IPP Commentary is the official WeChat platform of the Institute of Public Policy (IPP) of South China University of Technology, a national high-end think tank
Lead:
Recently, Professor Zheng Yongnian, Chairman of the Academic Committee of the Institute of Public Policy (IPP) of South China University of Technology, delivered an online speech entitled "Southeast Asia's Neighborhood Diplomacy with China" at the IPP "Peace and Future in Southeast Asia".
In his speech, Professor Zheng Yongnian said that the situation in Southeast Asia is deeply affected by the dynamics of the international geopolitical environment, and the trend of China-ASEAN relations is also guided by extraterritorial factors such as the United States.
He analyzed the current international environment from the macro, meso, and micro levels, and pointed out that China is facing risks at multiple levels, such as the rise of global populism, the United States' construction of an Asia-Pacific "mini-multilateral", negative narratives against China, and trade wars. Against this backdrop, "ASEAN will be China's most valuable diplomatic area for a long time to come." ”
"If China wants to become a maritime country, it cannot lose ASEAN; If China wants to promote economic development and modernization, it cannot lose ASEAN; If China wants to ensure geopolitical security, it cannot afford to lose ASEAN. ”
In his speech, Professor Zheng Yongnian shared his views on the evolution of the situation in Southeast Asia, and today I would like to discuss the general environment of China-ASEAN relations and China's neighborhood diplomacy from a broader perspective, including China, Japan, South Korea, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, Russia, the Middle East, South Asia, etc. After all, in today's world, it is difficult for China to separate diplomacy in one region from another.
I remember Napoleon saying: "China is the sleeping lion of the East, which will shock the world when it wakes up". After China "fell asleep", the whole modern history is a history of humiliation - the defeat of the two Opium Wars, and later the defeat of Japan, the "former student", after more than 100 years of war and revolution from 1840 to 1949, Chinese people finally stood up. Since the reform and opening up, China has achieved a rise after waking up. Now we must realize that China has become one of the geopolitical centers of gravity in the world. The next question needs to be considered: we are bullied after we "fall asleep"; After we wake up and rise, how can people contain, contain and even strangle us? From this perspective, ASEAN-China relations are particularly important. At present, China-ASEAN relations are strongly influenced by the broader international environment. In this regard, I think it can be viewed on three levels.
First, at the micro level, populist and nationalist forces are on the rise within countries. The internal affairs and diplomacy of a sovereign state are inseparable, just as the Prussian military strategist Clausewitz said, "diplomacy is an extension of internal affairs" and "war is another form of expression of politics."
The guests listened to Professor Zheng Yongnian's keynote speech
What is the internal affairs of each country in the world today? As the EU Parliamentary elections have shown, the world, whether it is the United States, Europe or even Latin America, whether it is the West, the East, the North or the South, regardless of whether it is developed or underdeveloped, regardless of the political system, the world is facing a situation of populism and nationalism. Although this situation is at the level of domestic affairs, scholars of international relations must not forget the lessons that have been repeated again and again in history.
In the European Parliament elections, the far-right National Rally won a historic victory. Source: Xinhua News Agency
Nationalism and populism are two sides of the same coin. Once the power of populism and nationalism is unleashed, it will have a long-term impact on the international political landscape. Populism and nationalism are related to the economic and social development of the country. It will take a long time for the political situation to dissolve and stabilize. We can recall the two world wars that led to populism before World War I and World War II; Further back we can see the rise of the socialist movement in Europe after the revolution of 1848. It should be noted that the populism mentioned here is not only the ideas of the right, but also the ideas of the left. The conflict between the left and right extremism in various countries can easily manifest itself in international politics. Second, the meso-level. At the national level, populist forces have begun to compete for power. Judging from the current EU Parliament elections, the rise to power of extremists and far-right factions is the trend of the times. If Trump comes to power again, then the formation of a "quasi-fascist regime" in the United States is a high probability event - Trump mentioned in his previous speech that he would "lock up" his political enemies and "people he doesn't like". These claims are the release of populist and fascist sentiments. As far as China is concerned, if political forces such as Pompeo and Bolming come to power, the United States is likely to pursue a "fascist" foreign policy toward China. In particular, Trump's presidency will affect European politics and lead to the emergence of more "quasi-fascist" regimes in Europe, just as fascist regimes came to power in many European countries before World War II. Of course, if Biden can continue to be in power, it will have a certain restraining effect on extremists, but we must also clearly see that his China policy will not be greatly improved.
In the first debate of the 2024 U.S. election, Biden and Trump both attacked each other on issues involving China, with Trump accusing China of "strangling" the U.S. with opioids and slamming Biden for inaction. Mr. Kissinger once said, "Nobody likes war, but war lasts." Everyone wanted to solve the domestic and international problems in other ways, but they couldn't solve them, and they ended up resorting to violence. The logic of international war and domestic violence is the same: many domestic things cannot be solved, so they resort to violence; In the international community, small and weak countries will resort to violence if they resist the big countries, and if the big countries cannot solve the problems of the small countries or solve the problems with other big countries, they will also resort to violence. Third, at the macro level, geopolitical polarization has formed a general trend. Polarization manifests itself not only at the economic level, but also at the political level and at the international geopolitical level. At the political level, Biden's Sino-US competition is the competition of "American democracy VS Chinese ideology"; At the economic level, the international trading system with the World Trade Organization (WTO) at its core has failed, and has been replaced by various "gangs" of trade agreements under the leadership of the United States. We have always said that the United States is "deglobalized," but in reality the United States is reshaping the international trade organization centered around it. Recently, the West has also been engaged in another discourse, that is, the so-called "China is shaping a China-centric global trading system through the Belt and Road Initiative". Is the global trading system "one world, two systems", as some have said? Although the jury is still out on this issue, we need to be careful now that the pace of China's decoupling from the United States and Europe is accelerating. In terms of geopolitics, the United States has spent a lot of energy to reshape geopolitics and established a number of exclusive alliances of "gangs and gangs" around China, which is a manifestation of the formation of "one world, two systems".
From the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework to AUKUS, the United States is trying to complete the "de-risking" of China in terms of supply chains, artificial intelligence, information and military technology. The forces at the micro, meso, and macro levels reinforce each other and are intensifying the reshaping of the world order. Against this backdrop, China's relationship with ASEAN is of profound significance. Judging from the recent trend, ASEAN countries' perception of China has improved considerably compared with that of the United States, which is actually the result of the interaction of these three factors.
These three dimensions also affect the relationship between China and ASEAN. In particular, the just-concluded Shangri-La Forum dialogue has many new and noteworthy points compared with previous years:
According to relevant reports, at the 21st Shangri-La Dialogue, US allies such as the Philippines, Australia, and Canada played up the China threat in the South China Sea and on the topic of "freedom of navigation".
First, both the United States and Europe are shifting their strategic focus to the Indo-Pacific region. The United States has shifted its strategic focus to East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region since the Obama era, and in recent years, the United States has adjusted the geopolitical and economic framework of the Indo-Pacific region in order to achieve this strategic goal. Unexpectedly, Europe's geopolitical center of gravity has also shifted to the Indo-Pacific and Asia-Pacific regions. The Shangri-La Dialogue, originally a dialogue on Asia-Pacific security, has almost become a transatlantic security concern.
It can be seen from Biden's interview with the media some time ago that the United States has a very clear grasp of the process of the Russian-Ukrainian war, including how many shells are used every day and how many soldiers are sacrificed. Why is Russia not now "going to lose soon", as the West believes? Now the United States and Europe have been engaged in cognitive warfare, that is, to "kidnap" China and Russia together. Although this "kidnapping" has existed since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, now, the West is beginning to attribute the reason for the inability to defeat Russia to China. Senior U.S. officials have been shaping the discourse that "it is precisely because of China's exports of dual-use products to Russia that the Russia-Ukraine war can continue." Although the United States and Europe themselves are trading energy and other things with Russia, China is seen as the most important supporting force for Russia in its war of attrition.
We cannot underestimate this cognitive warfare. Europe, whether in the media, in the diplomatic or strategic circles, is now venting all its complaints and hatred on China, believing that China is now the source of Russia's protracted war. This has affected not only the relationship between China and the West, but also the relationship between China and ASEAN.
In the Q&A session, the participating experts and scholars had a lively discussion on the prospects of China-ASEAN relations, and I believe that from any perspective, ASEAN is China's most valuable diplomatic field for a long time to come. Let's look at Northeast Asia. Japan and South Korea are already completely "lying flat" because their security system is part of the US security system. They have already decided to continue to follow the United States diplomatically.
Our relations with Russia are still good. However, the two countries have their own strategic considerations, and we must pay attention to the situation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the decision-making trends of Russia in all aspects. If Russia adjusts itself, and China has not had time to adjust, then we will be in a very passive situation.
I note that on the day of the commemoration of the Normandy landings in the West, Putin also held a meeting for several hours. Judging by the wording, Putin actually wants to adjust this war. In any case, Russia is still part of the West - from the time of Tsarist Russia, Russia's only goal was to become a "Western country". In fact, the relationship between Russia and the West is not the same as the relationship between Russia and the West as we know it, and it is not so antagonistic. When the West rejects Russia, Russia is anti-Western; When the West accepts it, it is too late for Russia to rejoice. From Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union to Boris Yeltsin in Russia to the early President Putin, they were all very pro-Western.
Russian Sputnik News Agency previously reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin said that Russia is willing to continue negotiations with Ukraine, but the premise of returning to negotiations is that it cannot be "divorced from the reality of the current battlefield". We must pay attention to the adjustment of Russia's attitude towards the West around this Russia-Ukraine war. Especially after the United States sees China as its sole competitor, the United States will reconsider Russia. For the West and the United States, the goal of diplomacy with Russia is to "stop Russia from causing trouble." In the end, it is likely that when Putin has achieved part of his goal, and the West has also achieved part of it, they will be able to compromise. If we don't understand this clearly and continue the previous policies, then we will be in a very passive situation.
In relations between China and Central Asia, the SCO plays an important role. But China-Central Asia interaction based on the SCO is more focused on the security dimension. Economic considerations, while present, are not large. In China's thousands of years of history, it has been difficult for China's foreign policy in the northwest frontier to achieve a major transformation of development-oriented. Also keep in mind that the rise of Turkey will put a lot of pressure on our Northwest Frontier.
Looking at South Asia, India is now ambitious. We must pay attention to the development of Sino-Indian relations. In modern times, the so-called "India", a modern nation-state, was not fought for by itself, but given by the British. At the beginning of India's founding, the parties led by Gandhi and Nehru were all family parties, and now Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party has developed from a regional party to a national party, and we must not underestimate him. Ideologically, Modi's Hindu nationalism is a combination of "Hindu nationalism" and "anti-Chinese nationalism." Because there is a great risk of "Hindu nationalism" at home, Modi will resort to "anti-Chinese nationalism" at every turn to strengthen the legitimacy of his rule.
Modi continues to bolster his Hindu nationalist agenda, which has attracted large numbers of voters but also sowed fears of religious conflict. At the same time, the case in India also reflects that the transition of political parties in post-developing countries tends to be dominated by nation-states. I think India's pressure on China is not due to India's role in the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, but to India's rise as a result of India's internal institutional transformation. China and India are two major countries bordering each other, and China is still defensive, so it is difficult for India to have an expansive and development-oriented diplomatic space. So, ASEAN is very important for China. If China wants to become a maritime country, it cannot lose ASEAN; If China wants to promote economic development and modernization, it cannot lose ASEAN; If China wants to ensure geopolitical security, it cannot afford to lose ASEAN.
On the whole, our policies towards ASEAN over the past few years have been relatively successful. Previously, Pompeo visited Southeast Asia and mobilized Southeast Asian countries to follow the United States. Still, ASEAN made a collective decision not to take sides between China and the United States. On the one hand, ASEAN maintains a security relationship with the United States, and on the other hand, it develops economic and trade relations with China. This is very beneficial to China. China has also adopted the right foreign policy toward ASEAN. When the United States forced ASEAN to choose sides, China adopted "inclusive multilateralism" and "open multilateralism", which provided a precondition for ASEAN countries to remain neutral.
But judging from this year's Shangri-La Dialogue, when the United States and Europe shift their strategic focus from India to Southeast Asia, what kind of pressure will ASEAN this platform encounter? How should we view China's relationship with ASEAN from an ASEAN perspective? How to solve the South China Sea issue, continue in the previous way, or do we have to change the way of thinking? Is the economic and trade relationship between China and ASEAN sufficient through the mechanism of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area Version 3.0?
The audience at the meeting actively asked questions
I think there are political, economic, and social aspects that need to be considered. We have also recently conducted research on the construction of a China-ASEAN common market, and found that in fact, in the current situation of the trade war between the United States and Europe, version 3.0 of the China-ASEAN free trade area mechanism is not enough to unleash the vitality of the China-ASEAN bilateral economy.
What should the research community do? I don't think we have enough research with ASEAN. Now "regional country studies" have become a first-level discipline, but the focus of regional country studies should go beyond language. Optical language is difficult to study ASEAN. We need to study ASEAN from the perspective of social sciences.
Another factor in ASEAN is the Chinese. The vast majority of overseas Chinese in China are in ASEAN countries, but the Chinese can be both a link between us and a trap for us to make mistakes in diplomacy. The relationship between the Chinese people and the motherland is very complex, and it cannot be clearly explained in a single word, but should be considered from a more complex perspective. Let's not think that if there are Chinese people in Southeast Asia, diplomacy can be carried out as we envisioned.
On Petaling Street in Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Malaysia, local overseas Chinese held a lion dance to celebrate the Lantern Festival. Source: Xinhua News Agency hopes that our new generation of researchers will conduct research on China and Southeast Asia from the perspective of international politics. Looking at China-ASEAN relations from the perspective of China-ASEAN relations, it is no longer possible to analyze the essence of the problem. It is necessary to look at the relationship between China and ASEAN from various aspects such as global geopolitics, the reshaping of the economic and trade system, and the ideological struggle, so as to get closer to the economic and political reality of Southeast Asia. It will also help us to develop a more effective foreign policy. Thank you. The content of the article is based on Professor Zheng Yongnian's speech, and the content has been deleted.
Manuscript arrangement|Liu Shen
Content Approval|Guo Hai
Typesetting|Zhou Haokai
IPP Symposium on "Peace and the Future of Southeast Asia" was successfully concluded
IPP Interview|Zheng Yongnian: The Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China will play a "reassuring pill" role
Zheng Yongnian: China does not choose any country, but only the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence for 70 years
About IPP
The Institute of Public Policy (IPP) of South China University of Technology is an independent, non-profit research platform for knowledge innovation and public policy. IPP has carried out a series of research work on China's institutional reform, social policy, China's discourse power and international relations, and on this basis, a good pattern of coordinated development of knowledge innovation and policy consultation has been formed. IPP's vision is to build an open platform for knowledge innovation and policy research, and to become a world-leading Chinese think tank.