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"Cultivating the Soviet Union as an Adversary": The Historical Lessons of American Industrial Proliferation, Awakening China | Cultural horizontal

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"Cultivating the Soviet Union as an Adversary": The Historical Lessons of American Industrial Proliferation, Awakening China | Cultural horizontal

The new issue of "Cultural Vertical" will be released in June 2024, click on the picture above or the lower left corner at the end of the article to read the original article, check the submission email: [email protected], "Cultural Vertical", postal code: 80-942

✪ Yan Peng

Research Center for Chinese Industrial Culture, Institute of Modern Chinese History, Central China Normal University

After the U.S. trade war with China and the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the global industrial chain has once again entered a period of transfer and reconstruction, which is an important opportunity to reflect on the injustice of the last round of global order and promote a "new type of globalization". However, the transfer and reconstruction of the global industrial chain is unlikely to be smooth. In the last round of globalization, the United States' major global industrial chain helped the United States establish global hegemony, but it also planted the root cause of decay. For China, it is necessary to think about "how to ensure China's national economic security while promoting the lofty ideals of Concord Wanbang", and must have a clear understanding of the transfer and restructuring of the global industrial chain, and make a strategic layout.

This paper provides an important reference for answering this strategic question. The transfer and reconstruction of the industrial chain is manifested in industrial diffusion and catch-up at the micro level. As pointed out in this article, a country's industrial development is constrained by natural resources, geopolitical situation, and national size. This not only makes it difficult to stop the process of industrial diffusion brought about by the international division of production and cooperation; On the other hand, it will also affect the likelihood and extent of cooperation and competition between countries, and thus the consequences of industrial diffusion.

What are the consequences of industrial proliferation? This article dissects this by looking back at history. At the beginning of the 20 th century, the United States took the initiative to carry out large-scale technology diffusion to the Soviet Union, helped the Soviet Union establish heavy industry, and provided indispensable conditions for the Soviet Union to establish a complete industrial system. Although this has practical interests in absorbing domestic excess capacity during the Great Depression, it is a historical lesson if we look at the position of the United States during the Cold War. After World War II, in order to maintain its hegemony, the United States chose to open its domestic market and export its production capacity. As a result of this round of industrial diffusion, the United States cultivated economic rivals for itself and sowed the bane of industrial decay. History tells us that, on the one hand, the history of industry is full of lessons about the backlash of industrial diffusion countries; On the other hand, with the interweaving of market and geopolitical factors, it is not advisable to forcibly stop the proliferation of industry.

Therefore, this paper points out that China should implement "strategic diffusion" to reconcile the ideals and realities of the new global order. Specifically, first, due to the uneven distribution of natural resources, industrial diffusion still has economic advantages and should be encouraged. Second, from the perspective of the geopolitical situation, newly industrialized countries should carry out a certain degree of diffusion of the industrial sectors of resource countries, especially the light industry sector that involves people's livelihood needs, help resource countries establish industries that can bring other jobs in addition to the extractive industries, and carry out extensive publicity; For the domestic light industry, we should take advantage of the situation and help it climb to the high end of the value chain. Third, it is necessary to take into account the size of the country in the issue of industrial proliferation and carefully select proliferation targets. On the one hand, we should be cautious about the proliferation of military or dual-use industries, and on the other hand, we should select friendly countries that cannot pose a military threat in the long run, and limit them to countries of moderate size.

As a leader in the current new global order, China must carefully assess which countries and which industries to spread, and think about how to manage relevant strategic risks while improving the social wealth and value chain ranking of partner countries, so as to open up new strategic space for the common development of the global economy.

This article was originally published in the 3rd issue of Culture in 2024, with the original title of "Strategic Industrial Diffusion: The Bottom-line Thinking of China's Participation in the Reconstruction of the Global Industrial Chain".

Strategic Industrial Diffusion: The Bottom-Line Thinking of China's Participation in the Restructuring of the Global Industrial Chain

The transfer of industrial chain and the reconstruction of supply chain have been the focus of global issues in recent years. Behind all the noise, the sectoral decline in U.S. manufacturing and the efforts of successive U.S. administrations to revive it are a structural driving force, from "offshoring" to "friendly shoring" as geopolitical shifts reshape the global economic geography. As a result, these questions all point to the diffusion of industry and its different impacts. As a post-developing country and a global industrial power, China is not only a recipient of industrial diffusion, but also faced with the choice of whether to spread outward. Industrial diffusion and industrial catch-up are the eternal themes of industrial history, which are full of lessons from the backlash of industrial diffusion countries. However, with the intertwining of market and geopolitical factors, forcibly preventing industrial proliferation can also have negative consequences. Perhaps, for the countries in the sandwich layer, selectively carrying out industrial diffusion with a cautious attitude is an effective harmony between the real national economic security and the lofty ideals of the concordant nations. Choosing within the constraints of limited resources is an essential attribute of strategy, so the idea in this paper can be called "strategic industrial diffusion". In a certain sense, the history of China's industrialization is mainly a kind of strategic industrialization, and after going through the stage of strategic cultivation, strategic diffusion is also a problem that must be faced sooner or later.

▍The Return of Geography: The Power of Constraint Industry

Industrial diffusion takes place in concrete space, a kind of reconstruction of economic geography. The end of history at the end of the twentieth century was, in a sense, a kind of geographical end, because the most popular slogan of globalization at the time was "the world is flat". However, for specific countries, regions and industries, the world is not flat, and the reconstruction of economic geography means the redistribution of interests. It is only because specific interests have increased and decreased in different regions that industrial diffusion has become an issue worth discussing. Based on the importance of geography, it is necessary to highlight some of the structural forces that constrain industrial development before reviewing the history of industrial diffusion, which are natural resources, geopolitical situation and national size.

Industrial development is constrained by natural resources, although technology and markets often give modern people the illusion that such constraints are irrelevant. The importance of natural resources to industry has changed with the development of technology. In a sense, the Industrial Revolution is breaking the shackles of natural resources on human economic activities. For example, from the late 19th century to the early 20th century, the development of synthetic dyes almost destroyed the natural dye industry in countries such as India. However, the substitution of artefacts for natural raw materials is not always successful. In addition to raw materials, energy also makes industry inseparable from natural resources. The Industrial Revolution was essentially a power revolution, but it was based on natural non-renewable resources such as coal and oil. In the 21st century, the new energy industry is trying to break free from the shackles of fossil fuels with new technological paths, but the importance of metal resources such as lithium has become more prominent.

At a time when technological breakthroughs could not completely free modern industry from the constraints of natural resources, market transactions gave modern people another kind of confidence, making people think that they could buy resources at any time if they had money, and the developed industrialized countries happened to be rich countries with money. However, this idea fails to take into account the concentration of certain scarce resources in a small number of countries, whose substantial monopoly position enables them to increase the cost burden of industrial countries by raising the price of resources, which is not trivial for industrial countries that compete with each other in the global market. In fact, when the cost of raw materials and energy is too high, industry may move away under the influence of market mechanisms. This is what is happening in Europe after the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2022. Moreover, the world is not flat precisely because history has not ended, and political factors such as wars and blockades may have prevented industrial countries from accessing the natural resources they lack through normal market transactions. This was deeply felt in Germany during the First World War, and it was also true in Japan before the Pacific War. Until today in the 21st century, the disruption of global supply chains, while not entirely directed at inter-state trade in natural resources, has at least demonstrated the fragility of the trading system. Thus, the constraints of the geographical distribution of natural resources on industry have not disappeared as a result of technological progress and the globalization of markets.

Given the uneven distribution of natural resources, where to allocate the resources needed in the country and how to repatriate them are important issues for every country. The geopolitical situation is therefore very important. The first is the issue of pure economic cost. Under the premise of a certain price of natural resources, the distance and the convenience of transportation methods will affect the buyer's decision. Distance depends on the location between countries and is a political geographical factor, on the basis of which the convenience of transportation mode is limited by physical geographical conditions. Second, as mentioned earlier, the political relationship between countries will largely determine whether and how resource deals can be made in the end. Seeking the near and far is often economically damaging, but it is a choice made after comprehensive consideration of politics, military and security. Thus, the possibility of a country's industry to acquire natural resources on a global scale is limited by a geography that is politically divided and dominated.

The geospatial variable of country size is also important in terms of both industry and natural resources. In the 21st century, geographers in Japan, a country with small resources, still say, "All in all, it is the countries with large land areas that are strong." "This sensitivity to resources and space may not be easily perceived by residents of large countries. A large land area does not mean that natural resources are evenly distributed, but from the perspective of resource security, it still has greater confidence. In addition, it is easier for a large country in the geographical sense to build a comprehensive industrial system and make the industrial system the basis for the projection of military power. After World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union were able to influence the world pattern, while the old European powers such as Britain and France could not mobilize equal resources and had to take a back seat, which was a huge change in the 20th century compared with the 19th century. Of course, the size of a country includes not only the size of the country, but also the number of people, the types of resources and reserves, and the combined effect of these factors determines a country's industrial and military potential. Obviously, a large land area does not necessarily mean that there are many natural resources, but a small land area is destined to have a variety of natural resources, and the dependence and passivity in geopolitics will be greater.

The significance of natural resources, geopolitical situation and country size for industrial diffusion lies in the fact that they can influence the consequences of industrial diffusion by influencing the likelihood and extent of cooperation and competition between countries. As for the consequences of industrial diffusion, it is necessary to look back at history.

▍Diffusion and catch-up: the eternal theme of industrial history

Diffusion and catch-up are the eternal themes of industrial history. Although it is constrained by resources and energy, the most prominent attribute of industry is reflected in its knowledge and technology. It is with knowledge and technology that some countries and regions with scarce raw materials can develop strong manufacturing industries, while some countries and regions with abundant resources can only rely on the export of raw materials to make a living. Learning and creating new knowledge and technology is the driving force for industrial development, and it is also an inherent mechanism that must be included in the geographical transfer of industry. This kind of geographical transfer is a kind of diffusion. It may be initiated by industrially advanced countries and regions, which is common in the outbound investment of multinational enterprises. If it is an industrially backward country or region that takes the initiative to learn knowledge and technology, it also involves catching up. The diffusion and catch-up of industry will reshape the pattern of interests, and the adjustment of interests is often accompanied by contradictions and conflicts.

As early as before the Industrial Revolution, there was a proliferation and catch-up in the manufacturing industry with manual production as the labor method. In the era of handicrafts, the tools and products that were easy to imitate were easy to proliferate, and once there were more craftsmen who mastered the technology, the industry also spread. However, technologies related to military security or market monopolies often take a long time to spread. Due to the secrecy of the craftsmen's unique skills and the fact that such techniques can only be passed down by word of mouth, it is not surprising that some techniques have been lost. The legend that the Byzantine Empire obtained silkworm seeds from China to establish a silk industry, whether true or not, reflects the thirst for catch-up in technologically backward regions. And this obvious act of industrial espionage also shows the less pleasant side of industrial proliferation. David Hume described the concerns of the British in the time of James I about the exodus of manufacturing technology: "Shipbuilding and cannon making were what the British excelled. They seem to have mastered the mysteries of the latter, so much so that every session of Parliament complains about the export of British weapons. However, this does not prevent the UK from actively importing technology from abroad.

After the industrial revolution in Britain in the middle of the 18th century, the British were well aware of the value of new technologies and banned the export of machinery, which can be regarded as a very clear curband of industrial proliferation. From the perspective of military self-sufficiency and economic self-reliance, some elites in the United States, a former colony of British independence, advocated the cultivation of manufacturing by policy means, which can be said to be a clear goal of industrial catch-up. Alexander Hamilton, the founding Treasury secretary of the United States, and his assistant Tench Coxe threw out a classic report on the development of manufacturing, in which Cox's vision was desirable for industrial espionage of British advanced technology. In fact, the development of the American textile industry is also due to the fact that British craftsmen went to the United States and drew the blueprint of the machine in their minds to imitate. The British Empire was unable to curb industrial proliferation by policy means.

The early machines were relatively simple, and only one craftsman could master their structure and principles, which made it possible for the industry to catch up at that time without excessive intellectual and technical barriers, which was also an important condition for the first industrial revolution to spread to the world in the mid-19th century. However, in this wave of industrial diffusion brought about by the demonstration effect of advanced countries, whether the catch-up can successfully establish its own industrial base depends on its own ability. This capability includes both the ability of the catch-up to create a macro environment conducive to industrialization and, at the micro level, the ability of firms in backward countries to learn and transfer new knowledge. In terms of the latter point, it is quite revealing to compare the outcome of Chinese Western-style enterprises in the 19th century with their Japanese counterparts. The dependence of some of China's foreign military enterprises on foreigners hired from abroad continued until the 30s of the 20th century, while Japanese related enterprises such as Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipbuilding Co., Ltd. consciously and step-by-step replaced foreign technical instructors with domestic engineers in the late 19th century, which led to the fact that in 1937, the military production capacity of China and Japan was completely different. Industrial diffusion is not an easy task, and not all countries and regions can undertake the transfer of new technologies and industries.

U.S. industry rose to prominence in the 19th century with an expanding domestic market, and in the 20th century it grew its presence in the global market. On the one hand, before World War II, the U.S. industry's ability to produce on a large scale made Western European industry feel threatened, prompting some Western European companies to take countermeasures. On the other hand, American industry almost voluntarily carried out a large-scale technological diffusion to the Soviet Union, accelerating the industrialization of its future Cold War rivals. Naturally, the industrial diffusion of the Soviet Union by the United States was not motivated by good intentions, but on the contrary, it carried a practical calculation of the calculus of the absorption of domestic excess capacity during the Great Depression, as was done by some European countries, including Nazi Germany. In the Second World War, the United States' industrial and military-technical assistance to the Soviet Union was also motivated by the strategic needs of the anti-fascist alliance. With the benefit of hindsight, some Americans in the Cold War would have regretted the industrial proliferation of the Soviet Union. Before 1945, however, many American businessmen and dignitaries did not see any problem with the transfer of technology and industry to the Soviet Union. On April 27, 1938, the U.S. Department of State issued a reply to E. Bliss in response to the letter of E. Bliss. W. Bliss) in its letter proposing to provide the Soviet Union with "a complete set of ammunition for the production of light weapons and ammunition, including the necessary machinery and all operational information", stated that the above proposal was not contrary to the policy of the United States, as long as it did not involve military secrets. When an American enterprise provided technical assistance to a Soviet plant for the production of nitrocellulose, the US Department of Defense specifically emphasized in a letter that the assistance would become an "extremely important military asset" for the Soviet Union, but the project was approved. In the case of dual-use machine tools, an American company reorganized a factory near Moscow and built a large refining and metal foundry in the same way as American production lines. The company also brought Soviet engineers to the United States to work in the design, drafting, planning and procurement of equipment.

The reason why the transfer of technology from the United States to the Soviet Union is called industrial diffusion is that it is larger and more systematic than ordinary technical cooperation, and at the same time it has helped the Soviet Union lay the foundation of related industries. For example, the Stalingrad Tractor Factory, built in 1929, was built by 80 American manufacturers and assembled by 570 Americans and 80 Germans in Stalingrad, and the building was also contracted by American companies. The Soviet press praised the American specialists for "not only consulting, but also practical supervision of the entire construction and related operations." This is known as a "turnkey project". The Stalingrad Tractor Plant is one of the largest in Europe, with a design plan for an annual production capacity of 50,000 tractors, capable of converting to tanks in wartime. The United States was equivalent of moving the entire production line to the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union established an industry from it. According to statistics, in 1929~1945 there were about 200 technical assistance agreements with foreign enterprises in the USSR that were being implemented. In terms of sectors, in 1930 the Soviet Union implemented about 84 technical assistance agreements with American and German enterprises, 37 in the metallurgical sector, 25 in the chemical sector, 13 in the electric power sector, and only 5 in the textile sector. It can be seen from this that the industrial diffusion of the United States and other countries to the Soviet Union was mainly to help the Soviet Union establish the capital goods sector, that is, heavy industry, which was the basis of the military industry. In other words, the industrial diffusion of the United States to the Soviet Union was strategic at the sectoral level and provided the indispensable conditions for the Soviet Union to establish a complete industrial system. From the standpoint of the United States during the Cold War, its industrial proliferation of the Soviet Union is a historical lesson.

It is worth mentioning that at the beginning of the Cold War, the Soviet Union carried out the most successful industrial diffusion of the newly established People's Republic of China in history, that is, 156 key projects that laid the foundation of China's industrial system. The basic task of the first five-year plan of the new China is to "concentrate the main forces on industrial construction centered on the 156 construction units designed by the Soviet Union with the help of the mainland, and composed of 694 construction units above the quota, so as to establish the initial foundation for the socialist industrialization of the mainland." A total of 150 of the 156 key projects were actually implemented, of which 147 were started during the "First Five-Year Plan" period, and the overall situation is shown in Table 1. Similar to the situation in the Soviet Union before it, this industrial diffusion laid the foundation for the establishment of a complete industrial system in China. Unlike the profit-seeking motives of American corporations, the Soviet Union's industrial diffusion into China was based more on the idealism of aiding socialist allies. However, it is undeniable that in the context of the Korean War, the Soviet Union's move also had strategic considerations, and while the Soviet Union spread heavy industry and military industry to China, China also exported agricultural products and resources to the Soviet Union to balance trade. However, on the whole, in terms of the scale, intensity, and especially effectiveness of this industrial diffusion, the idealistic brilliance of the 156 key projects exceeds the actual calculation of interests. The fact that Chinese industry was able to compress the 200-year-old industrial development process of the capitalist powers in a few decades and quickly catch up should be thanks to the industrial diffusion of China by the Soviet Union. Of course, the success of this industrial diffusion is also inseparable from the political and economic system created by the new China, which is different from the pre-1949 system, which can fully mobilize resources to overcome the resistance of industrialization and train a large number of technicians and workers with the ability to learn independently.

"Cultivating the Soviet Union as an Adversary": The Historical Lessons of American Industrial Proliferation, Awakening China | Cultural horizontal

The industrial diffusion of the United States to the Soviet Union before 1945 was of the nature of an export of capital. After the Second World War, as the United States became the hegemon of the capitalist world system, it could no longer adhere to the protectionist tradition, but needed to open its domestic market and export production capacity to maintain the entire hegemonic system. In this sense, American hegemony is more assertive than British hegemony in the early days of the Industrial Revolution. At this time, however, the pattern of industrial development began to change as a result of globalization. In the 19th century and even earlier, the main mode of industrial development of a country was to manufacture at home and then sell goods to various places. However, the development of transportation and communication technology after World War II overcame geographical resistance, and capital could break down the original complete manufacturing process into different links, and then place different links where the factor cost was lowest. This is the rise of multinational corporations in the modern sense. Based on the simple principle of comparative advantage, American multinationals have kept their headquarters and R&D at home, while moving production abroad. Since production is the main part of industry, such a specialized division of labor has actually contributed to the diffusion of industry. At the very least, some post-developing countries and regions, or later so-called emerging markets, have built physical factories and manufactured products in their own countries with the help of this strategy of American capital. From the perspective of transnational capital, the world has indeed flattened out as a result.

However, when the United States began this industrial diffusion led by multinational corporations, its manufacturing industry occupied an unrivaled position in the world, and as this industrial diffusion deepened, the United States cultivated economic rivals for itself, which in turn weakened the competitiveness of local manufacturing. In addition, this industrial diffusion has led to a redistribution of benefits within the United States, with local workers suffering from the flow of production abroad while transnational capital has profited. It may not be a big problem if these American workers who have been squeezed out of manufacturing can find jobs in the service sector with comparable benefits, but in reality, career adjustment is not as smooth as the theory suggests. Concerned about national security are also concerned that industrial proliferation could lead to an outflow of military technology or weaken the U.S. military's production capacity. While maintaining American hegemony, Robert Girpin expressed concern about industrial proliferation, saying: "While I am not opposed to foreign investment and multinational corporations in principle, I have great doubts and concerns about the continued heavy reliance of the United States on foreign direct investment as a way to deal with foreign competition, earn foreign exchange, and solve domestic economic problems." He argues that "industrial diffusion has a significant impact on the relative distribution of power in the international system" and that "outward investment benefits the owners of capital (rentiers and transnational corporations), but does not necessarily have no costs to labour and the industrial status of the core", with the result that "outward investment ultimately distributes the international distribution of power to its advantage". Commenting on Gilpin's views will lead to different conclusions from different standpoints, but the decline of domestic manufacturing in the United States and its negative impact on military production has been a fact that has been repeatedly discussed in the United States in the 21st century.

On the whole, industrial history is intertwined with diffusion and catch-up, but the so-called diffusion has different forms and contents. The large-scale, deliberate, systematic diffusion led by the industrially advanced countries took place only in the twentieth century, motivated either by economic gain, by a temporary expediency to help military allies, or by a lofty idealism of concern for all mankind. All of these industrial diffusions have succeeded in helping some countries achieve or accelerate industrial catch-up. For the United States, the lessons of industrial proliferation may outweigh the benefits. The industrial proliferation of the Soviet Union before World War II created a formidable strategic and military adversary for the United States during the Cold War. The post-World War II industrial diffusion led by U.S. multinationals did not help any country build a complete industrial system, but it also moved key links in some key industries, such as semiconductor manufacturing, overseas, cultivating economic rivals and eroding domestic industrial and military capabilities. The history of industrial diffusion provides a necessary reference for thinking about the prospects of this issue.

▍Strategic diffusion: the coordination of reality and ideals

Looking back at history, it can be seen that the large-scale diffusion of a country's industry on its own initiative is still a new phenomenon in the short modern industrial history of mankind. This kind of industrial diffusion is driven by realistic motives, and it may also make the proliferating countries taste the bitter fruits of reality, but they are only governed by practical motives, and they also contain practical constraints that cannot be done. In addition, in addition to the industrial diffusion dominated by real economic interests, there are more idealistic cases of industrial diffusion in history, which exist as a special phenomenon in a special historical era. Therefore, if we consider industrial diffusion from a strategic perspective, we should follow the principle of pursuing advantages and avoiding disadvantages, and carry out some coordination between reality and ideals, so as to reduce the pressure of reality and avoid possible backlash, and make industrial diffusion conform to the morality of building a higher-level human social community. The prospect of this issue may be discussed in the context of geographical and historical factors.

First of all, the imbalance in the distribution of natural resources determines that industrial countries must cooperate with resource countries, and in today's modern industrial system, which is already more complex, this cooperation will inevitably bring more knowledge and technology diffusion than in the 19th century, and form a more complex industrial chain system in resource countries outside of a single extractive industry. Michael Klare pointed out that the main mineral resources that underpinned global economic growth after World War II are facing systematic depletion, and the remaining new mineral deposits are extremely difficult to mine and require more advanced development technologies to obtain. In order to develop these new deposits, industrialized countries need to focus on technological innovation while taking into account the problems of equipment renewal and on-site maintenance, so that the cost of development is not too high. The creation of some kind of industrial base in the resource country would help to reduce costs. The logic of this industrial diffusion is not new, but since the construction of relevant infrastructure is inevitably greater than the exploitation of easily exploitable mineral deposits, the knowledge and technology that spreads to resource countries are likely to lead to a more complex industrial chain. For industrial countries, this industrial diffusion is to be encouraged. In fact, the industrial countries have exchanged the proliferation of certain links in the heavy chemical industry for the exploitation and utilization of natural resources.

Second, from the perspective of the geopolitical situation, in an era when an industrial country cannot use the gunboat policy to control the resource country, the cooperation between the industrial country and the resource country will inevitably include a certain industrial diffusion of the industrial country to the resource country. Such proliferation is not only moral, but also a political condition that is necessary for cooperation to be successfully achieved. The world today is a strange spectacle in which politicians in the old imperialist countries use Marxism and other left-wing discourse to accuse the newly industrialized countries of exploiting the resource countries, and the elites of these resource countries also use this rhetoric to bargain with the newly industrialized countries to achieve their own domestic political goals. This bargaining includes mobilizing their own populations to destroy the mineral bases invested by the newly industrialized countries. In such a situation, in addition to investing in and exploiting the mineral deposits of the resource countries, the newly industrialized countries should carry out a certain degree of diffusion in other industrial sectors, especially the light industry sectors that are related to the needs of the people's livelihood, and help the resource countries to establish industries that can bring other jobs in addition to the extractive industries, and carry out extensive publicity, which is conducive to occupying the moral high ground and countering all kinds of groundless accusations. In the 21st century, this is a truly idealistic and internationalist enterprise. In fact, if the proliferation of light industry can create more jobs and raise the overall income level of the people in the resource countries, then the investment of the newly industrialized countries in the mineral resources of the resource countries can also bring about a more stable social environment and help the newly industrialized countries export more technologically complex manufacturing products. After all, the poorest countries lack the purchasing power and demand for complex industrial goods. Although this kind of industrial diffusion will impact the light industry of the newly industrialized countries themselves, under the effect of globalization, the industrial transfer of the light industry of the newly industrialized countries to more developed countries is not a new phenomenon in itself. The newly industrialized countries, which were originally employed in light industry or labor-intensive manufacturing, have shifted to other sectors in large numbers under the general trend of intelligent manufacturing, which is also the general trend.

Finally, the size of the country is considered in the issue of industrial proliferation because this variable is closely related to military security. Judging from the historical record, only those countries with large land areas, large populations, and historical backgrounds have been able to establish a relatively complete industrial system after accepting large-scale industrial diffusion, and transform this industrial system into military capabilities, which in turn will harm those countries that have taken the initiative to carry out industrial diffusion, either economically or strategically. This means that, if there is a strategic industrial diffusion, its strategy will be primarily reflected in the careful selection of proliferation targets. On the one hand, it is necessary to prudently spread the military industry or dual-use industry; On the other hand, the target country of proliferation should not only be a friendly country in reality, but also a country that cannot pose a military threat in the long run. From these two principles, it is most advantageous to limit industrial diffusion to countries of moderate size. Obviously, it is much more difficult for a country to establish complex industrial sectors and a complete industrial system today than in the second half of the 20 th century, and some small countries are unable to undertake the proliferation of military industries and even dual-use industries from the perspective of technological capabilities and domestic economic needs, and even if they establish their own military industrial systems, it is also difficult for them to truly challenge the big countries. However, this is not the case with certain territorial and populous countries with regional and even global hegemonic ambitions. For example, Bangladesh in South Asia is a more suitable target for industrial diffusion. Since the 90s of the 20th century, the country has undertaken the transfer of the industrial chain of labor-intensive manufacturing industries such as the garment industry, and has maintained rapid growth, reducing the country's poor population. The diffusion of industries that benefit people's livelihood and help them improve their infrastructure to such a country is in fact an idealistic cause of international poverty alleviation and poverty alleviation, and it will not bring about a military threat that will change the pattern of regional and global power distribution. Therefore, if newly industrialized countries want to carry out industrial diffusion, they must conduct a detailed assessment and analysis of the industries and technologies that are being difused, as well as the countries that are the target of the diffusion. Otherwise, I am afraid that the lessons of history will repeat themselves.

This article was originally published in the third issue of Culture in 2024 and was originally titled "Strategic Industrial Diffusion: Bottom-line Thinking for China's Participation in the Reconstruction of the Global Industrial Chain". The article represents the author's views only and is for readers' reference.

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