, there were 8 items exported from Western Xia to the Northern Song Dynasty, and 16 items from the Northern Song Dynasty to Western Xia. The export items of Western Xia are mostly raw materials, and the export items of the Northern Song Dynasty are mostly finished products.
From the perspective of the types and quantities of goods traded by the Song and Xia dynasties, Western Xia had a strong dependence on the Northern Song Dynasty, and this asymmetric dependence could improve the success rate of Li Jiqian in the Northern Song Dynasty to a certain extent.
Therefore, Zheng Wenbao proposed to use economic sanctions to solve the problem of Li Jiqian disturbing the border. The core of the "ban on salt and summer" is that the Northern Song Dynasty had sufficient salt solution to supply the Yan, Yan, Huan, Qing, Yi, Wei and other places along the border of Shaanxi, so that the people who originally ate green and white salt changed to salt solution.
In this regard, Zheng Wenbao's measure was "Xu merchants selling two pools of salt from Anyi and Xie County in Shaanxi to help the people." Anyi Hehe County is rich in salt melting and is an important salt producing area in the Northern Song Dynasty.
"Song Shi Food Goods Lower III" recorded: "An Yi Chi planted 1,000 seats of salt per year, and the Xiechi minus 20 seats." ”
Due to the advancement of production technology, the salt solution is not only produced in huge quantities but also of high quality, in this regard, Tang Shenwei of the Song Dynasty pointed out in "Political Materia Medica": "The salt grown in the two ponds of Anyi, Xiezhou is the most exquisite." ”
Although salt production is abundant, the production and sale of salt solution is in the hands of the government. At the beginning of the Northern Song Dynasty, the government implemented a strict system of salt sales, supplemented by commerce, allowing merchants to sell on behalf of officials in designated areas.
Before Zheng Wenbao proposed that salt solution be sold in Shaanxi by trade, the Northern Song Dynasty twice implemented salt solution, but in the end, "it was said that merchants lost many abuses, because of it."
Second, the objectives of the strategy
When Zheng Wenbao proposed the "ban on salt and summer production", he presupposed two goals according to the actual situation of the Northern Song Dynasty: First, merchants would transport the salt solution to the border of Shaanxi for sale, in an effort to squeeze the green and white salt out of the Shaanxi salt market, so as to achieve the purpose of obtaining salt profits from the government.
The second is to let the people along the border of Shaanxi change their diet to salt solution, and no longer exchange grain and wheat for green and white salt, so as to achieve the purpose of making the Cheyenne border.
From the perspective of operating costs, as a policy tool, economic sanctions, war, and diplomatic negotiations are important means of settling disputes between countries, although the cost is higher than the cost of diplomatic pressure, but lower than the cost of starting a war.
Therefore, the economic cost to the sanctioning party is much lower than the economic cost of military strikes. Zheng Wenbao proposed the economic sanctions strategy of "banning salt and making summer", which met the needs of quiet politics in the late Taizong Dynasty.
During the Yongxi Northern Expedition, Song Qi pointed out: "Every time the ministers saw that the kingdom sent troops to the dynasty, they had already transferred people and transported grain in the counties of Lianghe, and they were in a commotion from far and near, and they were ten times more troublesome." ”
It can be seen that this kind of military operation with high economic costs did not realize Emperor Taizong's desire to restore the old Han and Tang dynasties.
After the failure of the Yongxi Northern Expedition, military defeatism gradually rose, Emperor Taizong's politics became increasingly conservative during the Chunhua years, and the military and political aspects of the Northern Song Dynasty took a major turn, and "guarding the inside and outside" became the basic national policy.
Emperor Taizong often preached to his subordinates the quiet politics of "doing everything by oneself so that there is no action, the way of doing nothing, and doing what you should do", advocating that "governing the country cares about Xiude, and the four Yi should be ignored".
The economic sanctions strategy proposed by Zheng Wenbao is in line with Emperor Taizong's mentality of "every discussion to raise troops, it is a last resort".
Therefore, Emperor Taizong issued an edict: "From the west of Shaanxi, those who dare to fight the green and white salt of the people in the private market will sit and die." In the second year of Zhidao (996), Zheng Wenbao once again proposed the "ban on salt and summer".
3. Documentation of documents
Regarding the specific content of the "salt ban on summer", the "History of Song" only mentions "repeat the salt ban". Climbing through the relevant historical materials can still outline the ins and outs of this salt ban.
According to the "Song Shi Zheng Wenbao Biography", it is recorded that the successor chief has a Song Luo Wei who knows the Russians, and Wen Bao lures him with gold, makes an offer with the handwriting, and keeps his adopted son as a hostage, so that Yin Tu will continue to move, that is, he will be sent. It is said: "When the matter is accomplished, the imperial court grants Ru to assassinate history." ”
Wenbao also pre-painted wood as a letter in preparation for the first step of succession. He also sent the ancient stele Shi Yi Qing Yuan Army to the Qing Yuan Army, and Tu Jigong. And Song Luo and others did everything to sue and relocate, and then moved to the table to plead guilty.
It can be seen from this that Zheng Wenbao contacted the Bo chief without authorization, and tried to use interests, covenants and official positions to induce the Bo chief to rebel and relocate. However, Zheng's character and insight of "good talk and strategy, taking merit as his own responsibility" and "having more than enough heart but insufficient knowledge" made him lack an accurate assessment of Li Jiqian's strength.
In fact, since Li Jiqian resisted the Song Dynasty, his strength gradually increased, and he migrated the people of Suizhou to Pingxia in the first month of the fifth year of Chunhua.
In order to prevent Xia Prefecture from falling into the hands of Li Jiqian, Emperor Taizong issued an edict in April: "With Xia Prefecture deep in the desert, the land where the traitor has stolen the stronghold, will move the city of Xia and its people to Yin and Sui." And Zheng Wenbao, when the odds of victory are uncertain, is ready to sacrifice and celebrate.
To his surprise, the chief informed Jiqian of his plot, and Jiqian directly reported the matter to Emperor Taizong, and retaliated by "attacking the Qingyuan army with a thousand horses". Faced with this situation, Zheng Wenbao was unable to deal with it, so he had to "repeat the ban on salt".
The direct purpose of this salt ban was to trap Li Jiqian, and the purpose of obtaining salt profits from officials was secondary, or even less proposed. In June of the third year of Zhenzong Xianping (1000), the Northern Song Dynasty implemented the "ban on salt and summer" for the third time.
The "Manuscript of the Song Meeting" recorded: "Since June of the third year of Xianping, green salt has been banned, salt has been released, and the 21st prefecture army Xu Ke Brigade in Hubei and Yan has entered COFCO grass to sell, and Xu Yu Nanlu Tang, Deng and other prefectures have sold goods." ”
The origin of the salt ban is not confirmed, and according to the analysis of relevant literature, the main reason should be that Li Jiqian frequently disturbed the border. In the third year of Dao, Li Ji moved to Song and repeatedly offended Song.
In June of the second year of Xianping, he attacked Li Fan, the commander of Hexi, invaded Linzhou in August, attacked Fuzhou in September, and invaded Yan'an in December. In the third year of Xianping, he attacked Tunling Prefecture and Hexi, lured the border people of the Northern Song Dynasty, and invaded Linzhou again in May.
Li Jiqian's intensive disturbance of the side is "with the intention of trying to take the Shuo Fang." Since the late period of Emperor Taizong, the negative mood of the supreme ruler's war-weary and scrupulous theft of peace has gradually become consistent with the courtiers' anti-war theories of cultivating virtue and cherishing the people and resting the army and the people.
The Northern Song government did not want to raise troops, so it had to ban salt again. In the first year of Jingde (1004), after Li Jiqian's death, the Northern Song Dynasty took the initiative to propose to Li Jiqian's son Li Deming to "ban green salt", but because Deming "only had his children to enter the pledge and Naling Prefecture, he also banned salt as before".
In April of the first year of Dazhong Xiangfu (1008), Zhang Chonggui of Yanyan Prefecture spoke: "Get Zhao Demingshu, please Xu City Qingyan." Shinzō once again reiterated the salt ban policy on the grounds that the oath received by Deming did not contain the matter of green salt.
Regarding the change in attitude of Zhenzong from the ban to the reinstatement, Liao Longsheng believed that it was related to the financial difficulties after the end of Jingde, because the Song court's fiscal revenue was directly related to salt relief, and the effective way to make up for the finance was to ban green and white salt and expand the sale of salt in Shaanxi.
He cited the figures cited in Qian Gongbo's "Production and Distribution System of Salt Relief in the Song Dynasty" as an example, pointing out that "the amount of salt produced by Xiechi, which was directly related to the fiscal revenue of the Song court, amounted to 43.5 million jin by the second year of the Dao, but the sales volume in the following year was only half of this." In the first year of the Jubilee, production was even more forced. Actually, this view is debatable.
First of all, salt production refers to the amount of salt production, which cannot be equated with sales, and salt production and sales cannot be confused when discussing the decline in fiscal revenue of the Northern Song Dynasty ("the sales volume of the following year is only half of this"). Second, the numbers are used incorrectly.
According to Guo Zhengzhong's research, the annual output of salt solution in the second year of Dao is 43,517,992.5 jin, the ninth year of Dazhong Xiangfu is 45111130 jin, and the end of the Jubilee is less than 43827300 jin.
Based on this comparison, compared with the salt production in the second year of the Dao (996) and the first year of the Tianxi (1017) mentioned by Mr. Liao Longsheng, it can be seen that the annual salt production of the Zhenzong dynasty remained basically stable.
The author believes that the reason for Zhenzong's change in attitude was more due to Li Deming's military campaign to capture the Ganzhou Uighurs, which threatened the bankruptcy of the Northern Song Dynasty's strategy of forming an alliance with the Ganzhou Uighurs to resist Western Xia.
At the beginning of the founding of the Northern Song Dynasty, the Ganzhou Uighurs maintained close relations with the Northern Song Dynasty, and the Ganzhou Uighur Khan "sent tribute to Jingqiong Jianlong in December of the second year, and since the Ganzhou Uighurs paid tribute horses, beautiful jade, corals, amber and the like".
After Li moved to resist the Song Dynasty, the Northern Song Dynasty began to unite forces around Western Xia to deal with Western Xia, and the Ganzhou Uighurs also needed Northern Song support to resist Western Xia invasion, and the two sides formed an alliance.
And Li Deming's action to take the Ganzhou Uighurs undoubtedly threatened the Northern Song Dynasty and the Ganzhou Uighur Alliance. Because the Northern Song Dynasty could not directly provide military support, Li Deming was only trapped by the ban on salt.
In addition, on the issue of "banning salt and summer control", Zhenzong once discussed with Li Jihe, who was familiar with Shaanxi's border affairs.
Li Jihe once pointed out that "the imperial court is more comfortable than forbidden green salt", "In fact, the Han land does not eat green salt, and the familiar households do not enter the Boyi world, and the forbidden people are not in vain food, and as for the dried things of the armor, its name is rich." In fact, what is relied on is stopped at green salt, and forbidden is self-pandatory. Hope to stick to the former edict for convenience. ”
The ban on salt could prevent grain, dried armor and other materials from flowing into Western Xia and strengthen its military strength. Therefore, Zhenzong's attitude change from opening the ban to resuming the ban was more out of support for the Ganzhou Uighurs to resist Western Xia.
To sum up, the origin of the Northern Song Dynasty's "ban on salt and summer" was that Western Xia invaded the northwestern frontier and the Northern Song Dynasty was difficult to solve by military means. The primary purpose of the salt ban was to trap Western Xia by means of economic sanctions and force it to be unable to disturb the border.
Due to the asymmetry of the Song-Xia trade relationship, the Northern Song Dynasty had sufficient salt solution to replace the green and white salt of Western Xia, but Western Xia had difficulty obtaining sufficient grain in other ways. Theoretically, the salt ban could economically trap Xixia to achieve the predetermined purpose of the Northern Song Dynasty.
Compared with the means of war, the "ban on salt and summer" is also in line with the realistic thinking of Emperor Taizong's late frontier.