This year is Bao Gangsheng's natal year, and the 48-year-old decided to do something "new". Starting from the evening of the Lantern Festival in the Year of the Dragon, he plans to spend a year in the form of a live video broadcast to guide the public to read dozens of Chinese and foreign classics in political science, social sciences and history. For each live broadcast, Bao Gangsheng spends most of the day preparing, with A4 printer paper full of content prompts, and books covered with yellow post-it notes for taking notes. He is so committed that he has higher ambitions. "Behind these books, they are concerned with the growth of modern civilization or modern society. China is an ancient country, and since the reform and opening up in 1978, the degree of modernization of our society has advanced rapidly, but it is still far from true modernity. The books I have guided are all related to the growth of modern political and economic civilization in terms of politics, economy, science and technology, and ideology. ”
Re-examine modern Chinese history from the perspective of domestic and foreign political history
CBN: In many historical narratives in the past, discussions about China's failures after encountering the West in the 19th century have focused on Britain's "strong ships and sharp guns" after the Industrial Revolution, with a strong military and a corrupt and backward Qing government. At the beginning of "The Fate of the Great Powers", you use a similar style to "The Fifteenth Year of Wanli" to make a panoramic sketch of the three representative powers in the early 19th century. After reading it, the biggest feeling is that at that time, Britain not only had the technological revolution that everyone knows, but also was far ahead in all aspects, so it had the ability to "reduce dimensionality" against the late Qing Dynasty and other traditional powers, is this so?
Bao Gangsheng: At that time, Britain was leading in all aspects, and the idea was not my first creation, and a group of political economists represented by Douglas North had systematically discussed it decades ago. In general, they all emphasized that Britain first had important changes in the political field, including the restraint of the king's power, the rule of law and the separation of powers and checks and balances, etc., which produced a very direct and important result in the economic field, that is, private property rights and market mechanisms were protected, and they would not be arbitrarily deprived of arbitrary power, and then wealth continued to accumulate, and finally led to the Industrial Revolution. North has repeatedly discussed similar views in his books such as Structure and Change in Economic History and Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance.
I have borrowed the views of this school of scholars, but I generally believe that the eventual success of a country in promoting the Industrial Revolution in a pre-modern society is a systems project, not that the Industrial Revolution will occur because a few inventors have the inspiration to improve the steam engine. I see the Industrial Revolution as the result of the evolution of the social system to a new stage, including the political, economic, and conceptual systems, all of which have undergone important revolutions, and we are fully prepared, and the emergence of the steam engine is only a kick in the door.
For example, in the introduction to The Fate of the Great Powers, I introduced the world of ideas in Britain at that time. In 1800, Edmund Burke's French Revolution was published for 10 years, Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations for 24 years, John Locke's Treatise on Government for 111 years, and Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan for 149 years. Through these works, we can roughly outline the basic conceptual characteristics of the English people in the political, economic, and legal fields from the mid-17th century to the end of the 18th century. Therefore, before the Industrial Revolution, Britain was different from other pre-modern societies, and even more different from the non-Western traditional powers mentioned in the book, including the Qing Dynasty, the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire, the Mughal Empire, etc.
CBN: What do you think are the key points that have been overlooked in the past when you re-look at China's modern history from the dual perspectives of international and domestic politics?
Bao Gangsheng: This question is not easy to answer, and the reason is that it is a complete change of perspective. In the past, our historical narrative was based on "I" and considered China to be special, so as to construct the historical and political narrative of 1840~1949. There are many tones in this kind of writing, including repeated defeats in wars and having to admit that we are backward, etc., and these narratives often have deep emotions, which is also completely understandable, because that is the path that our country has walked. Many other traditional or late-developing countries have had similar experiences and have written their history in this way.
It is important to note that the history that has already taken place, while immutable, still has an important impact on today. In addition to the direct influence of history itself, another important mechanism is that the same history can have different political effects through different interpretations.
The traditional powers often have unpleasant experiences in their dealings with the West, and this creates a dilemma: they have to learn from the West and hate the West because of its unpleasant history—there is a huge tension between the two. As a result, many traditional powers have produced two factions: one is the liberal idealists, who believe that in order to modernize the country, they must learn from the West; On the one hand, there are national realists, who feel that the West is hypocritical, colonial, and belligerent, with a greater emphasis on local identity.
In the polls of non-Western traditional powers, only India has the largest number of people who have a friendly attitude towards Western countries, and most of the other countries have a relatively negative mainstream view of the West, because the heavy historical burden of the past has not been completely dissipated today.
In my historical writing, I do not put strong national feelings into it, but use a more objective and neutral third-party perspective to re-understand the politics and history of non-Western traditional powers in modern times. I do not deliberately avoid the problems faced by the non-Western traditional powers themselves, such as the belief that their politics, economy, and concepts in the 19th century were all pre-modern and outdated, and they could not adapt to the new world after the Industrial Revolution; In fact, the West has "created" its own enemies in the process of its own rise and global expansion, and the subsequent costs are very large.
In short, I hope to transcend the nation-state identity of scholars in this research, and strive to achieve the "value neutrality" advocated by sociologist Max Weber, so that we can make new discoveries and contributions to knowledge, and provide ideas and results that are more meaningful to practice.
Globalization is deepening, and it is necessary to get rid of the victim mentality
CBN: As you mentioned earlier, non-Western traditional powers need to get rid of the victim mentality. How do you do that?
Bao Gangsheng: It is understandable that the victimization mentality that prevails among the non-Western traditional powers is because historically, the way they have engaged with the West has been the history of conflicts, wars, defeats, subjugations or colonization with Western powers. Taking China as an example, in the 19th century, there were two Opium Wars, the First Sino-Japanese War, and the Eight-Nation Coalition War. Further, at a specific historical moment when the country is in danger, this kind of psychology has a positive effect, just like what is written in our national anthem, "Rise up, those who do not want to be slaves", to inspire and mobilize the people, and encourage the nation to become self-reliant and self-reliant.
However, with the passage of time, if a country not only becomes independent, but also has experienced a long period of peace and development, or even has completed its rise, and becomes an important power in the international arena in the eyes of other countries, no matter how strong the victim mentality is, it will have a serious negative impact and even infinitely harmful.
First of all, if the historical memory of the people of a large country is quite dominant in hatred, hatred is more than peace, hatred is more than cooperation, and hatred is more than friendship, it will become very unfavorable in the era of globalization. Victim psychology is often associated with extreme or radical nationalism, which has historically had a serious negative impact both internally and externally. If a country is to grow into a real world power, it must recognize the problems that extreme or radical nationalism can bring, and be cautious about this phenomenon.
Second, if the strong victim mentality of a rising power manifests itself in some form, it will bring considerable anxiety to other countries, and they will develop a sense of insecurity and even fear, which may encourage them to take countermeasures, which will create an external environment that is very unfavorable to the development of the country.
So, as I said in The Fate of a Great Power, it is important what the past history is, but equally important is our narrative of history. In particular, in the context of deepening globalization, weakening and eliminating the psychology of victims can be conducive to national growth and national development in the long run. If a rising power cannot overcome the victim mentality, it will not be able to complete its true growth.
CBN: Especially in the Internet era, extreme words and deeds are easy to be infinitely amplified. On 9 June, after the results of the European Parliament elections were announced, there was a lot of international concern about the apparent rise of radical nationalist forces. In the era of self-media, how to deal with and respond to radical nationalism?
Bao Gangsheng: It's quite a challenge. First of all, as I mentioned earlier, radical nationalism has a very important function of political mobilization, and it is also a particularly convenient way of political mobilization, because nationalism naturally distinguishes people between self and other, which is also in line with people's intuitive instinct and political imagination. If the relationship between the country and the outside world is complicated, nationalism becomes an effective means of political mobilization of the country's political elite. Moreover, today's world is still composed of nation-states, and the relationship between major powers and the outside world is very complicated for various reasons, which is also an important reason why radical nationalism is not easy to eliminate.
How can the influence of radical nationalism be prevented or reduced? The most important thing is that a country has to define what kind of political relationship it has with the outside world. If a country is fundamentally antagonistic, hateful, or even conflictual with the outside world, radical nationalism is more likely to emerge at home. Radical nationalism is less likely to emerge if a country is fundamentally actively integrated into globalization, actively participating in a global network of mutual benefit and cooperation, or if it has no significant external adversaries or hostile states.
Becoming a global leader requires a three-pronged axe
Yicai: You analyzed the history of the United Kingdom and the United States becoming global leaders, and believed that it would take 50~100 years for the replacement of global leaders to complete. In the case of the United States, which had become the largest economy in the Western world in the late 19th century, did not completely replace Britain as the new global leader until after World War II. The United States also managed to avoid the "Thucydides Trap" in the process, and there was no war with Britain. Looking back at the history of the rise of the United States in the current world situation, what do you think is particularly worthy of reference for the rising non-Western powers?
Bao Gangsheng: Looking back on this period of history today, I am afraid that the first lesson is that in the process of the rise of the United States, the freedom, happiness and success of individual citizens are more important than the strength and status of the country. This has to do with the political tradition of the United States, which has historically had a relatively strong tradition of individualism and a long tradition of small government.
Between development and diplomacy, the United States attaches more importance to development, places internal development in the highest position, and does not take the initiative to actively seek and strive for the status of a great power. In his farewell speech in 1796, Founding President George Washington discussed American foreign policy and relations with Europe, saying, "Europe has a set of fundamental interests which have little to do with us." This is the foreign policy tone that Washington has left to the United States, that is, to develop its own country well.
Today we say that "a weak country has no diplomacy," but in fact the experience of the United States is different, and it is "a strong country without diplomacy." Before World War I, the United States was far ahead of European countries in terms of economic aggregate, but at that time it was not considered the most important power in the international system by Europe because the Americans did not actively engage in diplomacy and focused on developing themselves. The relatively moderate tone of foreign policy is one of the important characteristics of the rise of the United States.
Third, between economic development and military development, the United States has given priority to economic development. By the late 1870s, the United States had become the largest economy in the Western world, but at this time the U.S. navy and land forces were completely disproportionate to their economic status. Later, retired US Navy Colonel Alfred Mahan criticized the US Navy for not being able to fight any major naval battle in his "On Sea Power". This practice of the United States is not entirely "taoguang and obscurity" in the Chinese sense, but also the basic value orientation and strategic prudence in the process of rise. It is precisely because of this that the United States has not been involved in major disputes between major European countries for a long time. Thus, when the United States, as a major power, surpasses the United Kingdom, another major power, to become a true global leader, the United States can avoid a major conflict or war with the United Kingdom.
Yicai: Since Trump was elected president, the partisan struggle between the Democratic Party and the Republican Party in the United States has intensified, and many domestic self-media big Vs are very concerned about these and like to interpret that the United States is in decline. However, you argued in "The Fate of Great Powers" that the United States and the United Kingdom share three key elements to become global leaders, and believe that the United States is still the most likely country to maintain its status as a "global leader" for at least 10~20 years in the future.
Bao Gangsheng: In "The Fate of Great Powers", I argue that becoming a global leader requires "three axes": first, to become the most economically and technologically advanced country, especially to emphasize that this does not refer to the total amount, but to the concept of per capita; the second is to create a scalable order of human cooperation; Third, it is necessary to contribute to the new international order and international rules.
Indeed, America's lead has declined relative to both the end of World War II and the end of the Cold War. However, at present, no other country can challenge the United States in terms of strength, the per capita GDP of Chinese is only one-sixth to one-fifth of the United States, Germany, Japan, France, the United Kingdom and other major developed countries, the current per capita GDP is about 35,000 ~ 50,000 US dollars, and the United States per capita more than 70,000 US dollars There is also a large gap. In addition, there is still a considerable gap between these countries and the United States in terms of scale and comprehensive scientific research strength. In the book, I also made a simple calculation, assuming that an emerging rising country with a per capita GDP of $12,000 wants to catch up with the most developed country with a per capita GDP of $70,000 and an average annual growth rate of 2%, if the country's GDP growth rate is 8%, it will take about 30 years to catch up. If the growth rate is 6%, it will take 45 years; If it's 4%, it will take 90 years.
From China's point of view, there is a dream of catching up with the most developed countries, which is not only completely understandable, but also positive. But I want you to be fair about the current situation, and you need to be fair about the future. I do research and write books, at no time to satisfy the emotional value of readers or people, to tell everyone that everything is fine, and to provide emotional value should not be the job of social science.
My goal is to discuss the facts and the current situation, to discover the logic behind it, and to rationally assess what kind of road our country is going to take, how far or difficult this road may be, how it may be faster, and how to go will not only slow down, but even widen the gap. If a country wants to develop well, it should still follow those laws that have been repeatedly tested by historical experience. I think that I am truly responsible for history in such thoughts and practices.
Migrant workers and stay-at-home mothers are also listening to the live broadcast
CBN: Since this year, you have been doing live broadcasts of famous books every Saturday night. I was very impressed by the fact that during the interactive time of the first live broadcast on February 24, you asked everyone what they did, some said they were lawyers, some said they were middle school teachers, and some people said they were migrant workers and stay-at-home mothers. After the publication of your book Arrival: A History of Political Evolution last year, you said that more people are paying attention to political science than ever before. That night, how did you feel when you saw migrant workers and stay-at-home mothers also coming to listen to the live class?
Bao Gangsheng: Confucius has a concept called "education without class". For example, for a migrant worker, a lecture is the cost of mobile phone traffic, and if there is free WiFi in a factory or construction site, it is zero cost for him. Then, he could listen to a university professor talk about it for an hour at 9 p.m. every Saturday. Therefore, the communication effect of the Internet, especially self-media, was unimaginable in the past.
Since the opening of my WeChat video account, it has accumulated more than 15,000 followers, and each live broadcast has thousands to tens of thousands of cumulative online viewers. The professional team of Bilibili.com has refined my live broadcast replay video and cut it into 20~30 minute episodes, and the current number of views of each episode is generally 40,000 or 50,000 times, and the most popular episode has 170,000 plays, and the completion rate is 20%~30%. This means that I spend most of the day preparing for an hour-long live broadcast, and I can usually watch this knowledge video from the beginning to the end, which is a very meaningful and valuable thing for me.
Yicai: One day when I was listening to the live class, I suddenly realized that in the current environment of being very impetuous and many people have no patience to watch more brain-burning long videos, even if you are on a business trip in the field, you insist on live broadcast reading, in addition to trying to be easy to understand, never say words that attract attention and traffic, and just tell you about the books you have read. The person who does this must be an idealist, right?
Bao Gangsheng: Yes, I consider myself an idealist, otherwise I wouldn't have written these books and focused on these issues. I originally said something that is also my reference as a scholar. I said: Since China's reform and opening up, the group of scholars who have made the greatest contributions to this country are a small number of economists who advocated market economy in the 80s of the last century, and the two most representative are Professor Li Yining of Peking University and Professor Wu Jinglian, who graduated from the Department of Economics of Fudan University. At a time when the country was still a planned economy, they pointed out that the planned economy could not go on, and the market economy was the only way out. At that time, they faced a lot of social and political pressures, but through their own efforts, they partially influenced policies and pushed the country back on the right track of economic development. This group of scholars is remarkable, and they are scholars who really benefit the people of this land.
Today, history has marched to 2024. If we look back 10, 20, or 30 years, what can scholars do to play a positive role in improving the country's civilization and effective governance? This is a question that our generation of scholars should ponder. We must transcend the constraints of one time and one place, and insist on something that is more scientific, more benevolent, and more in line with the interests of the majority in the long run.
Bao Gangsheng Lecture Notes on Political Science
Bao just ascended
Nova Press gets the March 2024 edition of the book
Evolution: The New Reality of Western Politics
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CITIC Publishing Group, February 2024 edition
(This article is from Yicai)