Late one night in June 1982, the tranquility of Detroit, USA, was shattered by a tragedy. Chen Guoren, a 27-year-old Chinese young man, was brutally attacked by a white father and son at a bachelorette party that was supposed to be laughing, and finally died. Behind this murder, there are hidden grievances and wrestling between the two major automobile powers, the United States and Japan.
The killers claimed that their motive for attacking Chen Guoren was simply because he "looked Japanese." The father and son, who work in the American auto industry, vented their anger on the innocent Chen Guoren due to job insecurity and financial pressure. This case not only shocked the United States, but also triggered a deep reflection on racial discrimination and hate crimes.
Ever since Ford introduced the Model T, the automotive industry has been a source of pride for the United States. However, in the late '70s and early '80s, with the outbreak of the oil crisis and the rise of Japanese automobiles, the U.S. auto industry began to encounter unprecedented challenges. Japanese automobiles quickly took over the U.S. market due to their small size and fuel efficiency, resulting in a sharp decline in the market share of the three major U.S. automakers (General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler), unemployment of workers, and closure of dealers. The glory of the U.S. auto industry is no longer there, and the self-confidence of the people has also suffered.
Faced with the decline of the auto industry and the impact of unemployment, American society is filled with anger and fear. The public blames the "aggressiveness" of the Japanese auto industry, believing that Japan is stealing market share and jobs in the United States. Driven by this sentiment, anti-Japanese sentiment has spread in the United States, and calls for action in Japan have grown from the private sector to industry to the Diet.
In the face of growing anti-Japanese sentiment, President Carter chose to take a cold approach and tried to resolve the issue through diplomatic means. However, with the victory of Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan, the course of the U.S.-Japan auto industry war has changed. The Reagan administration was unequivocal in its support of restricting Japanese exports to the United States and established an auto task force to develop a concrete plan. Eventually, after weighing the pros and cons, the Reagan administration opted for the option of having Japan voluntarily limit exports to the United States (VER) in order to avoid a direct trade war.
Chen's death is not only a tragic event, but also a microcosm of the conflict and racial discrimination in the U.S.-Japan auto industry. This case reminds us that in the face of international competition and economic pressures, we should maintain a rational and tolerant mindset and avoid taking out hatred and discrimination on innocent people. At the same time, governments and enterprises should also strengthen cooperation and communication to jointly respond to challenges and crises and maintain the stability and prosperity of the global economy.
U.S.-Japan Auto Industry Negotiations: 52 Hours of Game and Choice
On March 19, 1981, a conference on the future of the U.S. and Japanese auto industry came to an end. President Reagan acted quickly, calling Secretary of State Haig and directing that a clear position be conveyed to Japan through the U.S. ambassador to Japan: Japan must voluntarily cut its auto exports to the U.S. or the U.S. will take tougher measures. This tough stance is undoubtedly a direct challenge to Japan, and it also indicates that the next tense and complicated negotiations will be inevitable.
After receiving this information, the Japanese side knew very well that there was no way out and could only choose to negotiate with the United States. To effectively advance the process, President Reagan appointed William Bullock, a hard-line trade negotiator. Bullock made no secret of his stance, making it clear that Japan would need to exercise restraint for three to four years to give the U.S. auto industry time to transform. He even used Volkswagen of Germany as an example to criticize the lack of enthusiasm of Japanese car companies to build factories in the United States, especially Toyota and Nissan.
In the face of the aggressive posture of the United States, the Japanese side reacted quickly. They sent foreign ministers, vice ministers of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and other high-ranking officials to Washington to mediate, and finally reached an agreement to resolve the car dispute between the two countries before Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiyuki Suzuki visits the United States.
On April 29, 1981, William Bullock set off for Tokyo, a trip to Japan filled with tension and unknown. Before leaving, he once again issued a warning to Japan: either Japan's auto exports to the United States will be voluntarily cut to 1.6 million units within two years, or the US Congress will legislate to set a cap of 1.6 million vehicles. However, Bullock clearly underestimated the difficulty of the negotiations.
In Japan, he faced an equally tough and difficult opponent – Minister of International Trade and Industry Rokusuke Tanaka. Rokusuke Tanaka is also under intense pressure at home, with Japanese businessmen demanding that the government not make too many concessions to appease Washington. From the very beginning, this negotiation was full of gunpowder.
On the first day of negotiations, Bullock tried to give the Japanese side a tough attitude, but Tanaka Rokusuke was unmoved, and he proposed a one-year, voluntary quota of 1.7 million vehicles. Although this proposal falls short of the expectations of the US side, it is already the biggest concession that Rokusuke Tanaka can give. However, Japanese auto giants such as Nissan President Takashi Ishihara have strongly opposed this, arguing that it is a huge sacrifice.
In the face of the persistence and hardline attitude of the Japanese side, Bullock found himself in a difficult situation. He began all kinds of coercion and inducement, and even did not hesitate to use Congress as a bargaining chip. But Rokusuke Tanaka always remained calm and determined, and did not let up. And just like that, Bullock left the negotiating table with frustration and frustration.
However, things took a turn for the worse the next day. Perhaps it was President Reagan's threats that began to take effect, and the Japanese side, which had been tough yesterday, finally made a concession: a voluntary quota of 1.68 million vehicles for a three-year period beginning in April 1981. It is then decided whether to extend it to the fourth year on a case-by-case basis. Upon hearing the news, a smile finally appeared on Brock's face.
On May 1, 1981, the Japanese government officially announced the news. Negotiators from both sides successfully resolved the car dispute before the two heads of state met. However, this victory was only temporary for the American auto industry. Rather than investing more short-term profits in R&D to enhance their competitiveness, they chose to acquire non-core businesses such as finance, aviation and computer companies to obtain more profits. This short-sighted behavior eventually led to the rapid decline of the U.S. auto industry after 1985.
At the same time, Japanese automakers have succeeded in recouping the loss of export quotas by increasing investment in the United States and localizing production, and doubling down on the cost of the U.S. auto industry. Not only have they achieved a larger share of the U.S. market, but they have also won the hearts of consumers through technological innovation and quality improvement.
Although the 52-hour negotiations have given the US auto industry a respite, it has also exposed their weakness and short-sightedness in the global auto industry competition. For Japanese automakers, they have demonstrated their strength and wisdom through this negotiation and laid a solid foundation for future development.
However, a decade later, a striking phenomenon has emerged: almost all major Japanese automakers, including Toyota, Nissan, and Mazda, have set up production lines in the United States to assemble cars. This strategic shift not only marks the deep penetration of the Japanese auto industry into the U.S. market, but also indicates a significant increase in its global competitiveness.
In this cross-border game of the automobile industry, Japanese automakers have not flinched due to temporary restrictions, but have entered the U.S. market with a more active attitude. They have not only increased their investment in the United States, but also launched a high-end battle through technological innovation and quality improvement. High-end brands such as Honda's Acura, Toyota's Lexus, and Nissan's Infiniti have been born one after another, becoming a popular choice for American consumers.
Now, 40 years have passed since the U.S. waged an automobile war against Japan. Surprisingly, instead of disappearing from the U.S. market, Japanese automakers have further increased their market share from 22% to 35% at a more steady pace. This achievement is not only a testament to the strength of the Japanese automotive industry, but also a reflection of its ability to adapt to market changes and continue to innovate.
Wall Street auto analysts have expressed their opinions on this result. They mocked: "Detroit persuaded Washington to restrict the import of Japanese automobiles, and it turned out to be a tragic victory!" The irony of this is self-evident, the so-called "victory" is actually only a temporary respite, and the real winners are those who can adapt to the trend of the times and continue to innovate.
As early as 1984, more than 60 American economists jointly expressed their opposition to trade protectionism to the governments of both parties. They point out that protectionism not only drives up domestic prices and weakens consumer purchasing power, but also hinders innovation and development in U.S. industry. As one economist put it, "If the U.S. auto industry is cut off from international trade, it can't function and prosper." This view is undoubtedly insightful today.
Japan's voluntary import quotas (VRs), which President Ronald Reagan and trade negotiator William Bullock were proud of, now seem more like a short-sighted decision. Although this policy has bought the U.S. auto industry some breathing time in the short term, in the long run, it has weakened the competitiveness and innovation ability of the U.S. auto industry. While Japanese automakers are gaining a foothold in the U.S. market and growing from strength to strength, the U.S. auto industry is struggling, with declining market share and declining innovation capabilities.
Therefore, this automobile war is indeed a contest of "winning for a time and losing for a lifetime" for the American auto industry. It reminds us that in the era of globalization, no country or business can be isolated from the world. Only by conforming to the trend of the times, continuous innovation and progress, can we be invincible in the fierce international competition.
Source: Internet
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