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In the international political arena in 1985, tensions in Southeast Asia reached a subtle climax. Le Duan, a staunch leader of the Vietnamese revolution, began to look for an external solution in the face of ongoing border conflicts and economic hardships at home.
He abruptly shifted tactics away from unilateralism and instead sought international mediation, hoping to ease tensions with China through external forces. Surprisingly, Le Duan chose India as a mediator and invited the then Prime Minister of India to mediate. In the face of this diplomatic move, how will Deng Xiaoping respond to this attempt at transnational mediation?
The cause of the Sino-Vietnamese border conflict
In Southeast Asia in 1978, geopolitical plates were destabilized by Vietnam's actions. The Vietnamese government at that time, with the full support of the Soviet Union, not only launched a military attack on Cambodia, but also tightened political and military control over Laos. This series of actions shows that Vietnam is trying to build a political alliance in the region that it will dominate, the "Indochinese Federation".
Vietnam's ambition not only sought to rewrite Cambodia's political landscape, but also profoundly affected the internal governance of Laos, causing great concern among neighboring countries. Against this background, China, as an important ally of these two countries, has issued a stern warning against Vietnam's aggressive behavior.
The Chinese government has repeatedly conveyed its grievances and warnings to Vietnam through diplomatic channels, demanding that it respect national sovereignty and regional political stability, and stop its interference in Cambodia and Laos. However, the Vietnamese government seems to have turned a deaf ear to this, and instead of reining in its aggressive behavior, it has further challenged China's bottom line on the border issue.
The actions of the Vietnamese army are becoming more and more arrogant. From time to time, they crossed the Sino-Cambodian border and invaded Chinese territory. During these military violations, the Vietnamese army not only illegally occupied a number of important places on Chinese territory, but also posed a direct threat to Chinese border guards.
What's more, Vietnamese troops shot Chinese border guards during clashes along the border, an act that greatly exacerbated tensions between the two countries. These incidents have been repeated, and there is growing evidence of the Vietnamese government's attempts to change the status quo along the border through military means.
In the face of Vietnam's series of provocations, China's response has gradually shifted from diplomatic warnings to military readiness. In the view of the Chinese government, clearer and more resolute measures must be taken to safeguard the territorial integrity and border security of the country.
The Chinese government and military began to strengthen military deployments in the border areas, improve the combat readiness of the border defense forces, and ensure that they can quickly respond to a possible military aggression by Vietnam.
The PLA's self-defense counterattack
On February 17, 1979, in the face of Vietnam's continued provocations and violations, China's Central Military Commission issued a decisive directive, ordering the PLA to carry out limited self-defense counterattacks. The action unfolded quickly. In accordance with the established plan, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) advanced into Vietnamese territory by three routes.
These three armies consisted of the eastern, middle, and western fronts, each with different strategic goals and tasks. The Eastern Front was mainly responsible for the offensive in the coastal zone to quickly cut off the sea supply lines of Vietnam and its main ally, the Soviet Union;
The Central Line Army took direct access to Vietnam's important military and political centers, including the capital Hanoi; The Western Front Army passed through the mountainous areas to carry out a roundabout outflanking, cutting off the connection between the north and the south of Vietnam, and forming a situation of encirclement.
During this operation, it is especially worth mentioning the strategy of the PLA against the Vietnamese city of Cao Binh. Located in the north of Vietnam, Cao Bang City is strategically important as a transportation hub in northern Vietnam and is of strategic importance for controlling the entire northern region. The PLA's strategy was to quickly encircle and occupy the city of Cao Bang as a breakthrough to penetrate further into Vietnam.
The PLA's offensive operations were swift and precise. From the beginning of the operation on February 17 to February 24, in less than a week, PLA troops successfully surrounded the city of Cao Binh. In the process, the Chinese armed forces have demonstrated extremely high combat effectiveness and outstanding command capabilities. Taking advantage of the terrain and night operations, they advanced quickly, reducing the reaction time of the enemy.
The 346th Division, the main force of the Vietnamese army, was quickly surrounded. The division's defense in the city of Gaoping was broken through by the PLA in one fell swoop. The PLA used a lot of artillery support and maneuver tactics in the encirclement of Cao Binh, which effectively weakened the Vietnamese army's ability to resist.
In the fierce battle, the 346th Division of the Vietnamese Army was under great pressure and finally failed to resist the offensive of the People's Liberation Army, which led to the complete breakthrough of the defense line in the city of Cao Binh.
China announced the withdrawal of its troops and continued to protect its borders
By March 5, 1979, with the fulfillment of the main strategic objectives of the People's Liberation Army in northern Vietnam, the Chinese government officially declared that the goal of the self-defense counterattack had been achieved. The announcement not only marked the end of the short-term military campaign, but also heralded the beginning of the orderly withdrawal of Chinese forces from their forces in Vietnam.
During the withdrawal process, the Chinese troops withdrew in batches in accordance with the established plan to ensure the orderly and safe withdrawal process. This operation requires precise coordination and execution to avoid unnecessary conflict during the evacuation process. However, despite China's apparent willingness to make peace, the Vietnamese side did not show corresponding restraint.
Taking advantage of the retreat of Chinese troops, Vietnam began a series of provocative actions along the Sino-Vietnamese border. Not only have they encroached on a number of border strongholds, but they have also built a large number of defenses in these areas. These actions are a clear attempt to change the status quo along the border and to strengthen de facto control over the border line.
In the face of this series of provocations by Vietnam, China has had to reconsider its border security strategy. In order to maintain the security and stability of the national border, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) began to plan and carry out a series of operational operations under the direct order of the Central Military Commission.
Although small in scale, these operations were highly targeted and tactical, and were designed to carry out precision strikes on illegal strongholds along the Vietnamese border in order to restore the original status quo of the border line.
Vietnam's internal woes and international response
During the ongoing conflict on the Sino-Vietnamese border, Vietnam's domestic economic and social conditions gradually deteriorated. The conflict has directly affected Vietnam's supplies and infrastructure, with many areas experiencing shortages and reduced productivity. In addition, as the war continued, many production facilities were destroyed, resulting in a significant reduction in production activities and severe impact on both industrial and agricultural production.
When China announced the withdrawal of its troops, it also decided to withdraw the large amount of aid it had previously provided to Vietnam. These include both military equipment and civilian goods such as food, medicine and other daily necessities. This action has exacerbated Vietnam's already strained material situation, with the living conditions of many ordinary people rapidly deteriorating.
Shortages of food and basic necessities have led to soaring prices, with the cost of living rising sharply for ordinary people without increasing incomes. Faced with an increasingly difficult domestic situation, the Vietnamese government is trying to find international support and solutions to avoid further internal instability.
Against this backdrop, Vietnam has tried to find a way to resolve the Sino-Vietnamese border issue through the intervention of a third country. Among them, Vietnam tried to enlist India as a mediator to intervene in the border conflict between China and Vietnam, and Vietnamese leader Le Duan euphemistically proposed to Rajiv Gandhi during the talks that India would intervene as a mediator to help resolve the border conflict between China and Vietnam.
The request was made during a formal bilateral meeting. During the talks, Le Duan and Gandhi discussed a number of bilateral relations and regional security issues. Speaking about the Sino-Vietnamese border issue, Le Duan expressed concern about the current state of conflict and expressed Vietnam's desire to resolve the dispute through peaceful means.
He noted that India is internationally neutral and has the capacity and influence to act as a mediator to help ease tensions. Gandhi expressed concern and promised that Vietnam's request would be considered. He said that India has always supported the peaceful settlement of international disputes and is willing to provide necessary assistance on the basis of respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both sides.
However, Gandhi also stressed that any mediation work requires the cooperation and sincerity of both China and Vietnam. After the news was transmitted back to Beijing, Deng Xiaoping carefully considered the news. After internal discussions, he instructed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to adopt a strategy of not responding proactively.
His instructions were clear: "There will be no response to the Indian side, Vietnam wants a truce, let them themselves, at least show sincerity." "Any negotiations on the border conflict must be conducted directly with the Vietnamese government, and Vietnam needs to show a genuine willingness to resolve the issue.
After learning that China had not reacted clearly to India's offer of mediation, Le Duan's government felt some diplomatic pressure. Vietnam had hoped to change the impasse in the border conflict through the involvement of a third party, but China's attitude complicates this plan.
In the weeks that followed, while there was discussion within the Vietnamese government about whether to move forward with India's plan as a mediator, the proposal was not put on the agenda again.
Changes and impacts on the regional situation
The year 1986 was a turning point in the history of Southeast Asia, with a significant impact on the political landscape of Vietnam and Cambodia in particular. The USSR, under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, began to change the direction of its foreign policy, especially in the tactics of dealing with international conflicts and intervening in the internal affairs of other countries.
Gorbachev's policy of new thinking emphasizes more on the settlement of international disputes through peaceful and diplomatic means than military involvement. This shift in Soviet policy was particularly evident in its handling of Cambodian affairs. For many years, the Soviet Union had been the main supporter of Vietnam's military involvement in Cambodia, providing substantial military and economic assistance.
However, the Soviet Union made it clear in 1986 that it would no longer intervene in Cambodia, a statement that undoubtedly put considerable diplomatic and military pressure on the Vietnamese government. Vietnam has lost an important backing to maintain its influence in Cambodia, forcing it to reassess its strategy in Cambodia and throughout Southeast Asia.
In addition, the year saw significant changes in Vietnam's domestic politics. Le Duan, an important leader of the Vietnamese revolution, died in that year, marking the end of an era in Vietnam's political scene. Le Duan, who had long been a central figure in power within the Communist Party of Vietnam, has entered a new phase of uncertainty in Vietnam's political situation.
At this critical moment, Nguyen Van Linh came to power as the general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, opening a new chapter in Vietnamese politics. Nguyen Van Linh was considered a pro-China figure within the Viet Cong, and his leadership style and foreign policy differed from his predecessor. After Nguyen Van Linh came to power, Vietnam began to seek to adjust and improve relations with its neighbors, especially with China.
He believes that in the context of rapid geopolitical changes, maintaining good relations with China is essential for Vietnam's security and development. Nguyen Van Linh's policy shift has had a positive impact on Sino-Vietnamese relations. Under his facilitation, China and Vietnam began to resolve long-standing border issues and other bilateral disputes through dialogue.
This improved relationship has laid the foundation for future cooperation between the two countries and has also created favorable conditions for regional stability and development.
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Resources:
[1] Huang Huilian. The criminal acts of the Le Duan group in Cambodia and Laos[J].Southeast Asian Studies,1980(1):92-96